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This dissertation examines the attacks on the Three Kong Sites (Confucius Temple, 
Confucius Mansion, Confucius Cemetery) in Confucius’s birthplace Qufu, Shandong 
Province at the start of the Cultural Revolution. During the height of the campaign 
against the Four Olds in August 1966, Qufu’s local Red Guards attempted to raid the 
Three Kong Sites but failed. In November 1966, Beijing Red Guards came to Qufu 
and succeeded in attacking the Three Kong Sites and leveling Confucius’s tomb. In 
January 1967, Qufu peasants thoroughly plundered the Confucius Cemetery for 
buried treasures. This case study takes into consideration all related participants and 
circumstances and explores the complicated events that interwove dictatorship with 
anarchy, physical violence with ideological abuse, party conspiracy with mass 
mobilization, cultural destruction with revolutionary indoctrination, ideological 
vandalism with acquisitive vandalism, and state violence with popular violence. This 
study argues that the violence against the Three Kong Sites was not a typical episode 
  
of the campaign against the Four Olds with outside Red Guards as the principal actors 
but a complex process involving multiple players, intraparty strife, Red Guard 
factionalism, bureaucratic plight, peasant opportunism, social ecology, and ever-
evolving state-society relations. This study also maintains that Qufu locals’ initial 
protection of the Three Kong Sites and resistance to the Red Guards were driven 
more by their bureaucratic obligations and self-interest rather than by their pride in 
their cultural heritage.  Finally, this study introduces the concept of “Qufu 
exceptionalism,” namely, the unassailability and invulnerability of Confucius’s 
birthplace throughout Chinese history, and provides the reasons why Qufu 
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In 479 B.C., Confucius died a humble man and a disappointed philosopher. 
When he was laid to rest, “Rome was an infant in arms, Socrates was not yet born, 
and Greece had not attained the Golden Age of Pericles.”1 After his death, however, 
his status rose sharply. With the passage of time, his philosophy became the state 
creed; his birthplace became China’s holy land; his descendants gained unsurpassed 
imperial patronage and local power; and his influence spread across China and 
beyond. Even the United States House of Representatives passed House Resolution 
784 on September 29, 2009, “honoring the 2,560th anniversary of the birth of 
Confucius and recognizing his invaluable contributions to philosophy and social and 
political thought.”2
As honorary titles were posthumously piled on Confucius, Master Kong, as 
Confucius has been known to the Chinese, was resting peacefully in his plain grave at 
his birthplace Qufu, Shandong Province. But his long peace came to a violent end at 
the outbreak of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). During the 
height of the campaign against the Four Olds (old culture, old ideas, old customs, old 
habits) in August 1966, Red Guards from his birthplace made repeated attempts to 
attack Qufu’s Three Kong Sites (Confucius Temple, Confucius Mansion, Confucius 
Cemetery).  With support from local peasants, Qufu authorities initially repelled the 
attacks, but Red Guards kept coming. On November 9, 1966, over 200 Red Guards 
from the Beijing Normal University (BNU) descended on Qufu, raided the Three 
 
                                               
1 Walter K. Fisher, “A pilgrimage to the Home of Confucius” The Scientific Monthly 4 (1917): 487. 
2 United States House of Representatives, “H.Res.784 Honoring the 2,560th anniversary of the birth of 
Confucius and recognizing his invaluable contributions to philosophy and social and political thought” 




Kong Sites and dug up Confucius’s grave. After the departure of the Beijing Red 
Guards, Qufu peasants plundered the Confucius Cemetery for buried treasures and 
ignored every attempt by the Red Guards to stop them. In a mere blip of history, 
seventy-four percent of the material representation of Qufu’s history and culture was 
obliterated from its map.3
Several questions arise: First, what was so special about the Three Kong Sites 
that motivated both the local and Beijing’s Red Guards to attack them and local 
officials to protect them?  How did the symbolic significance of the Three Kong Sites 
contribute to the mobilization of the Red Guards and the legitimation of their 
mission? And what was the relationship between the physical destruction of those 
sites and the consolidation of Mao’s ideological and moral control and dominance? 
Next, how did the radical leaders, such as members of Mao’s inner circle, manage to 
circumvent the rigid party and bureaucratic hierarchy to mobilize the Red Guards for 
the Qufu mission? What were the organizational links between the radical leaders and 
the Red Guards? What was the radical leaders’ mechanism of manipulation? 
Moreover, since the local peasants ended up pillaging the Confucius Cemetery that 
they once fiercely defended and the Red Guards eventually defended the Confucius 
Cemetery that they once relentlessly attacked, what led to the changing roles of the 
attackers and defenders? What does it tell us about the volatility and complexity of 
the Cultural Revolution?  Furthermore, why did the Qufu peasants, with one in five of 
them as a descendant of Confucius, so thoroughly and indiscriminately plunder the 
sacred burial grounds of their own ancestors and forefathers? Last, but not least, why 
 
                                               
3 Ya Zi and Liang Zi, Kongfu da jienan [Great calamity of the Confucius Mansion] (Hong Kong: 




did such horrific violence take place in the bedrock of the Chinese culture that 
“condemns violence” and “seeks harmony over all other values”?4
Research on the Qufu violence is sparse and, in some cases, dated or 
inaccurate. In his History in Three Keys, a multidimensional study of the Boxer 
Rebellion, Paul Cohen introduces the notion that there are three keys to history: 
events as narrated or explained by historians; experience as lived, remembered and 
recounted by participants; and myth as created by mythologizers who draw on history 
to “serve the political, ideological, rhetorical, and/or emotional needs of the present.”
  How does the 
peaceful community of Qufu reconcile itself to such extraordinary violence? The 
purpose of this study is to establish the relevant facts and answer these questions.  
5 
Existing publications about the Qufu violence generally fall into these three 
categories as well. The Qufu violence as narrated and recounted by historians and 
researchers is generally characterized as a typical episode of the campaign against the 
Four Olds and the most egregious example of cultural destruction during the Cultural 
Revolution.6 The blame is usually put on the Red Guards leaders. Little or no 
information is provided about the backers of the Red Guards in the Central Cultural 
Revolution Group (CCRG) who engineered the Qufu mission.7
                                               
4 Jonathan N. Lipman and Stevan Harrell, ed., Violence in China: Essays in Culture and 
Counterculture (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1990), 1. 
 Nor is there any 
5 Paul Cohen, History in Three Keys: The Boxer as Event, Experience, and Myth, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1997), 290-293. 213.  
6 Roderick Macfarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, Mao’s Last Revolution  (Cambridge, Mass: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006). 119-120; Yan Jiaqi & Gao Gao, Turbulent Decade, 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1996), 89. 
7 CCRG was the staff headquarters of the Cultural Revolution under the direct leadership of Mao and 
served as the de facto ruling body of China and the headquarters for the Red Guards. Its director was 
Chen Boda and its deputy director was Mao’s wife Jiang Qing. CCRG was the driving force of the 




discussion of the locally initiated violence or analysis of the broad social basis and 
historical context of the Qufu violence. 
The Qufu violence as remembered and recounted by participants primarily 
comes from the English translation of some excerpts of a Chinese source titled Great 
Calamity in the Confucius Mansion. As such, some details and recounts of the 
participants in the Qufu violence are provided, but no information or analysis of the 
massive peasant-initiated tomb-robbing mania is included in the translated essay.8 On 
the other hand, the Qufu violence as myth has been visible in both academic and 
general publications. It is mostly reflected in two areas. The Chinese government has 
ascribed the Qufu violence to the Red Guards, CCRG, and the Gang of Four, which 
fits the government’s master narrative on the causes and villains of the Cultural 
Revolution that usually eschews the role of Mao Zedong.9 Another myth about the 
Qufu violence is the role of premier Zhou Enlai. Zhou, who has often been viewed as 
the patron saint of the Chinese culture by both scholars and the general public alike, is 
erroneously described as having attempted to stop the Red Guards violence in Qufu 
and succeeded in ordering them back to Beijing.10
The most significant time period covered in this study extends from late 
August 1966 to early January 1967. However, other related time periods, during 
which Confucianism and the Three Kong Sites evolved, are also included to provide 
 
                                               
8 Thomas A. Wilson, On Sacred Grounds: Culture, Society, Politics, and the Formation of the Cult of 
Confucius (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Asia Center, 2002), 34-35; 
9 Li Shi Di Shen Pan [Trials by History]. “Li Shi Di Shen Pan” Bian Ji Zu Bian. Beijing: Qun Zhong 
Chu Ban She Xin Hua Shu Dian Beijing Fa Xing Suo Fa Xing, 1981.  
10 Fan Xiaoping, Zhongguo Kongmiao [Confucius Temples in China], (Chengdu: Sichuan wen yi chu 




the necessary backdrop and context for this study, including Confucius’s lifetime, 
imperial China, republican China, and the first seventeen years of the PRC. 
The method of this study is decidedly that of narrative history. Not only is a 
good narrative the bedrock of history, but a brief chronicle of the evolution of 
Confucianism and the Three Kong Sites, as well as a step-by-step account of the 
events leading to Beijing Red Guards’ Qufu mission are essential for the 
understanding of the entire Qufu saga. Likewise, a detailed account of the highly fluid 
and complex attacks on the Three Kong Sites by both the outside radicals and local 
Red Guards and peasants are critical for deconstructing the Qufu events as well. 
However, within the chronological framework, some developments will be treated 
topically, such as various aspects of the tomb-robbing mania.  This is also a study of 
political, social, and cultural history, and as such adopts a multidisciplinary approach, 
whereby perspectives and analytical frameworks of several disciplines are employed, 
where appropriate.  
The types of sources used in this study include: (1) official and unofficial 
publications, (2) Chinese and English sources, (3) sources published before, during, 
and after the Cultural Revolution, (4) unpublished sources, such as former Red 
Guards’ confessions, diaries, or internal party documents, and (5) sources in various 
formats, including textual, oral, electronic, and pictorial sources.  
This study relies heavily on three important sources. The first two are primary 
sources and the third one contains a significant amount of primary sources. The first 
one, The Chinese Cultural Revolution Database, provides a wealth of primary 




Battlefield Report (Tao Kong zhanbao), a Red Guard newspaper launched by the 
Beijing Red Guards and exclusively devoted to the 1966-1967 anti-Confucian 
campaign in Qufu. It provides the most detailed, if propagandistic, information about 
the events in Qufu from its first issue published on November 10, 1966 to its last 
issue published on August 10, 1967. The third important source, titled The Great 
Calamity in the Confucius Mansion, is a Chinese source by two indigenous Chinese 
writers who are also Qufu natives. 11
My two field trips to Qufu in 2007 and 2009 also generated valuable sources 
for this study. I studied both the general Qufu community and the Three Kong Sites, 
where I traced Red Guards’ footsteps, taking pictures and collecting footage of all 
related locations and monuments. I also interviewed former peasant tomb-robbers, a 
staff member of the Confucius Cemetery during the anti-Confucian campaign, former 
Red Guards, peasants from the pre-communist era, scholars and researchers from 
Qufu Teachers University, and many descendants of Confucius and residents of Qufu 
from all walks of life. The photos, footage, and transcripts from the tours and 
 Taking advantage of their unique access to 
internal government documents, Qufu local archives, and confessions of former Red 
Guards that remain unavailable to the public today, the authors carefully chronicled 
Red Guard attacks on the Three Kong Sites in great detail. They also interviewed 
many important players in the campaign concerning their specific roles during the 
campaign as well as their reflections on their participation in the campaign years later. 
The only caveat about this book is its genre: it is a popular work written in reportage 
style and provides limited documentation. 
                                               




interviews proved to be invaluable for my research and are employed, where 
appropriate, in this dissertation.  
The focus of this dissertation is the Red Guards attacks on the Three Kong 
Sites in late August and November of 1966 and the height of the tomb-robbing mania 
in January 1967. Additional damage was done to the Three Kong Sites by various 
entities and polities in the months and years following the events covered in this 
study, but it is not part of this study. The much better known campaign against Lin 
Biao and Confucius (1973-1975), whose genesis is not related to the anti-Confucian 
events of 1966 and 1967, is briefly discussed here for comparison purpose only.   
Organizationally, this dissertation is structured in five chapters. Chapter I, 
titled “Confucianism before the Cultural Revolution,” traces the evolution of 
Confucianism from Confucius’s lifetime to the eve of the Cultural Revolution. 
Chapter II, titled “Qufu—China’s Mecca,” provides an overview of Qufu, its land and 
people, and the Confucian establishment, with special attention to Qufu’s unique 
status in Chinese history and the relationship between Qufu’s Confucian 
establishment and general public. Chapter III, titled “Defending the Three Kong 
Sites,” is devoted to describing the local Red Guards’ failed attempts to assault the 
Three Kong Sites and the Beijing Red Guards’ subsequent plan to attack the Three 
Kong Sites. Chapter IV, titled “Organized Destruction,” provides a detailed account 
of the Beijing Red Guards’ mobilization of the Qufu locals and their ultimate attacks 
on the Three Kong Sites. Chapter V, titled “Rebellion of Confucius’s Descendants,” 
details the local Red Guards’ methodical destruction of the Confucius Temple and the 




This case study explores complicated events that interwove dictatorship with 
anarchy, physical violence with ideological abuse, party conspiracy with mass 
mobilization, state violence with popular violence, and cultural destruction with 
revolutionary indoctrination. The violence treated here occurred in the small rural 
community that happened to be China’s holy land, but it served as a microcosm of the 






















Chapter I: Confucianism Before the Cultural Revolution 
The year 1919 was extraordinarily difficult for the 48-year-old Kong Lingyi 
(1872-1919), the last “Chinese Pope” and the last Yansheng Duke in Chinese 
history.12 That year, an unprecedented convergence of crises unfolded before his eyes: 
China had fallen into disorder; his home province of Shandong was in danger of 
falling under Japanese control; and Confucianism had just lost its two-millennia-
strong institutional clout. Meanwhile, the anti-Confucian May Fourth Movement had 
just reached its highest point and Shandong students’ anti-Confucian chanting was 
within earshot of the Confucius Mansion.  Even his own family life was hanging in 
the balance as, after having two daughters and with his fourth wife pregnant with his 
third child whose sex was yet to be determined, he had suddenly learned that he was 
fatally ill and was certain to die before the birth of his next child. He was going to 
depart this world with a host of unanswered questions: Would a male heir be born to 
carry on the Yansheng Duke title? Would the anti-Confucian movement continue 
until “Confucius Family Shop” was totally discredited?13
                                               
12 The institution of Yansheng Duke was inaugurated in 1055 during the Song dynasty. It was granted 
to the direct descendant of Confucius. Generations of Yansheng Duke enjoyed semi-religious status. 
 Would the fast-growing 
modern society reduce Confucianism to an inconspicuous footnote in history? The 
questions were hard and the answers hard to come by.  
13 The expression kongjiadian, was created by Hu Shi, a leading figure in the May Fourth Movement. 
It means the Confucian ideology, tradition, and institution. The term has been variously translated as 
“Confucius and Sons,” “Confucius’s Shop,” “Confucian Store,” “Confucius Family Shop,” or simply 




Despite the mounting uncertainties facing the Kong lineage and Confucianism, 
this was not the first time they encountered turmoil and changes. Indeed, the road to their 
unique and privileged status was paved with changes and challenges throughout Chinese 
history as a result of such circumstances as dynastic changes, domestic turmoil, and 
foreign invasions. 
Confucianism from Antiquity to the Opium War: 551 B.C. – A.D. 1840 
Confucianism dates back to sixth century B.C. when it co-existed with other 
schools of thought. The first major assault on Confucianism occurred during the 
centralizing and tyrannical Qin dynasty (221 – 209 B.C.). The famous historical event of 
“Burning Books and Burying Scholars Alive” under the First Emperor of Qin specifically 
targeted Confucian scholars and books because “they contained materials antithetical to 
the obedience of people to the ruler.”1 But the Qin dynasty is known for its brevity as 
Confucianism is known for its longevity. Despite this setback, Confucianism was soon 
able to regain and even expand its influence. It became the official creed of the state 
during the reign of Wu Di (140-87 B.C.) of the Former Han dynasty (202 B.C. – A.D. 9) 
when Confucius was even dubbed a godlike, heaven-sent “uncrowned king.”2
                                               
1 Jonathan D. Spence, “Confucius” The Wilson Quarterly 17 (1993): 1. 
 In the 
ensuing years, however, Confucianism had to compete with both imported and domestic 
belief systems for the hearts and minds of both the masses and the rulers alike. From the 
second century to the tenth century, Confucianism was “eclipsed” by Buddhism and 
Daoism that appealed to both rulers and the common people until the arrival of neo-
2 Julia K. Murray, “Idols” in the Temple: Icons and the Cult of Confucius” The Journal of Asian Studies 68 




Confucianism during the Song dynasty (960-1279).3  This resurgence of Confucianism, 
however, came at a significant price to the original Confucian principles as neo-
Confucianists incorporated Buddhist elements and added a dualistic structure to 
Confucianism, lending credit to the argument that Confucius was “neither the founder of 
Confucianism nor the highest manifestation of the Confucian ideal.”4  The 
transformation, alteration, and erosion of Confucianism continued during the ensuing 
dynasties of Yuan (1279-1368), Ming (1368-1644), and Qing (1644-1911), when 
Confucianism was appropriated and further transformed by both rulers and Confucian 
literati alike. The real challenge to the roles of Confucianism as state creed, the 
mainstream of Chinese thought, and the foundation of Chinese culture did not begin until 
around the end of the High Qing (1661-1796) when mounting external pressure, coupled 
with domestic turbulences, became too great and grave to be ignored.5
Confucianism in Decline: 1840-1949 
  
The decline of Confucianism in modern China began with China’s defeat in the 
Opium War (1839-1842).6
                                               
3 Lloyd Eastman, Family, Fields, and Ancestors, Constancy and Change in China’s Social and Economic 
History , 1550-1949 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 42. 
 A number of treaties after the war resulted in the opening of 
China’s door to foreign missionaries. Article 17 of the Sino-U.S. Treaty of Wanghia 
(1844) allowed American Protestant missionaries to erect churches in China. Likewise, 
the Sino-French Treaty of Whampoa (1844) also granted “full toleration to the Catholics, 
4 Tu Weiming, “Confucius: the embodiment of faith in humanity” World and I 14 (1999): 5. 
5 The term “High Qing” refers to the high point of Manchu rule. Its definitions vary. For the purpose of this 
dissertation, this term covers the reigns of Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong emperors (1661-1796). 
6 The Opium War, also known as the “Anglo-Chinese War,” was a conflict between Britain and China that 
resulted from Chinese attempts to suppress British merchants’ smuggling of opium. The war ended with the 




reversing Yongzheng’s edicts against missionaries.”7
Initially, the Qing court and scholar-officials did not view Confucianism as a 
roadblock to China’s adaptation to the new world order. To them, the solution to China’s 
weakness lay in the improvement of “hardware,” i.e., guns and ships rather than in the 
change of its “software,” i.e., institutions and culture. Reflecting on the failure in the 
Opium War, scholar-official Lin Zexu (1785-1850) wrote in 1842 that he recommended 
ships and guns to the emperor and stressed, “Ships, guns, and a water force are absolutely 
indispensable.
   These watershed reversals turned 
the flow of Christian missionaries to China from a trickle to a flood and the missionary 
expansion began to erode Confucian influence in many parts of China.  
8 Another Confucian scholar Wei Yuan (1794-1856) also noted in 1844 
that China “possesses a spiritual and moral strength that can yet triumph over the 
enemy,” but they needed to equip themselves with the necessary hardware to deal with 
the “barbarians.” Wei asked rhetorically, “Without mastering the best techniques, how 
can the stormy seas be tamed?”9
 While the “stormy seas” around China remained untamed, domestic storms 
arose with the arrival of the quasi-Christian Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864), which 
repudiated Confucianism and destroyed many physical representations of Confucianism. 
The pro-Confucian Chinese gentry and scholars were so threatened and enraged by the 
Taipings that they organized massive counterattacks against the Taiping rebels and 
finally helped the Manchu court suppress this massive rebellion. Although the Taiping 
 Apparently, both scholars believed in a “hardware” 
solution and continued to regard Confucianism as an asset rather than as a liability.  
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Rebellion was finally quelled, its aftermath deepened the sense of crisis and inspired the 
ruling class’s desire to revive Confucianism as a cure for the moral decline that they 
believed had contributed to the decline of the empire.  
 Consequently, in the ensuing Self-Strengthening Movement (1861-1895), the 
status of Confucianism changed from a mere asset to an active cure. Confucianism 
became part of the solution to the empire’s woes.  The Self-Strengthening Movement was 
triggered by the recognition of the empire’s overall weakness and the desire for a 
dynastic revival. The Self-Strengtheners identified two primary weaknesses: “military 
inferiority to the West” and “moral inadequacy with respect to traditional ideals.”10 They 
attempted to address the military inferiority problem through the application of Western 
knowledge and technology.  They tried to solve the problem of moral inadequacy by 
reviving Confucianism as an indispensable ideological foundation for a moral renewal. 
Feng Guifen, the ideological architect of the movement and the inventor of the famous 
saying “using barbarians to control barbarians,” dismissed the need for Western ideas and 
stated in 1861: “We have only one thing to learn from the barbarians, and that is strong 
ships and effective guns.”11  In his 1879 Suggestions on Foreign Affairs, Xue Fucheng 
also advocated the adaptation of Western knowledge and technology to protect the way 
of “Duke of Zhou and Confucius.”12  Zhang Zhidong, the creator of the Ti-Yong theory, 
also listed “preserving the doctrine of Confucius” as a precondition for saving China.”13
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Indeed, the whole Self-Strengthening Movement was a Neo-Confucian construct, for 
11 Ibid., 236. 
12 Ibid., 243. 




neo-Confucian principles, such as self-reliance and self-discipline, were the core 
underlying values of the Self-Strengthening Movement.”14
 While Confucianism was considered a moral source for modernization, the 
xenophobia of its adherents actually retarded the industrialization effort. Ardent 
Confucianists refused to accept modern technology and Western learning, so much so 
that even Li Hongzhang (1823-1901), chief architect of the movement, complained that, 
“The gentry class forbids the local people to use Western methods and machines… 
Scholars and men of letters always criticize me for honoring strange knowledge and for 
being queer and unusual.”
 
15
 The Self-Strengthening Movement failed spectacularly with China’s defeat in 
the 1895 Sino-Japanese War.  Some scholars ascribe its failure to such factors as lack of 
coordination, shortage of capital, foreign imperialism, technical backwardness, and 
limited vision.
 Li’s complaints were echoed loudly by the noises from the 
1874 dismantling of the British-built railroad from Shanghai to Wusong by the locals 
who resented it, purchased it, and destroyed it.  
16 Others point their fingers directly at Confucianism. Among them is Mary 
Wright who writes, “The obstacles to successful adaptation to the modern world were not 
imperialist aggression, Manchu rule, mandarin stupidity, or the accidents of history, but 
nothing less than the constituent elements of the Confucian system itself.”17
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one’s position on the role of Confucianism in this movement, there is no disputing that it 
did not turn out to be the moral and spiritual asset it was initially perceived to be.  
15 Li Chien-nung, The political History of China, 1840-1928, tran. S.Y. Teng and J. Ingalls (New York, 
1956), , 108-109.  
16 Immanuel Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 287-291.  
17 Mary Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The Tung-Chih Restoration, 1862-1874 




The humiliating defeat in the 1895 Sino-Japanese War precipitated a series of 
crises that put China on the brink of partition and called for a new approach to national 
salvation. Some reform-minded scholars, headed by Kang Youwei (1858-1927) and 
Liang Qichao (1873-1929), began to find new medicine for China’s ills. The new 
prescriptions they recommended were sweeping political and institutional reforms that 
entailed drastic changes in a wide array of areas. Again, Confucianism became relevant 
to the process as, given the historical context, it was necessary for the reformists to find 
Confucian justifications for reforms. That was precisely what the reformists did.  In an 
essay he penned in 1870, pro-reform writer Wang Tao (1828-1897) argues that reform 
was in keeping with Confucian tradition and boldly posits: “If Confucius lived today, we 
may be certain that he would not cling to antiquity and oppose making changes.”18 Kang 
Youwei also offered his new interpretation of Confucianism to paint Confucius as a 
reformer. In his “Study of Confucius’s Reforms” (1897), Kang maintains that, “Every 
founder of doctrine in the world reformed institutions” and Confucius was just such a 
founder.19
With this self-proclaimed Confucian mandate for change, the reformists took 
concrete steps to achieve their objectives.  They persuaded the Guangxu emperor (1871-
1908) to support them and embarked on the 1898 One Hundred Days Reform. But the 
radical reform met with stiff resistance and died a quick death. Among the main reasons 
for its quick demise was the tension between the reformists and the gentry class with 
vested interest in the civil service examination based on Confucian Classics, as well as 
the conservatives’ ideological opposition to reformists’ liberal interpretation of 
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Confucianism. The reformists were so despised that Kang Youwei was even described as 
having a “Confucian face” but a “barbarian’s heart.”20
Although the conservatives succeeded in defending the Confucian state and the 
status quo, their victory was short-lived. Shortly after the defeat of the court-backed 
Boxer Rebellion (1899-1901), the Qing court finally carried out a stream of substantive 
institutional reforms during much of the so-called Xinzheng Revolution (1898-1912) that 
included the establishment of modern schools and the abolishing of the civil service 
examination (1905), stripping Confucianism of its institutional clout and ending its tie to 
access to officialdom. Despite the sweeping institutional reforms, the Manchu empire 
was still toppled following the 1911 Wuchang Uprising, which ended the two-millennia-
long monarchial-Confucian relationship and the role of Confucianism as the state creed. 
As institutional Confucianism became cultural Confucianism, the heyday of 
Confucianism came to a major halt and great uncertainties for Confucianism loomed 
large. 
 Evidently, Confucianism became a 
significant polarizing factor during the ill-fated reform movement and continued to be 
part of a problem rather than part of a solution for China’s modernization endeavors.  
 However, neither institutional reforms nor regime change solved China’s 
perennial problems. Life in the new republic was chaotic: constitutional procedures were 
disregarded and warlordism descended. The state of Confucianism after the 1911 
Revolution was marked by a tug-of-war between its admirers and detractors. While the 
1911 Republic discontinued the teaching of Confucius Classics in schools, various 
attempts to restore Confucian influences began almost immediately. Loyal Confucianists 
led by Kang Youwei made the first wave of attempts to turn Confucianism into the state 
                                               




religion, starting with the establishment of the Confucian Association in Shanghai in 
1912. Kang’s efforts were echoed three years later by Yuan Shikai’s (1859-1916) 
monarchical movement and warlord Zhang Xun’s attempt to restore the monarchy 
(1917). These persistent efforts unmistakably demonstrated the staying power of 
Confucianism in the post-dynastic era.  Given all the upheavals in the first few years of 
the new republic, it was clear that the “new republican bottle” was still holding the “old 
dynastic wine.” But another crisis for Confucianism was brewing and it came with the 
debut of Chen Duxiu’s magazine New Youth.  
The iconoclastic New Youth became the opening salvo for an all-out war on 
Confucianism and announced the arrival of the May Fourth Movement (1916-1919).21 It 
was initiated by leading intellectuals such as Chen Duxiu (1879-1942), Hu Shi (1891-
1962), and Wu Yu (1871-1949). Since all previous efforts had failed to arrest China’s 
decline and address her perennial problems such as poverty, sickness, illiteracy, 
corruption, and disorder, these intellectuals concluded that Chinese culture and 
Confucianism upon which it was based were the culprits and must be problematized and 
destabilized.22 Their rationale for an intellectual revolution also resonated with John 
Dewey, Hu Shi’s mentor, who observed, “China could not be changed without a social 
transformation based upon a transformation of ideas.”23
This “cultural prescription” specifically targeted “old ethics, customs, literature, 
social relations, and economic and political institutions.”
  
24
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 Practically all of them were 
tied to Confucianism and the iconoclasts spared no effort to attack this perceived root of 
22 Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, 508.  
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China’s evils. Chen Duxiu considered Confucianism totally incompatible with an 
industrial and capitalistic modern society and identified Confucianism with “everything 
from the past that, to his mind, had smothered progress and creativity.”25 Under his aegis, 
“Mr. Science” and “Mr. Democracy,” became the signature slogans of the era and a 
major legacy of the movement.  Hu Shi, known for his promotion of pragmatism and the 
vernacular style of writing, invented the pejorative phase ‘Confucius and Sons 
Incorporated,” and his followers shouted “Down with Confucianism.”26  Wu Yu, on the 
other hand, considered Confucianism’s advocacy of paternalism “the basis for 
despotism” and maintained that the Confucian notion of filial piety turned China into a 
“big factory for the manufacturing of obedient subjects.” 27
The 1919 Versailles Peace Conference intended to transfer to Japan the control of 
Shandong, the birthplace of Confucius and Mencius and arguably the Holy Land of 
China. This took the May Fourth Movement to its peak. On May 4, enraged Beijing 
students held a huge demonstration against the verdict and protests spread across the 
country. It was at once “an explosion of public anger, an outburst of nationalism, a deep 
disappointment in the West, and a violent indictment of the ‘traitorous’ warlord 
government in Peking.”
 Other major players in the 
movement, such as Cai Yuanpei, Li Dazao and Lu Xun, also made scathing criticisms of 
Confucianism through their own styles and perspectives.   
28
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  The May Fourth Movement inflicted unprecedented and 
irreparable damage to the status and image of Confucianism. Following the gradual 
erosion and eventual loss of institutional, political, and ideological power during the 
26 Ibid., 409.  
27 Tse-tsung Chow, The May Fourth Movement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964), 304. 




preceding years, Confucianism had now also lost its aura of orthodoxy and authority and 
a significant part of its long-held intellectual and moral clout. Although some argue that 
this revolution did more to destroy the past than to create a new future,29 one of the 
movement’s most noteworthy legacies is the rise of the Chinese Nationalists and the 
Communists. “The contemporary history of China from 1921 onward,” notes one 
historian, “is primarily a story of the struggle between these two parties and their 
different approaches.”30
In the 1920s, Confucianism enjoyed a brief respite as the debate on it took a 
backseat to other pressing issues. Liberal intellectuals such as Hu Shi, Qian Xuantong 
(1887-1939), and Gu Jiegang (1893-1980) adopted a “scientifically critical historical 
approach” to reassessing traditional Chinese thought and scholarship.
 
31  Meanwhile, 
conservatives tried to strengthen their defense of the old tradition, as exhibited in Liang 
Qichao’s exaltation of Confucius in his long essay “Confucius” (1922), and the unveiling 
of the Confucian University in Peking (1923). The Nationalists were initially anti-
Confucian, but they turned conservative after the rise of the Nanjing government in 1927 
and their split with the Communists. The new government under Chiang Kai-shek (1887-
1975) adopted a series of pro-Confucian, pro-tradition policies. In 1928, Chiang Kai-shek 
toured Qufu, issued decrees to protect Confucian monuments, and made Confucian 
virtues the moral standards for all citizens.32
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removed the principal of Qufu Teachers College, who permitted a play “Confucius Saw 
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Nancy” that was deemed disrespectful to Confucius.  Overall, Confucianism in the 1920s 
receded from the foreground to the background.  
The 1930s and 1940s witnessed a reversal of fortune for Confucianism as it was 
courted by almost all the players as national survival and unity took the front stage. As 
tension with Japan grew, the Nationalist government decided to employ both the 
“hardware and software” approaches in preparation for an all-out war with Japan. As it 
prepared militarily for the war, the government also followed the example of the Self-
Strengtheners and attempted to strengthen the nation through the application of 
Confucian social virtues and personal ethics. This approach reflected a quintessential 
Confucian tradition of mixing politics with ethics where political order is dependent on 
social order and social order on personal cultivation.33 The vehicle for this new round of 
Confucian revival and “civilization project” was the New Life Movement of 1934. In that 
year alone, the government officially declared August 27 as the official National 
Confucius Commemoration Day, conducted elaborate ritual ceremonies in honor of 
Confucius in Qufu, and named Kong Decheng (1920-2008), the seventy-seventh 
generation descendant of Confucius, the first Sacrificial Official to Confucius.34
After the Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1937, the pro-Confucian effort 
maintained its momentum with the government asking citizens to apply Confucian 
precepts of “loyalty” and “filial piety” to “show loyalty to the country and filial piety to 
the nation.”
 Many 
more pro-Confucian policies and measures followed.  
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  Even some May Fourth iconoclasts softened or reversed their anti-
Confucian rhetoric and stance. Just two months after he was released from a Kuomintang 
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prison in August 1937 after the Second Sino-Japanese War broke out, Chen Duxiu, the 
man who is synonymous with the May Fourth Movement and once described Confucius 
as a roadblock to science and democracy, wrote “Confucius and China” in Oriental 
Magazine. In it, he gave Confucius a different assessment, stating that Confucius’s ideas 
were valuable in his own lifetime and that “Science and democracy are the two driving 
forces of human society. Confucius did not deal with ghosts and spirits and therefore he 
was close to being on the side of science.”36 As China’s ambassador to the U.S., Hu Shi 
remarked in 1939, “China is rich in democratic ideas owing to the influence of 
Confucius’s democratic ideals and educational approaches. It is Confucius’s ideas that 
made it possible for China to become a liberal and democratic country.”37
Chinese communists also publicly declared a truce with Confucianism, as 
manifested in Mao Zedong’s 1938 statement: “As we are believers in the Marxist 
approach to history, we must not cut off our whole historical past. We must make a 
summing up from Confucius down to Sun Yat-sen and inherit this precious legacy.”
 Scholar Feng 
Youlan (1895-1990) also authored a series of books during that period to establish 
connections between Confucian values and the new environment.  
38
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The following year, another prominent communist leader Liu Shaoqi (1900-1969) 
authored his How to Be a Good Communist where he quoted extensively from Confucian 
Classics. By 1940, Mao had already begun to formulate cultural policies of the new 
government he was envisioning. In his On New Democracy, Mao points out the tendency 
of Confucianism to resist change, but he is also careful to point out that the feudal society 
37 Ibid., 242. 
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also gave birth to a “splendid ancient culture.” Therefore, it was necessary to “clarify the 
process of development of this ancient culture, throw away its feudal dross, and absorb its 
democratic essence.”39  While Marxist historian Guo Moruo (1892-1978) shared Mao’s 
view on the “feudal nature” of Confucius, he was more positive about Confucius than 
Mao. In his The Ten Critiques (1945), Guo lauds Confucius and his disciples as political 
revolutionaries and considers Confucius a “progressive” in his own times.40 Even the 
Japanese and the Wang Jinwei regime were not to be “out-worshiped” as Confucianism 
was enthusiastically embraced in both Manchukuo and other parts of occupied China as 
part of Japan’s war propaganda strategy. The financial situation for the cash-strapped 
Kong lineage in Qufu actually improved during the war when it was under occupation.41
During the Chinese Civil War (1945-1949), Confucianism again took a backseat 
as the war ravaged the country. Although Qufu changed hands between the Communist 
and Nationalist troops three times during the war and extreme violence was committed by 
the surrogates of both sides, namely, the communist radicals in the region and their 
Nationalist counterpart, the “home-going legions (huanxiangtuan),”
   
42
 In brief, Confucianism in the 1930s and 1940s initially enjoyed a brief revival 
despite (or because of) the wars, but faded into the background towards the end of the 
1940s. Confucianism was appropriated by all political and warring parties when it was 
expedient to do so but put on the backburner when its utilitarian value was not apparent. 
 the Confucian 
monuments in Qufu stayed intact.  
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The opportunistic use and cynical political manipulations of Confucianism by many 
players during these two decades not only made the endorsement of Confucianism 
questionable and disingenuous, but it also foreshowed the difficult years ahead for both 
Confucianism and the Kong lineage.  
In 1949, Kong Decheng, head of the Qufu Kong lineage and the living symbol of 
Confucianism, left for Taiwan with the retreating Nationalist government. The 
communist triumph in China that year pushed the future of Confucianism to entirely new 
and unfamiliar terrains.  On the eve of the Communist takeover, a historian made this 
certain prediction about the future of Confucianism, “In what esteem the Chinese of the 
future will hold Confucius, only the future can tell. Yet it seems clear that, whether they 
praise his name or forget it, all Chinese will continue to be influenced by him for a long 
time to come.”43
Reevaluation of Confucianism During the Early PRC: 1949-1966 
 
 Confucius in the early PRC was still remembered and occasionally celebrated, 
but under entirely different circumstances and for very different reasons. The new regime 
committed to the Marxist-Leninist ideology imposed a fundamental paradigm shift in the 
assessment of China’s intellectual past in general and the assessment of Confucianism in 
particular. The new assessment criteria included dialectical materialism, class struggle, 
and Marxist historiography that entails a five-stage evolutionary process of history. 
Chinese scholars were now to base their assessment of Confucius on Marxist 
historiography and focus on two main issues: (1) whether or not Confucius lived in the 
                                               




slave-owning or feudal age and served as a voice for the slave-owning or feudal society; 
(2) whether or not Confucius was an idealist or a materialist thinker.44
 Under these rubrics, Confucius and some of his doctrines were reexamined and 
found by some to be instrumental in illustrating the historical stages within the Marxist 
theory of progress.  First, the feudal society with which Confucius was often associated 
was supposed to be one step more progressive than the slave-owning society. Therefore, 
Confucius was considered a voice for a progressive stage and deserved some recognition. 
Second, Confucius’s lack of interest in the afterlife, ghosts, and spirits put him in the 
camp for materialist thinkers as well.  Based on these factors, it made sense for Confucius 
to be, in Joseph Levenson’s words, “kept as a national monument, unworshipped, yet also 
unshattered” instead of being simply buried and thrown into the “dustbin of history.”
  
45 
The sage-philosopher was to be unworshipped because his tenets ran counter to the 
dominant revolutionary ideology, but he was to be unshattered because he remained 
instrumental to validate Marxist historiography. But lest there should be any confusion 
about the designated role Confucianism was meant to play in the communist discourse, 
Levenson hastens to add: “Feudalism per se wins no communist admiration. It is the 
progressive stage, not the entity [of Confucianism], that is praiseworthy.”46 Given all 
these factors, it can be said that there was, in the early PRC, generally an inactive 
Confucianism and a non-antagonistic position towards it on the part of the new regime, 
which neither dismissed nor resuscitated Confucianism but put him in a museum. 
Confucius, as Levenson proclaims, “is ready for history.”47
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 The reconfiguration of the ideological fields at the start of the PRC set the tone 
and stage for the reassessment of Confucianism. The new assessment guidelines that 
resulted then dictated and directed a series of related policies and practices in the early 
PRC. Consequently, between 1949 and mid-1966, Confucius, Confucianism, and their 
material symbols were delinked from contemporary politics and found themselves 
generally in three places that can perhaps be figuratively referred to as a national 
museum, a national park, and an ivory tower. 
Preservation of the material symbols of Confucius and Confucianism as museum 
items not only had the aforementioned ideological reasons, but it served two additional 
public relations benefits as well as they helped: (1) contrast the new society’s effort to 
preserve the nation’s cultural heritage with the neglect and “cultural crime” of the old 
society that failed to conserve it;48 (2) create a patriotic image for the new regime as the 
hostility towards Confucianism from the Chinese intelligentsia during the previous 
regimes was viewed as evidence of the “liberal, bourgeois, pro-Western abuse of 
Confucius” and “reverence for Western culture and disparagement of China’s.”49
The handling of Confucian monuments as museum pieces actually dates back to 
the start of the Chinese Civil War. Just one day after the takeover of Qufu by communist 
troops on December 31, 1945, signs announcing the occupying force’s policy to protect 
Confucian monuments were already publicly posted in Qufu on January 1, 1946,. On 
Confucius’s birthday anniversary the same year, a commemorative service in honor of 
Confucius was held in the Confucius Temple and a prominent CCP “scholar-official” 
Kuang Yaming made remarks at the service.  On March 1, 1949, Qufu County’s Ancient 
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Cultural Relics Administration Commission was established and the new government 
appropriated funds for the repair of the Confucius Temple wall despite its own financial 
difficulties. Special security and firefighting personnel were also assigned for the 
Confucian monuments, starting a long string of continuous annual state funding for 
preservation until 1966.50
Following the rise of the People’s Republic on October 1, 1949, not only did the 
preservation efforts pick up speed, but the impact of the new regime was soon felt in the 
academic and intellectual circles. Under the new regime, the debate on the role of 
Confucianism shifted from a contentious pro-anti dichotomy to a Marxist dialectical 
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 The newly prescribed assessment tools and guidelines changed the rule of 
the game and created challenges for members of the intellectual community who were 
either “baptized” in the May Fourth Movement and/or accustomed to a pluralistic 
discourse on Confucianism in the post-May Fourth era. Although Marxist historians, such 
as Guo Moruo, were already adept at assessing Confucianism from a Marxist standpoint, 
others who were predisposed to Confucian and Western ideas found themselves 
scrambling to understand, adapt, and apply the new paradigm. Feng Youlan, for instance, 
voluntarily wrote a letter to Mao in October 1949 in which he pleaded guilty to his 
previous involvement with “feudal philosophy” and pledged to study Marxism and write 




a new version of The History of Chinese Philosophy in five years using “Marxist 
viewpoints, ideas, and methods.”52
As the intelligentsia hurried to adjust to the new ideology and assessment 
guidelines, the newly assigned role of Confucian monuments as a de facto “museum-and-
park complex” also began to take shape. On March 20, 1950, the CCP Luzhongnan 




The following year was even more noteworthy and significant as Qufu witnessed 
a second visit by Mao Zedong. Mao first visited Qufu in March 1919 during his trip from 
Beijing to Nanjing. Although Mao was practically penniless and had to borrow money for 
this trip, it did not deter him from making a detour for a pilgrimage to China’s holy land. 
He visited Confucius’s grave and Mencius’ birthplace, and stood in front of the “small 
stream where Confucius’s disciples bathed their feet.”
 That same year, senior government officials and foreign guests began to descend 
on Qufu one after another. PLA Commander-in-Chief Zhu De visited Qufu in 1950, 
followed in October 1951 by Song Qingling, Vice President of the Central Government, 
and Chen Yi, standing committee member of the central government. Two months later 
on December 2, Liu Shaoqi, the Vice Chairman of the Central People’s government, set 
foot in Qufu too.  
54
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was not yet a committed communist. But on October 28, 1952, he went there as the head 
of a communist party and state. During his second trip, Mao not only visited the famous 
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Confucian sites again but he also inquired after the wellbeing of the descendants of 
Confucius.55
Mao’s pronounced interest in Confucius’s birthplace stood in sharp contrast to the 
fact that he never went back to Yanan, the place where he regained his breath and 
strength after the Long March, even once. Nor did he return to his own birthplace 
Shaoshan until 1959. Yet, he chose to visit Qufu a second time less than three years after 
he seized power. Practically all rulers in Chinese history since the Han dynasty reached 
out to the Confucius lineage in Qufu upon seizing power, but they were motivated by 
their search for a “Mandate of Heaven” through the endorsement of the Confucian 
establishment there. There appear to be no publicly available documents concerning 
Mao’s motives for this trip and as such it remains unclear what motivated Mao, a card-
carrying Marxist who was most instrumental in replacing Confucianism with communist 
ideology, to downplay Yanan, the cradle of communist revolution, and his own birthplace 
in favor of a second visit in the middle of the Korean War to the “cradle of feudal China.”  
   
Soon, Qufu became a top state-preferred place of interest for its international 
guests. In October 1952, an Indian cultural delegation visited Qufu as its first group of 
foreign visitors after the founding of the PRC. Qufu henceforth became a noted cultural 
place for the government to showcase to its international guests and enjoyed more or less 
the same status as the Great Wall and the Forbidden City.56
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cultural site. Over time, visits from overseas guests became so regular that an 
international guesthouse was built inside the Confucius Mansion to accommodate them.57
By 1953, Qufu even became a vacation place for government dignitaries as well, 
as Dong Biwu, Vice Premier of Political Affairs Council, vacationed there that year. 
Thereafter, many high-level officials and foreign guests kept coming to visit this 
elaborate museum-and-park complex and symbol of China’s “splendid ancient culture.”  
 
By 1954, additional impact of the new assessment guidelines began to be felt in 
the academic and intellectual circles. As non-Marxist intellectuals adapted to the new 
rubrics dictated by the master narrative, Marxist historians who were previously highly 
critical of Confucianism also began to soften their rhetoric to fit into the new political 
reality. In his 1954 revised edition of A Primer for General Chinese History, prominent 
Marxist historian Fan Wenlan revised his earlier criticism of Confucius and described 
him as a “great representative of the ancient Chinese culture” who had left a valuable 
cultural heritage.58
Between 1955 and 1956, the government launched two major political campaigns 
that affected intellectuals to varying degrees, namely, the Case of Hu Feng 
Counterrevolutionary Clique and the Campaign to Eradicate Counterrevolutionaries. 
However, there seems to be no public record of anyone being adversely affected for their 
remarks or views on Confucianism.  In fact, despite the seemingly endless political 
campaigns in the early PRC and even as Mao repeatedly made remarks critical of 
Confucius during that time, both academic debate on and preservation of Confucian 
monuments continued unabated. In 1956, Mao compared Confucius to his archrival 
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Chiang Kai-shek when he told his colleagues that they could improve their knowledge of 
materialism and dialectics by studying their opposites through reading “Kant, Hegel, and 
Confucius and Chiang Kai-shek, which are all negative stuff.”59  Yet in the same year, the 
government dispatched Beijing Palace Museum Deputy Director and other experts to 
Qufu to classify and archive cultural relics. In August 1956, the Qufu Cultural Relics 
Administration Commission, with the assistance of experts from the Nanjing Second 
National Archives, started the project of inventorying and archiving massive amounts of 
original historical documents stored in the Confucius Mansion. In December, the 
Confucius Research Society was also unveiled at Qufu Teachers College.60
 The year 1957 witnessed a watershed moment for Chinese intellectuals and 
contemporary Chinese history, as it was the year for the One Hundred Flowers 
Movement (1956-1957) proposed in Mao Zedong’s speech On the Correct Handling of 
Contradiction Among People
  
61. The Anti-Rightist Campaign came right on its heels. In 
January, Mao invited Feng Youlan to join the movement, saying, “Go ahead and speak 
out. You are one of the one hundred flowers. Whatever you write, I will read.”62
                                               
59 Mao Tse-tung, “Talks at a Conference of Secretaries of Provincial, Municipal and Autonomous Region 
Party Committees,” (January 1957) http://www.marxists.org (accessed 11 October 2011).  
  Feng 
soon found an opportunity to speak his mind. The political environment became so 
encouraging that a Forum on the History of Philosophy was convened from January 22 
through January 26 by the Philosophy Department of Peking University, attended by over 
one hundred scholars. At the meeting, some participants openly questioned the 
materialist-idealist dichotomy in interpreting China’s intellectual past while others 
60 Gangquan Lin, Confucius and the twneieth century China, 256-257. 
61 This movement started in 1956 when Mao Zedong encouraged intellectuals to voice their opinions about 
communist rule. However, when the intellectuals spoke out, Mao and the CCP persecuted them for their 
views in the 1957 Anti-Rightist Campaign.  




rejected indiscriminate rejections of traditional ideas.63
The other outspoken speaker was He Lin, Chair of Peking University’s 
Philosophy Department. He argued that the past interpretation of the materialist-idealist 
dichotomy was too narrow and dogmatic; the relationship between adherents of 
materialism and idealism was one between teachers and students, who could learn from 
one another. He also shared Feng Youlan’s view of certain ideas having transcendent 
values and rejected indiscriminate dismissal of things past. “The Grand View Gardens 
may have collapsed,” he argued, “but Dream of the Red Chamber lives on forever.”
  Two participants were especially 
outspoken at the forum. One was Feng Youlan, who repeated his favorite “abstract theory 
of ‘cultural inheritance’” in which he argued that certain philosophical ideas can 
transcend time and space and have universal applications and values. This applied to 
many Confucian thoughts as well, such as Confucius’s concepts of “ren” (human 
kindness) and “In teaching, there is no distinction of classes (youjiao wulei).”  
64
The rebuttal to their views was swift and strong and it first came from Guan Feng, 
a relatively young but high-profile CCP cultural official from the Propaganda 
Department. Guan argued that the conflict between materialism and idealism was “life 
and death” and that there was absolutely “no room for compromise.”
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 These remarks, 
though blunt, were made within the confines of an academic debate and did not seem to 
have any immediate political repercussions for Guan’s opponents.  Although in the 
ensuing Anti-Rightist Campaign both Feng and He were denounced for their views at the 
64 He Lin, “Some Views on Two Controversies in the Study of the History of Philosophy” Guangming 
Daily, 30 January 1957; Dream of the Red Chamber is one of China’s four great classic novels. It was 
composed by Cao Xueqin in the middle of the eighteenth century during the Qing dynasty.  The Grand 
View Garden is a large interior garden in the novel.  
65 Guan Feng, “On Issues Concerning the Struggle Between Idealism and Materialism in the History of 




forum, neither was officially labeled a rightist. This was nothing short of a miracle 
considering well over half a million people were branded rightists and severely dealt 
with, many of whom said very little or nothing at all against the party and the state during 
the campaign.  
In fact, even as large numbers of rightists were demoted or shipped to reeducation 
camps across the country and additional rightists were being “ferreted out” throughout 
1958, preservation of Confucian sites continued unabated and Mao continued to make 
remarks that were positive about Confucius and in favor of preserving historical artifacts. 
On November 21, 1958, Mao reiterated the party’s assessment guidelines on Confucius. 
He noted that, as historical materialists, the Chinese communists recognized Confucius’s 
historical roles, but they would not recognize his sagehood. “Confucius’s math level 
could not even match the math at the junior high level,” Mao commented. “He was 
probably just at elementary school level. Our college students are sages, and Confucius 
was just a virtuous person”66  Meanwhile, Qufu’s Confucian monuments continued to 
play their museum-and-park roles. In 1959 alone, Qufu saw visits by both CCP Vice 
Chairman and Deputy Premier Chen Yun and Marxist historian Guo Moruo who wrote 
five highly laudatory poems in praise of Confucius.67
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  On October 1, 1959, the Confucius 
Temple and Confucius Mansion restoration projects were completed. Both places were 
briefly open to the public as part of the commemorative activities for PRC’s tenth 
National Day.  




As the radical Great Leap Forward (1958-1960) went awry, moderates in the 
government began to gain more control and the general political atmosphere became 
more relaxed. It was in this historical context that a succession of academic forums and 
activities on the assessment of Confucius sprang up across the country between 1960 and 
1962. A rigorous national debate on how to assess Confucius and his ideas emerged in 
academic and intellectual circles and brought the post-1949 debate on Confucius to its 
climax. The participants in this national debate came up with four concrete criteria with 
which to assess Confucius, namely, assessment of Confucius based on (1) Confucius’s 
own class background, (2) Confucius’s intellectual contributions compared with those 
before him, (3) evaluation of Confucius by other historical figures, and (4) Confucius’s 
own views on others.68  In 1961, the State Council under Zhou Enlai designated the Three 
Kong Sites as National Key Cultural Relics Protection Sites, making “official” the place 
of Confucian monuments as a national cultural heritage. On the 2,440th anniversary of 
Confucius’s death in 1962, the debates and commemorative activities reached their 
highest point. To both honor this occasion and to debate Confucius further, yet another 
round of forums was held across the country including those called by Jilin University, 
Guangdong academic circles, the Shanghai History Association, and Shanxi Province 
history circles. The common denominator of all these forums was the application of 
“Marxist dialectical approach,” namely, assessing Confucius and his ideas for both their 
strengths and weaknesses.69
By September 1962, there were already indications that Mao, who had been 
briefly and nominally sidelined due to the Great Leap Forward debacle, was maneuvering 
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to return to the political center when he called for the renewal of the class struggle at the 
Tenth Plenum of the Eighth Party Congress. However, the gravity of this move somehow 
appeared to be lost on many academics and government officials alike. The 
extraordinarily lively, and at times heated, debate on the interpretation and roles of 
Confucius and his ideas in the socialist era continued and eventually culminated in the 
Second Shandong Forum on Confucius (Confucius Forum) held on November 6 – 12, 
1962 in Jinan, Shandong’s capital city. This forum was initiated and organized by Zhou 
Yang, a senior official at the Department of Propaganda, and attended by more than 160 
scholars and experts, along with a few government officials from eighteen provinces and 
cities across the country.70 The participants of the Confucius Forum were arguably the 
Who’s Who of experts on Confucian studies. Among the moderates or traditionalists 
were Zhou Yutong of Fudan University, Gao Zanfei, President of Qufu Teachers College 
Liu Jie of Sun Yat-sen University, and the aforementioned Feng Youlan. Among the 
staunch critics of Confucius were Yang Rongguo, also of Sun Yat-sen University, and 
orthodox Marxist theorist Gaun Feng. While the theme of the Confucius Forum was the 
perennial “How to apply Marxist viewpoints and methodologies to inherit China’s 
historical and cultural legacy critically,”71
This “Confucius-friendly” atmosphere was detected by Guan Feng, who attended 
the forum in a last-minute decision and arrived in Jinan on the evening of November 6 
after the forum had already started.  Upon joining the forum, Guan immediately sensed 
 the tone of this particular forum was very 
different as there seemed to be an especially “kinder and gentler” approach towards 
Confucius and his ideas.  
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that “the atmosphere of the Confucius Forum was inconsistent with the general political 
climate at that time.”72 He immediately demanded access to all papers that had been 
submitted and scanned them for “black materials,” “reactionary viewpoints,” and “black 
words.”73 The following morning, Guan demanded that the forum organizer alter the 
program to squeeze in his presentation. What transpired next made the forum even more 
unbearable for Guan as his presentation was “cut short” by the moderator, who concluded 
that Guan had used up his 30-minute presentation time. Guan actually had to argue for 
more time for his lengthy speech on the grounds that his paper was coauthored and he 
therefore deserved twice as much time.74
But Guan was more alarmed by the content of the papers submitted and presented 
than he was irked by the “snub” he received during his presentation. As an orthodox 
hardline party theorist, he actually had good reasons to feel that way. The viewpoints 
expressed at the forum and during the subsequent tour of Qufu seemed to present an 
apparently spontaneous but actually well-coordinated corpus of ideas that almost seemed 
to systematically problematize the government’s established position on Confucius and 
his ideas.  There was Liu Jie who questioned the appropriateness of using class analysis 
for historical matters when he observed, “To entangle ancient historical facts into class 
viewpoints may not be easily workable.” There were also attempts to merge 
Confucianism into the mainstream ideology as shown by scholar Jing Zhaoxing, who 
remarked, “The Confucian worldview not only reflects materialism, but it even borders 
on dialectic materialism. It was as if a red [revolutionary] line ran across all of the 
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remarks Confucius made in his lifetime.” Scholar Zhu Kairui also made similar remarks 
where he even used Liu Shaoqi to validate his point, “The ideas of Confucius and 
Mencius have already been critically absorbed and turned into one of the important 
components for the cultivation of a communist party member…. Comrade Liu Shaoqi in 
his outstanding theoretical work How to Be a Good Communist had already successfully 
accomplished this task.”  
Others even strived to break through the prescribed ideological boundaries by 
going above and beyond the accepted level of praise for Confucius. Scholar Zhu Qianzi 
boldly elevated the status of Confucius when he remarked, “Confucius is indeed the most 
sagacious, most sacred philosopher. Human happiness is closely tied to just a few 
remarks by Confucius.” Such laudatory remarks were usually reserved for Mao Zedong. 
Jing Jingfang went one step further and almost compared Confucius to Mao when he 
proclaimed, “Confucius is the representative and center of the Chinese culture. He lives 
in the words and hearts of the Chinese people.”75 Even a senior government official 
chimed in and audaciously suggested that somehow the application of the class struggle 
analysis in the evaluation of Confucian ideas was a matter of little significance. Yu Xiu, 
lieutenant governor of Shandong Province, observed in his closing remarks, “Some 
comrades are not good at studying Confucianism through class analysis; and some 
comrades are not even accustomed to this approach, but I don’t think this is a serious 
issue when it comes to studying Confucius.”76
In the Chinese classic novel Journey to the West, Guanyin bodhisattva gives the 
monk Xuanzang a golden headband that would keep the Monkey King under control. If 
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the Monkey King becomes misbehaves, all Xuanzang has to do is say the magic words 
and the gold headband would tighten around the monkey’s head, causing him severe pain 
and making him stop his unruly behavior. In some ways, Guan Feng, a de facto thought 
police, had long played the role of monk Xuanzang and the Chinese intellectuals were 
playing the role of the Monkey King, who was always restless and tried to break the 
“rules” even after being repeatedly punished. To Guan Feng, this was the time to read the 
magic spell and tighten the golden headband again. In 1957, he did this to Feng Youlan 
and He Lin, who attempted to both universalize and eternalize some Confucian values, 
causing Feng and He tremendous “headaches.”  It worked then, and the act was worth 
repeating.  
Guan was caught unawares by the tone and content of the forum, but he 
confronted the “out-of-the-line” comments head on. Having read all the papers the night 
before, he fired back quickly the following morning and offered his scathing rebuttals to 
various “heretical” ideas articulated at the forum.  He pointed out some “noteworthy 
tendencies” observed during presentations, such as the tendencies to make Confucius 
relevant to the modern world, put Confucius’s ideas almost on a par with Marxist ideas, 
and conduct “supra-class, supra-social-stage abstract analysis.” All these, he concluded, 
boiled down to “a departure from Marxist class analysis and historicism.” Guan 
especially cited papers by Gao Zanfei and Liu Jie on the Confucian precept of “ren” as 
notable examples of such a departure. He skillfully tied his criticism of these two scholars 
to his criticism in 1957 of Feng Youlan by describing their ideas as similar to the 
“abstract theory of ‘cultural inheritance’” that Feng advanced in 1957. To illustrate his 




of “Do not impose on others what you do not wish for yourself,” Guan admonished, “Do 
impose on others what you do not wish for yourself!”77
Gaun’s ‘magic spells” caused fear among some participants but rejections by 
some others, but no arrangement was made to allow anyone to make any 
counterarguments. Guan was, after all, the voice for the party orthodoxy. Although Guan 
represented a minority view at the forum and felt uncomfortable, he was not the only 
person who felt somewhat isolated and concerned. Yang Rongguo, for instance, also 
echoed Guan and recalled that “At the Confucius Forum, more than ninety-five percent of 
the participants extolled Confucius.”
  
78
In short, under the brief moderate administration of Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai, 
who engaged in the deradicalization of many aspects of Chinese life, the 1962 Confucius 
Forum was a unique event in more ways than one. Some interpreted it as an attempt to 
“reevaluate Confucian philosophy more positively” and “supplement communist 
ideology with Confucian ideas of ethics and personal cultivation.”
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of the Confucius Forum is probably even more significant. There were bold attempts to 
challenge the dominant revolutionary ideology and prescribed evaluation guidelines. A 
few prominent scholars even attempted to take the retired Confucius out of the museum 
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make Confucianism “in addition to” rather than just “in support of” the master narrative. 
This forum was brief, but its timing was noteworthy and its impact consequential and 
lasting. If the 1957 Forum on the History of Philosophy held during the government’s 
One Hundred Flowers Movement represented a tentative attempt on the part of some 
Chinese intellectuals to make Confucianism at least peripherally relevant to the new 
society, then the 1962 Confucius Forum after the Great Leap Forward and at the end of 
the Great Famine of 1959-1961represented bold attempts by some scholars to reject the 
marginal role the new regime had assigned Confucianism and to renegotiate its proper 
place in the Chinese society.  
The fallout of the Confucius Forum was significant as criticisms of this “new 
Confucius-worshipping meeting” began almost immediately and greatly intensified in 
1963 when the nation’s political life gradually swung to the left again with the 
increasingly louder rhetoric on class struggle and the launching of the Socialist Education 
Movement.80 While Confucius again managed to stay in the eye of the political storms, he 
continued to be a popular topic in the ivory tower of academia. A significant number of 
papers published in 1963 and listed in a comprehensive bibliography on Confucian 
studies in China between 1949 and 1986 were in direct response to the views expressed at 
the 1962 forum, most of which were critical of the forum.81
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criticism and the fact that Confucius was returned to his “museum” shortly after the 1962 
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newspaper” Guangming Daily, or sections of regional newspapers reserved for academic 
news. No scholars were immediately persecuted as a result of their viewpoints expressed 
at the Confucius Forum. Somehow, the scholars on Confucian studies seemed to be an 
exception to the government’s handling of dissenters. Compared with others who 
disagreed with the party state, they only got a slap-on-the-wrist punishment for their 
remarks and views between 1957 and 1962.   
As the academic community was busy with the debate on the relevance or 
irrelevance of Confucius to socialist China, the Confucian monuments in Qufu continued 
to play their roles as a national museum and park. In September 1964, Party Secretary 
General Deng Xiaoping toured Qufu with his entourage.  On his 75th birthday on May 19, 
1965, Ho Chi Minh, the founding father of the Vietnamese communist revolution, toured 
Qufu as the President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and his host organized 
celebratory activities for his birthday.82
By early 1966, thunder clouds of the Cultural Revolution were rolling in as the 
debate over the historical play Hairui Dismissed from Office by historian Wu Han heated 
  The fact that Ho’s Chinese host and fellow 
communists selected Confucius’s birthplace instead of a place of revolutionary 
significance for Ho’s visit on his birthday is as significant as Mao’s visiting Qufu twice 
on his own initiative but never once to Yanan, the birthplace of his political power. It 
demonstrates how the new regime had morphed Confucius from his old role as a defender 
of the past and bedrock of reactionary ideas into his repackaged role as a cultural icon 
and a proud symbol of the national heritage.  
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up along with other signs of the nation’s political life swinging further to the left.83 Guan 
Feng and another relatively young “cultural official” Qi Benyu jumped on the bandwagon 
of attacks again. In March and April 1966, Guan and Qi accused Wu Han of engaging in 
analogical historiography and “using the past to mock today.”84
Just as hardline party “cultural officials” were using Confucius and his ideas as 
instruments to attack their political opponents, Confucius and his material symbols 
continued to rest peacefully in the quiet little town of Qufu by the gentle murmuring Zhu 
River, as they did for more than 2,444 years despite domestic turmoil, foreign invasions, 
and dynastic changes. On the fateful day of May 16, 1966, the May 16 Circular fired the 
opening salvo for the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.
 Again, culture and 
history became powerful tools and weapons on the political stage, except the context this 
time was even more sinister than before.  
85
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 On May 20, 1966, the 
largest delegation of international visitors composed of sixty foreign diplomats to China 
descended on Qufu to marvel at the wonders and symbols of the “splendid ancient 
culture” of China. The storms of the Cultural Revolution had already burst, but the sage-
philosopher was not to be bothered. After being turned topsy-turvy for more than a 
century in which he was called all sorts of names, given all sorts of accolades, and 
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accorded all sorts of interpretations, the Master was simply tired and preferred to be 
alone. 
Conclusion 
It is perhaps not an exaggeration to suggest that Confucius had a “rollercoaster 
experience” since the Opium War, when the roles he played in Chinese society drastically 
evolved from an asset, a reformer, and the root of all China’s ills to a precious legacy and 
a historical figure in a national museum-and-park complex. Confucius’s retirement from 
pedestal to the museum was the result of many factors: covert appropriation or overt 
political manipulations of his ideas by different historical players; the predispositions 
these players had to his ideas; the state’s reconfiguration of the ideological fields; and the 
ever-evolving state-society relations. 
By spring 1966 Confucius had been “retired into a museum” again. Confucianism 
had lost its influences in the political, intellectual, and ideological spheres, and the 
Confucian monuments in Qufu had been nationalized and reduced to a museum-and-park 
complex devoid of any significant political and social impact. De Bary describes 
Confucius as a neglected “shadowy figure” not recognizable to most Chinese and the 
state of Confucianism as, “virtually off-limits to any kind of serious study in Mao’s 
China, Confucianism survived…only as a museum piece.”86
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. However, all these facts 
might not sound that horrific to Kong Lingyi. When he learned in 1919 that mortality was 
going to remove him from the face of the earth, Kong had every reason to be extremely 
distraught because all the things that mattered most to him were hanging in the balance—




Duke title; the vociferous anti-Confucian May Fourth Movement and its impact on the 
status or even livelihood of the Kong lineage; the fast pace of modernization and its 
impact on the place of Confucianism in China. It seemed as though the only certainty in 
1919 was uncertainty.  
Sixty-seven years after his passing, however, Kong Lingyi had every reason to be 
content. He did have a son who produced a grandson, although both were in Taiwan. The 
Kong lineage no longer enjoyed as much prestige and as many privileges as it used to, 
but all seventy-six generations of the Confucian lineage were resting peacefully in the 
Confucius Cemetery. Even though emperors and warlords no longer came to pay respect 
or seek approval, communist leader Mao Zedong stopped by just the same. Diehard 
Confucianists no longer came regularly to pay tribute, but Marxist historians still cared to 
make a stop and say a few words of praise. Western and Japanese visitors no longer came 
as much, but foreign dignitaries as significant as Ho Chi Minh showed up for their 
birthdays and vacations. 87 Maintenance and repairs of the Kong sites remained costly, but 
the state was taking care of it. While Confucian ideas were no longer heard much in the 
public sphere, Master Kong still ruled behind the closed doors in many homes.88
Indeed, things could be better—much better—but, all things considered, Kong 
Lingyi still had good reasons to be content. The anti-tradition chanting reminiscent of the 
May Fourth era was within earshot of the Confucius Cemetery and another revolution 
was fast unfolding right outside the long walls of the Confucius Temple and Mansion, but 
Kong Lingyi was not to be too concerned. He had already paid his dues and all his 
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ancestors were already resting safely in this national museum-and-park. The Kongs were 
not to be worshipped, but they were not to be shattered either because they, after all, 
represented the splendid ancient culture and belonged only to history. There was the State 
Council’s stele to prove it. The Kong family had been busy for over two thousand years 




Chapter II: Qufu—China’s Mecca 
 
China’s Holy Land  
Qufu’s de facto status as China’s holy land was well known among the Chinese, 
but broad international awareness of this status did not come until 1919 when China 
faced her crisis for national survival. The catalyst for this awareness was the so-called 
Shandong Question, namely, the articles in the treaty reached at the 1919 Versailles 
Peace Conference to cede former German concessions in Shandong to Japan. Among the 
most compelling arguments made against these articles was the symbolic significance of 
Shandong to China. Speaking on behalf of China’s 400 million, Wellington Koo, head of 
the Chinese delegation to the Conference, emphatically stated on January 28, 1919, 
“Shandong was the cradle of civilization, the birthplace of Confucius and Mencius, and a 
Holy Land for the Chinese.”1  Koo’s designation of Shandong as China’s Holy Land and 
his putting the issue in a cultural and religious context resonated well with many 
delegates. Indeed, the Shandong to which Koo referred gave China not only her two great 
sages Confucius and Mencius, but two heroes of the Golden Age “Yao and Shun” as 
well, making Shandong “home of the Chinese race.” 2
Koo, however, was not the first person to call Confucius’s birthplace China’s holy 
land. As early as 1866, W.A.P. Martin, a prominent American protestant missionary in 
China, made a pilgrimage to the tomb of Confucius and referred to Confucius’s 
birthplace Qufu as a “holy city” and the “Mecca of the empire.”
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characterization of Qufu was echoed years later by fervent advocates for establishing 
Confucianism as China’s state religion, such as the founder of the Confucian Association 
Chen Huanzhang, who observed in 1913, “Christians’ Jerusalem, Muslims’ Mecca, and 
Confucians’ Confucius Cemetery are all Holy Land.”4
This notion of Qufu as China’s holy land was eventually applied by Qufu’s Kong 
lineage in 1930 when the Yan-Feng War against Chiang Kai-shek resulted in severe 
damage to major Confucian sites in Qufu. In an open letter of appeal, the Kong lineage 
compared Qufu to the “Holy Land of Jerusalem” and urged all Chinese warring parties to 
follow European armies’ practice of protecting their holy city by remaining a minimum 
of ten miles from Jerusalem, a city sacred to the memory of Jesus. “Qufu,” the letter 
stated, “is the location of sacred Temple and Forest.” 
  
5
Land and People  
 Indeed, while the religiosity of 
Confucianism is a matter of scholarly debate and the fortunes of Confucianism fluctuated 
from dynasty to dynasty, Qufu’s reputation and image as China’s sacred land have been 
deeply-rooted in the Chinese consciousness and recognized by the international 
community. 
As China’s holy land, Qufu assumes many unique characteristics. Located in an 
area known as Luzhongnan (Central and Southern Shandong), Qufu is rich in historical 
significance.6
                                               
4 Chen Huanzhang, Kong Jiao Lun [On Confucianism as a Religion] (Xianggang : Kong jiao xue yuan, 
1941), 28.  
 In the early Zhou dynasty (1122-770 B.C.), Qufu was enfeoffed to Duke 
Dan of Zhou, a prominent founder of the Zhou dynasty. From 1060 B.C. to 249 B.C., it 
5 Kong Demao and Ke Lan, The House of Confucius (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1988), 138.  
6 Qufu is geographically located in southwestern Shandong province but administratively defined as part of 
Central and Southern Shandong (Luzhongnan).  According to James Gao’s Communist Takeover of 
Hangzhou, Luzhongnan was a administrative district created by the CCP in 1948. Based on the content and 




served as the capital of the state of Lu, which occupied most of the southern half of 
today’s Shandong Province. Qufu also served as the seat of the local government almost 
uninterrupted from the Wei dynasty (220-265) to the end of the Qing dynasty (1911).7  
The Qufu area also happens to be known as the “land of paradox,” for it was both the 
homeland of prominent violence-averse thinkers such as Confucius and Mencius and the 
“hotbed of military conflicts” and peasant revolts, such as the Nian Rebellion.8
 Situated in the “Nine bends of the Yellow River and the single peak of Mount 
Tai,” Qufu is also rich in geographical significance.
     
9
Economically, Qufu has been a predominantly rural community throughout 
history with 70.9% of its land covered by a fertile plain and the rest of it being either hilly 
or low-lying areas. Sandwiched between the two rivers of Zhu and Si, Qufu produces 
such traditional agricultural products as wheat, soybeans, corns, sorghum, cotton, and 
vegetables. Qufu enjoys plenty of rainfall during summer but tends to have drought 
during spring and fall and limited snow in winter.
 To its west is the Yellow River, 
known as China’s “Mother River.”  Sixty miles to its south is Mount Tai, the foremost of 
China’s five most sacred mountains and a prominent place of religious worship for over 
3,000 years. Often, emperors would make pilgrimages to Mount Tai to declare the 
legitimacy of their rule and then stop by Qufu to pay personal homage to Confucius and 
seek ideological legitimation for their rule.  Qufu is also easily accessible by train and 
water as the Grand Canal is in the general vicinity and the major railway is close by.  
10
                                               
7 Cai Xiqin, A visit to Confucius’s Home Town (Beijing: New World Press, 1986), 11. 
 Thanks mostly to the Confucian 
tradition of privileging scholarship and agriculture over commerce, commercial activities 
8 Gao, The Communist Takeover of Hangzhou, 20-21 
9 Cai Xiqin, A visit to Confucius’s Home Town, 16. 
10Zhong gong Qufu shi wei dang shi yan jiu shi, Zhongong Qufu difang shi [CCP Qufu Local History] 




in Qufu had traditionally been less active than many other parts of Shandong. Many 
visitors described Qufu as lacking commerce and basic infrastructure.  A nineteenth-
century traveler described Qufu as totally lacking in trade, and this largely remained the 
case even during the Republican period.11  Despite Qufu’s high-profile domestic and 
international visitors, such as Chinese thinker Kang Youwei and American philosopher 
John Dewey, basic hospitality service there was so lacking that travelers to Qufu in the 
1920s and 1930s often had to find acceptable accommodation for the night outside 
Qufu.12 “Dogs were lying in the middle of the streets,” one traveler recalled, “and 
donkeys were sleeping on the roadside.”13  Even the rich and famous in Qufu, such as 
Kong Demao and Kong Deqi, the two sisters of the seventy-seventh Yansheng Duke 
Kong Decheng, once mistook shiny rubber boots for fancy fashion shoes and wore them 
around the Confucius Mansion just to show off on perfectly fine days in the early 
1930s.14
Although Qufu was lacking in commerce, it was rich in cultural traditions. One of 
the most distinctive characteristics of Qufu and its people are its folk customs. Shandong 
is well known as “The Land of Qi and Lu” because the province consists of the former 
feudal states of Qi and Lu separated by Mount Tai. Interestingly, the people of Qi were 
popularly known for their worldly pursuit of profit and material interest, but the people of 
Lu were known for their emphasis on agriculture, morals, and rituals. Situated on the 
former Lu side of today’s Shandong, Qufu has been so heavily influenced by Confucian 
  Modernization, somehow, bypassed Qufu.  
                                               
11 Martin, A Cycle of Cathay, 282.  
12 Ni Xiying, Qufu Tai Shan Youji [a trip to Qufu and Mount. Tai] (Shanghai: zhonghua shuju,, 1931), 96.  
13 People's Political Consultative Conference of Shandong and Qufu Cultural and Historical Materials 
Committee, Gongshang Jishi [recollections of industrial and commercial activities] (Qufu: Qufu Cultural 
and Historical Materials Committee, 1994), 109.   




teachings that its customs and values, such as emphasis on education and respect for 
teachers, have become the gold standard for the finest of folk customs and practices in 
China.15  The respect for Confucius and his birthplace was such that practically every 
prominent Shandong warlord, such as Zhang Zongchang and Han Fuju, was a close 
friend of the Kong lineage. The famous “Pigtailed General” Zhang Xun and Yansheng 
Duke Kong Lingyi were so close that they even became “blood-brothers.”16
The demographic dominance of the Kongs in Qufu population is another highly 
distinctive characteristic of Qufu. Although the two-million strong known and registered 
descendants of Confucius today are scattered all over China and overseas, enough of 
them stayed in Qufu that the Kongs there have had absolute numerical dominance since 
time immemorial. According to a 1985 government census, the number of people in Qufu 
surnamed Kong constituted as many as 20.54% of the total Qufu population (537,555). In 
other words, approximately one out of every five persons in Qufu is supposed to be a 
descendant of Confucius. The dominance of the Kongs in Qufu population has naturally 
  These 
warlords often provided not only protection of the prominent Kong sites in perilous and 
turbulent times but also significant financial support for the upkeep of the Kong sites 
when Confucianism and the Kong lineage were in sharp decline and had lost their appeal 
to rulers and the intellectuals, such as during the May Fourth Movement and the early 
Republican years (1911-1930).  The cultural appeal of Qufu, somehow, managed to come 
through hard times unscathed.  
                                               
15 San Man, Kong Men Zhi Xiang Min Su [folk customs in the land of Confucius and Mencius] (Jinan: 
Jinan chu ban she, 2002),   1-19.  




led to many popular sayings in Qufu, such as the well-known, “There is not a village 
without a Kong in it.” 17
Qufu from Confucius’s Lifetime to the Eve of Modern China: 551B.C.-1799 
  
 Qufu is synonymous with Confucius. Almost anything prominent in Qufu is 
somehow rooted in its ties with Confucius, be it its material culture, nonmaterial culture, 
or the Kong lineage. The vast majority of Qufu’s 300-plus places of interest are tied to 
Confucius in one fashion or the other. Thus a visit to Qufu is necessarily “a visit to 
Confucius’s birthplace.”18
Although Confucius’s political career can be characterized as unsuccessful, he 
was quite accomplished as an educator and a philosopher during his lifetime when he 
claimed as many as 3,000 private students. But that was not enough to make him a happy 
man. Shortly before he died, Confucius lamented to his favorite disciple Zi Gong, “No 
intelligent monarch arises; there is not one in the empire that will make me his master. 
My time is come to die.”
 The preeminence of Qufu and the Kong lineage there resulted 
strictly from Confucius’s long and sometimes dramatic rise to prominence.  
19
After his death, however, Confucius’s fortune began to change. He was gradually 
venerated, glorified, deified, and mythologized. The respect for Confucius the educator 
and philosopher, over time, morphed into a cult for a master, a sage, a prince, and a deity. 
Indeed, the limited recognition Confucius received during his lifetime stood in sharp 
contrast to the glorification and deification gradually heaped on him after his death. This 
 Confucius died a disappointed and embittered man in 479 B.C.  
                                               
17 San Man, Kong Men Zhi Xiang Min Su [folk customs in the land of Confucius and Mencius], 87-88.   
18 Cai Xiqin, A visit to Confucius’s Home Town, 20.  




contrast was captured by James Legge, who aptly observed that Confucius was, 
“unreasonably neglected when alive” but “unreasonably venerated when dead.”20
 Confucius put a premium on humility and frowned upon undeserved credit when 
he proclaimed, “Riches and honors acquired by unrighteousness are to me as a floating 
cloud.”
 
21 However, such “floating clouds” kept coming following his death through a 
long string of increasingly more laudatory posthumous titles conferred on Confucius and 
higher social status for his descendants in Qufu. No sooner had Confucius died than he 
received recognition from Duke Ai, the reigning ruler for the state of Lu, who lamented 
in his eulogy, “Heaven has not left to me the aged man. There is none now to assist me 
on the throne. Woe is me! Alas! O, Venerable Ni!”22 Duke Ai ordered Confucius’s three-
room former residence to be converted into a temple in his honor and decreed that 
sacrifice should be offered to Confucius periodically throughout the year.23
Since the Han dynasty, Confucianism served as the state creed and Confucius’s 
descendants in Qufu continuously received preferential treatment from the state 
throughout imperial China. In 43 B.C. Emperor Han Yuandi (48-32 B.C.) conferred on 
Kong Ba, the thirteenth-generation descendant of Confucius, the rank of Guannei 
  Little did 
Duke Ai know that, by establishing the first Confucius Temple in Qufu, conferring the 
posthumous title of “Venerable Ni,” and starting the ritual practices of paying homage to 
Confucius, he had actually begun the first step of a millenniums-long journey marked by 
increasing glorification and deification of Confucius, continuous imperial patronage to 
his descendants, and the ever-growing prominence of his birthplace Qufu.  
                                               
20 James Legge, The Life and Teachings of Confucius, 93.  
21 Ibid., 157.  
22 Venerable Ni was another title for Confucius who was born by a hill by the name of “Ni.”  




Marquis and the title of Lord Praised for Fulfillment, along with a grant of 800 
households and exemption from corvee labor.24 This was followed in 1 A.D. by Emperor 
Han Pingdi, who granted the sixteenth-generation descendant of Confucius Kong Jun the 
hereditary title of Praising Perfection Marquis along with an additional 2,000 households 
to help cover the expenses for the sacrifices to Confucius. Together, these Han rulers 
began in earnest the practice of appropriating state resources for the upkeep of the 
Confucius Temple through the guardianship of Confucius’s descendants in Qufu.  By the 
middle of the Han dynasty, Qufu Kongs’ accumulation of wealth and influence reached 
such a level that they became “owners of a considerable estate, with at least 3,800 
imperially granted households providing financial support for sacrifices to Confucius in 
the Confucius Temple.”25
The truly groundbreaking event in Qufu’s history occurred in 1055 when Emperor 
Renzong of the Song dynasty created the inheritable title of Yansheng Duke (the Duke 
for Fulfilling the Sage) and made the forty-sixth generation descendant of Confucius 
Kong Zhongyuan the first recipient of this title.
 
26 For over 800 years thereafter, a total of 
forty one more Yansheng Dukes were to inherit this title before the Yansheng Duke 
system ended in 1935.27
                                               
24 Abigail Lamberton, “The Kongs of Qufu: Power and Privilege in Late Imperial China” in On Sacred 
Grounds: Culture, Society, Politics, and the Formation of the Cult of Confucius, ed. Thomas A. Wilson 
(Cambridge and London: Harvard University Asia Center, 2002), 306.  
  The institution of Yansheng Duke was a highly unique and 
complex one. A Yansheng Duke was the senior heir of the main Kong lineage and the 
oldest or adopted son of the previous Yansheng Duke. He was supposed to be a direct 
25 Lamberton. “The Kongs of Qufu: Power and Privilege in Late Imperial China”319.  
26 Several translated versions for this title are available. The one selected here is from the Charles Hucker’s 
A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China. Charles Hucker, A Dictionary of Official Titles in 
Imperial China, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1985.   
27  Li Jing Ming and Gong Yuan Wei, li dai kong zi di yi yan sheng gong [a biography of Yansheng Dukes 




descendant of Confucius and must be recognized by the Kong lineage and approved by 
the imperial court. A Yansheng Duke wore many hats and assumed multiple 
responsibilities. As the head of the lineage, he was the lineage’s face and voice to the 
public and representative to the imperial court. He was the chief guardian of the 
Confucius Cemetery and the Confucius Temple responsible for offering sacrifices to 
Confucius, perpetuating the Kong lineage by producing offspring of the Sage, and 
modeling best behavior for the rest of the populace to emulate.   
Before long, the viability and resilience of the Yansheng Duke system was put to the 
test in the closing years of Northern Song dynasty (960-1127) and early years of Southern 
Song dynasty (1127-1279) when various domestic and foreign forces contended for 
dominance of the Middle Kingdom. When the Jurchen Jin attacked Northern Song in 
1128, Emperor Zhao Gou retreated to the southern city of Lin An (today’s Hangzhou) 
with the sitting Yansheng Duke Kong Duanyou of the forty-eighth generation. Unable to 
return to the Jin-occupied Qufu to continue his dukedom, Kong Duanyou settled in the 
southern city of Quzhou (in today’s Zhejiang Province) where he served as the first 
Yansheng Duke of the southern branch. Meanwhile, the invading Jin in 1130 named his 
younger brother Kong Duancao as the new Yansheng Duke in Qufu. Thus, there existed 
for the first time two simultaneous Yansheng Dukes. Meanwhile, two other coexisting 
regimes Xi Xia (1038-1127) and Liao (907-1125) also embraced Confucianism. Before 
long, the Mongol empire conquered China, and the Yuan dynasty (1280-1367) that 
ensued also embraced Confucianism and enthusiastically supported the institution of 
Yansheng Duke. It can be said that in the chaotic “jungle” of twelfth-fourteenth century 




Kongs. The need for Confucianism or the control of the orthodoxy was never lost on the 
rulers, domestic or foreign.  
The Ming dynasty (1368-1644) further elevated the status of Qufu and the Kong 
lineage. Its founder Taizu redefined the role of Yansheng Duke by relieving him of the 
less important public service and administrative work so that he could focus exclusively 
on sacrifices to Confucius.28 The Yansheng Duke’s rising status in the Ming court went 
hand in hand with the Kong lineage’s increase in wealth. Upon his ascendance to the 
throne, Taizu immediately enfeoffed the Kong lineage with 98,400 acres of land. In 1377, 
a mansion was built by imperial order for the Yansheng Duke and his family.”29
In 1511, peasant rebels led by the Liu Brothers were briefly stationed in Qufu and 
caused some physical damage to the Confucius Temple. Although the incident was not 
ideologically motivated, what happened still served as a warning to the vulnerability of 
the sacred Confucian sites. At the request of the reigning Yansheng Duke Kong Wenshao 
and through the petition of a high-ranking Ming official, the Zhengde emperor approved 
the relocation of the city of Qufu so that the Confucius Temple would be in the center of 
the city and therefore better protected.
 Thus, the 
heirs of Confucius lived in a grand mansion with generous state subsidies and performed 
ritual services to their famous ancestor.  
30
                                               
28 Gong and Li, A biography of Yansheng Dukes Who Were Direct Descendant of Confucius, 6.  
 Consequently, the famed project of “relocating 
the city to protect the temple” (yichengweimiao) began and a new Qufu was built over a 
ten-year period (1512-1522), all with state treasure and labor. Since its purpose was to 
protect the chief Confucian sites, the Confucius Mansion and Temple were situated in the 
center of the town and all traffic in Qufu would have to circle around the Confucius 
29 Ibid., 317-319.  




Temple and the Confucius Mansion (Confucian Complex). It became the prototype of 
today’s Qufu.31
However, neither the walled city nor imperial patronage were going to keep the Qufu 
Kong lineage from the impact of the upheavals in the closing years of the Ming dynasty 
when the declining dynasty was faced with famine, rebellions, and the rising Manchus in 
the Northeast. Since the Ming court was barely able to defend itself from attacks from 
both within and without, the Kong lineage was left to fend for itself.  Thus, its ability to 
handle major crises without government assistance was put to the test and such 
challenges kept coming to Qufu. When a major famine hit Shandong in 1640, the sixty-
fifth Yansheng Duke Kong Yinzhi intervened by both petitioning the government for tax 
relief for peasants and using the lineage resources for famine relief, which ended up 
“saving thousands of lives.” The same year, Qufu fell under siege by tens of thousands of 
peasant rebels, but the Yansheng Duke Kong Yinzhi climbed the city wall, 




Before long, the Kong lineage’s ability to respond to crises was put to an even greater 
test when the insurgent forces led by rebel leader Li Zicheng surrounded Qufu. Li told 
Qufu residents that he would enter the city and create havoc unless his conditions were 
met. The said conditions were that the Yansheng Duke should “attire himself in his 
ceremonial robes and put himself at the mercy of the besiegers by mounting the city 
wall.” Everyone was terrified about what might happen to the Duke and advised against 
meeting Li’s demand, but the Duke decided to accept the conditions and face the 
  
                                               
31 Wu Guanghua and Kong Linghe, “Qufu chengshi de jiedao” [The Streets of the Qufu City] 7 (1987): 1.  




consequences in order to save the city. 33 He put on his ducal robes as demanded and 
appeared on the city wall above the south gate with the weeping and terrified 
townspeople beneath the wall expecting his certain death. However, what happened next 
was a complete shock to all. Rebel leader Li “emerged on horseback…dismounted, 
bowed to the sagely figure on the wall above him, went down on his knees, and 
prostrated himself in reverent humility. Three times, he performed the ceremony of the 
kowtow; then, rising to his feet, he once more bowed to the motionless figure still 
standing on the wall above him, remounted his horse, and returned whence he had 
come.”34 The siege was lifted and the fear of a massacre gave way to a collective sigh of 
relief. The rebel leader responsible for the downfall of the Ming dynasty came to Qufu 
just for the privilege of seeing and showing reverence to the living representative of 
Confucius. The Kong lineage was so proud of this fact that it kept a poster that Li 
Zicheng left behind that declared his policy for the protection of Qufu and the Kong 
sites.35
The rulers of the Qing dynasty that replaced the Ming dynasty in 1644 were quick 
and eager to embrace Confucianism, for identification with Confucianism became an 
important part of the Manchu rulers’ carrot-and-stick strategy to win the hearts and minds 
of their newly conquered subjects. To their delight, the reigning Yansheng Duke Kong 
Yinzhi wrote a letter to the Qing court to pledge the Kong lineage’s allegiance to the 
conquest regime upon the fall of Shandong to Manchu forces in September 1644. The 
  
                                               
33 The name of the Yansheng Duke was not mentioned in Johnston’s book but it would have been the sixty-
fifth Yansheng Duke Kong Yinzhi who was the reigning duke of the time.  
34 Reginald Johnston, Confucianism and Modern China (Westport, Connecticut: Hyperion Press, 1934), 
128.   
35 Yao Xueyin, “Foreword to volume I of Li Zicheng,” in Yao Xueyin yanjiu zhuanji [anthology on research 




Qing court reciprocated immediately and rewarded the Kong lineage’s timely 
endorsement with a decree in October to confirm Kong Yinzhi as the new Yansheng 
Duke. Political expediency trumped ethnic divide. Almost immediately, the Manchu 
conquerors and Confucius’s descendants forged a relationship that had all the signs of a 
“love at first sight” and was to surpass all previous court-lineage relationships. Not only 
did the Qing court recognize and continue all the previous privileges and honors 
bestowed on the Kong lineage by previous dynasties, but it added so many more to it that 
the Kong lineage during the Qing dynasty would have easily been the envy of their 
forefathers. In 1645, the second year of the Shunzhi emperor of Qing, Yansheng Duke 
Kong Yinzhi received a unique gift from the Qing emperor that no previous Yansheng 
Dukes had ever dreamed of—a Yansheng Duke Official Mansion with over 100 rooms. It 
served as the Yansheng Duke’s representative office in the capital where the visiting 
Duke could stay and work during his regular trips to the capital.36
The three most accomplished Manchu emperors also happened to be among the most 
devout practicing Confucianists. In 1684, the Kangxi emperor (1662-1722) made the first 
imperial procession to Qufu since the twelfth century when he “set the example of 
kneeling thrice, and each time laying his forehead thrice in the dust, before the image of 
the sage.”
   
37
                                               
36 Ibid. 
 In so doing, he turned homage to Confucius to worship of the Sage. Kangxi’s 
visit brought not only additional prestige to the Qufu Kongs but tangible material benefits 
to them as well as he enfeoffed the Kong lineage with even more sacrificial lands, 
provided resources to enlarge the Confucius Cemetery, and reduced corvee labor for 




Qufu residents.38  In 1691 alone, the Kangxi emperor ordered a renovation of the 
Confucius Temple costing 86,500 taels of silver.39
Fortune continued to smile on the Kong lineage when Kangxi’s successor the 
Yongzheng emperor (1723-1735) assumed the throne and piled more privileges and 
financial favors on the lineage. He posthumously conferred princeships on the five 
generations of Confucius’s immediate descendants and repeatedly provided the Kong 
lineage with large grants for the repairs and renovations of the Confucian Complex and 
Confucius Cemetery. In 1724, after a devastating fire in the Confucius Temple destroyed 
the Hall of Great Perfection and much of the Confucius Temple, Yongzheng emperor 
appropriated 157,000 taels of silver to rebuild the Confucius Temple.
  
40 He even told the 
reigning Yansheng Duke, “Don’t hesitate to say it whatever should be added to the 
Confucius Temple.”41 When the visiting Yansheng Duke was ill, the Yongzheng emperor 
even sent his own personal physician to assist him.42
The only emperor that outdid emperors Kangxi and Yongzheng was emperor 
Qianlong of Qing (1736-1795) who created a new record by showering the Kong lineage 
with unprecedented imperial attention and material support. Emperor Qianlong made as 
many as nine imperial processions to Qufu between 1748 and 1790, each with grandiose 
ceremonies and rituals and generous gifts to the Kong lineage.  His relationship with the 
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39 Lamberton, “The Kongs of Qufu: Power and Privilege in Late Imperial China” 303. A tael is a Chinese 
ounce of silver.  
40 Ibid., 88.  
41 Ibid., 89.  




Qufu Kongs was so close that he was believed to have married his daughter to the 
seventy-second Yansheng Duke Kong Xianpei in 1773.43
Indeed, the continuous and committed state support for the Qufu Kong lineage left an 
unmistakable mark on both Qufu and its First Family. One needs to look no further than 
the ironic contrast between the simplicity of the tomb of Confucius, just a mound of earth 
inside a brick wall, and the grandiosity of the tombs of Yansheng Dukes during the Ming-
Qing dynasties to know how much had changed since the Master had departed from this 
world with disappo intment in 479 B.C.  While both Confucius and his descendants were 
resting peacefully in their walled lineage cemetery, the descendants, splendid in their 
elaborateness and lavishness, outshone their famed ancestor, splendid in his humility and 
humanity.  
  
Qufu and the Kong Lineage in Their Heyday on the Eve of Modern China 
 By the end of High Qing and before the dawn of modern China (1796), Qufu had 
evolved into a unique place and the Kong lineage into a unique institution. As the 
birthplace and burial site of China’s most influential and revered thinker, Qufu had 
developed some distinctive characteristics. As previously noted, the walled city of Qufu, 
one mile long and half a mile wide, was relocated and rebuilt to protect the Three Kong 
Sites—an unprecedented event in Chinese history. The city now had five gates with the 
south gate reserved for admitting only an emperor, an imperial envoy, or the Yansheng 
Duke himself. Only the reigning Yansheng Duke, not even the Qufu magistrate, had 
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exclusive access to this prestigious gate.44  By now, many landmarks and street names in 
Qufu had become directly connected with the Confucian establishment, such as the 
famous Queli Street (queli jie) in honor of Confucius’s old abode, Poverty Lane 
(louxiang jie) in honor of Confucius’s disciple Yan Hui, and Examination-Tent Street 
(kaopeng jie) named after the site where the Confucianism-based imperial examinations 
used to be held.45 Because of the dominance of Confucian influence, Qufu was practically 
off limits to traveling Buddhists and Daoists, as reflected in the famous Qufu saying, 
“Buddhists and Daoists never entered Qufu since antiquity,” except during Jin and Yuan 
times when other belief systems forced their way into Qufu with the blessings of 
conquest rulers.“46
As the most revered city in imperial China, Qufu, before the dawn of modern 
China, had also earned the rare distinction of attracting a great many emperors. During 
the 2,000 years between Han and Qing, as many as nineteen emperors came to Qufu to 
honor Confucius, which earned Qufu significant “bragging rights.” During the same 
period, 196 special imperial envoys were sent to Qufu to make sacrifices to Confucius on 
behalf of various emperors and imperial courts.
  
47
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380  
  But Qufu was not just a magnet for 
emperors only. Since Confucius was also the patron or spiritual ancestor of Chinese 
literati and Confucianism a religion of gentlemen, countless prominent men of letters 
visited Qufu to pay respect to their patron. The literati who left their footprints in Qufu 
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include such household names as poets Li Bai and Du Fu of the Tang dynasty as well as 
poet Su Shi and Zhu Xi, the founder of neo-Confucianism, of the Song dynasty.48
Qufu had also been repeatedly spared or even revered by the vast majority of 
countless rebels, bandits, and all types of outlaws that traveled through the Qufu area 
throughout history, as was the case with peasant rebel leader Li Zicheng. It was nothing 
short of a miracle that Qufu survived so many impossible situations in an area chronically 
plagued by military conflicts and peasant insurgencies. Its ability to survive so many 
crises had everything to do with the place of Confucius in Chinese society. Qufu became 
such a unique place that even the common people in Qufu were said to “walk with 




The uniqueness of the town of Qufu was surpassed only by the uniqueness of the 
Kong lineage in Qufu, such as the hereditary status of the ducal title for the Yansheng 
Dukes established long after feudalism had ended in China and a meritocracy system had 
become the norm for social mobility .
  The carefully nurtured respect for Confucius by people from all walks 
of life was demonstrated in Qufu and became a de facto insurance policy for its safety 
throughout China’s war-torn centuries.   
50  The list for the Kong lineage’s unique 
characteristics is long and endless, but they can be roughly classified into three 
interconnected yet separate categories of power, wealth, and privilege—the three 
components that German sociologist Max Weber uses to measure one’s social class.51
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The Kong lineage’s power began to take shape during the Han dynasty but gained 
significant momentum during the Song dynasty when the worship of Confucius began to 
accelerate and the new system of Yansheng Duke became increasingly formalized and 
institutionalized. Although this system was primarily created to ensure the proper 
guardianship of the Confucius Temple and Cemetery, the Kong lineage in due course 
attained both symbolic and practical power probably far beyond what its creator had ever 
imagined or intended.  
As China’s “oldest hereditary noble clan” with an “ever-expanding fiefdom since 
the Han,” the Kong lineage’s power was omnipresent in Qufu.52 It enjoyed so much 
autonomy and latitude as to be able to keep a private security force and run its own 
lineage court with full jurisdiction over lineage members, members of the servant 
households, and tenants of the lineage-owned sacrificial land.  The duke’s influence 
extended to the imperial court, at least symbolically, as the Yansheng Duke since the 
Ming dynasty was a grade-one official and would regularly go the capital to attend 
mandatory rituals where he was ranked with the “highest officials in the land.”53  He was 
even given the privilege to “walk beside the emperor along the Imperial Way within the 
Imperial Palace in Beijing, ride a horse inside the walls of the Purple Forbidden City, and 
accompany the emperor on inspection tours of institutions of learning.54
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 The Yansheng 
Duke was further granted a sizable mansion in the capital for his frequent trips to and stay 
there. He also had the ear of accommodating emperors who would from time to time 
grant him special privileges. In the first year of the Ming dynasty, for instance, the 
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reigning Yansheng Duke received a special “ruling cane” from Ming emperor Taizu, with 
which he could wield extra court-authorized power over lineage members and local 
affairs.55
One major manifestation of the Kong lineage’s power was its undisputed authority 
over the “lesser Kongs” or the minor descent lines of the Kongs as well as the 
descendants of Mencius, Yanhui and Zengzi, who were doctrinal descendants of 
Confucius known as “correlates.”  The Kong lineage was divided into the main or great 
lineage and minor lineages. The Yansheng Duke served as the head of the main lineage. 
The minor lineages were further divided into nine close collateral branches (known as the 
Twelve Mansions) for the siblings of the Yansheng Duke and sixty remote collateral 
branches for members of the Kongs scattered around the Qufu area. As members of the 
Qufu Kongs, both close and remote branches of the Kong lineage enjoyed relatively high 
social status, but they all fell under the jurisdiction of the main lineage.
  
56
This lineage further had power over the poor Kongs, who were either tenants of the 
land owned by the main lineage or servants of the Confucius Mansion. Anyone working 
for the Kong lineage who happened to be surnamed Kong had to change his last name 
from Kong to a different last name because, according to the Kong family genealogy, the 
Kongs, male or female, were above being other people’s servants.
  
57
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 The Yansheng Duke 
and his main lineage also used its control of the family genealogy to exercise power over 
other Kongs as inclusion in the family genealogy meant privileges and benefits. Family 
genealogy was even used to exercise control over other Kongs who had settled across 
56 Kong and Ke, The House of Confucius, 92-94.  




China and were required to update their family genealogy periodically.58  Those Kongs, 
who had settled elsewhere, had to handle the main descent line with care, lest they be 
excluded from the lineage and lose their benefits and privileges.59
However, the most salient manifestation of the power of the Kong lineage was its 
control of the local bureaucracy. During the Tang and Song dynasties, the office of the 
Qufu magistrate was mostly served by Confucius’s direct descendants, such as the 
Yansheng Duke himself.  Yuan rulers even turned this position into a hereditary one for 
the Kongs only.
  
60 Between Ming and mid-Qing, this office was always served by 
someone from the broad Kong lineage.  Even after this office turned into an officially-
appointed one under emperor Qianlong, any new Qufu magistrate must first report to the 
Yansheng Duke upon arriving in Qufu, a practice that continued until the communist 
takeover.61
Aside from power, wealth is another yardstick to measure the social status of the 
Kong lineage. The lineage’s economic status, like its power and privileges, fluctuated 
with the political vicissitudes, but it also reached its zenith at the end of High Qing. 
Income from land was the most important source of revenue for the Kong lineage. The 
lineage’s land consisted of imperially granted sacrificial land and self-purchased land. 
  In short, the office of the Qufu magistrate during most of middle and late 
imperial China was variously served, appointed, nominated or approved by the Kong 
lineage. With sympathetic ears in the imperial court and a larger-than-life public image, 
the Kong lineage for all intents and purposes ruled Qufu. 
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Imperially granted land was spread in over thirty counties across the five provinces of 
Shandong, Hebei, Henan, Jiangsu, and Anhui. By the middle of the Qing dynasty, the 
lineage owned as much as 164,000 acres of land.62  In Qufu county alone, the Kong 
lineage owned as much as 9.7% of the arable land.63 Additionally, the land was free from 
grain tax and the servant households were free from corvee obligations. The lineage also 
received government positions that it would sell for money. A grade-four position was 
sold for 1,200 taels of silver and grade five for 1,000 taels of silver.64
The imperial financial blessings made it possible for the lineage to operate its own 
bank and own pawn shops.
 This further 
enhanced the lineage’s coffers. The income from the land was used to cover expenses for 
sacrifices, provide financial contribution to the imperial court and regional officials on 
special occasions, and cover the daily expenses at the duke’s mansion.  
65 The duke’s mansion also had a regular staff of about 500 
people and was the largest employer in Qufu, where most economic activity revolved 
around the Confucian establishment.66
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  The lineage’s financial strength also made it 
possible for it to cover such expensive expenditures as a lineage-owned opera troupe as 
well as highly elaborate and expensive funerals and burials for diseased Yansheng Dukes. 
The wealth of the Kong lineage resulted strictly from government subsidies.  The 
Confucian establishment became such a regularly funded entity that the line between the 
state and the Confucian establishment became very blurred. In fact, they had more in 
common than in difference.   
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While government support did allow the Kongs to live a luxurious life, it also created 
two problems. One was the sharp contrast between the affluent Kong lineage and the 
poverty of the general populace.  This economic gap had the potential of leading the way 
to other issues. The other problem was the extreme dependence of the Kong lineage on 
government subsidies, without which the Kong sites could deteriorate seriously in very 
short order. It perhaps explained the lineage’s propensity to collaborate with whoever 
was in control of power. Both problems would come to haunt the Kong lineage in later 
years.  
The Kong lineage’s power and wealth were well-matched, if not eclipsed, by the 
unparalleled prestige that it enjoyed. While the lineage’s political and economic power 
was largely local or regional, its prestige was national or even international.  The 
manifestations of the lineage’s prestige were so voluminous that they almost defy 
enumeration.  Not only did the Kongs witness a succession of pilgrimages of bygone 
emperors, but they also received titles, lands, and servant households from the rulers of 
both domestic and conquest dynasties. When a Yansheng Duke died, the emperors would 
send a special envoy to convey condolences and grant “burial money”;67
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Confucius Temples across the country were replaced by inscribed tablets through an 
imperial mandate, the images of Confucius in the Confucius Temple in Qufu were the 
only ones that remained intact.68
Despite the simple, rustic lifestyle of Confucius and his immediate descendants, 
the metamorphosis of the Kong sites from the Han to the end of High Qing was so 
thorough that the Kong lineage ended up having a walled family cemetery as a last 
resting-place for every generation of the Kongs over twenty five centuries. Located right 
outside Qufu city and a few hundred years older than the world-renowned tomb of 
Emperor Qin Shi Huang for which the terracotta army is known, this family cemetery 
covers over 494 acres and is surrounded by walls 3.4 meters high and 7.5 kilometers 
long. It is the “most enduring and best preserved clan graveyard and garden in China.”
 All these unsurpassed privileges, however, pale in 
comparison to the ultimate privilege of the Kong lineage, namely, the Confucius Temple, 
Confucius Mansion, and Confucius Cemetery. It was these three gems of China that put 
Qufu on the cultural and religious maps of China and the world. 
69
The Confucius Temple, in the words of famed Chinese architect Liang Sicheng, 
“evolved from three simple rooms…to a gigantic temple maintained by the state and 
admired and worshiped by emperors for over 2,000 years….A record unmatched 
 
With an estimated 200,000 burials marked by a forest of tombstones ranging from those 
for the first three generations of Confucius to his latest descendants in Ming and Qing, 
the Confucius Cemetery commanded tremendous spiritual power for a country where 
ancestor worship is the essence of its spiritual life.   
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anywhere elsewhere in the world.70
The ever-increasing aggrandizement of the Confucian establishment in Qufu 
through ceaseless state sponsorship and patronage resulted in the majesty of the 
Confucius Temple with such landmarks as the Kuiwen Pavilion or the temple library, the 
Apricot Altar where Confucius was supposed to have taught his students, and the Hall of 
Great Perfection, the central shrine. Not only was the workmanship for the ten stone 
dragon pillars of the Temple so exquisite as to be “superior even to that of the dragon 
pillars of the Imperial Palace in Beijing,”
  Indeed, the Confucius Temple became the de facto 
state church or China’s “Sistine Chapel,” so to speak. Encompassing forty-nine acres and 
resembling Beijing’s Imperial Palace in style, this majestic temple with 466 rooms and 
halls is located in the heart of the city and surrounded by a red wall. Its significance to 
various rulers was so apparent that they readily took ownership of it and in 1511 
relocated the city of Qufu to provide better protection for it.   
71 but the Temple itself was also “vaster in 
proportions” than the Confucius Temple in Beijing, which it resembled.72 The Hall of 
Great Perfection also easily stood out among other Confucius Temples in the country in 
that here Confucius and his close disciples were “represented by statues of stone, while 
elsewhere they have only tablets inscribed with their names.”73 The grandiosity of the 
Temple was well-matched by the deified status of Confucius, who was described by the 
tablets in the shrine as, “the Model Teacher of All Ages” with virtue “Equal to that of 
Heaven and Earth.”74
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The 463-room Confucius Mansion is situated adjacent to the Confucius Temple 
and has the reputation of being the residence for the “First Family under the Heaven” 
because of its association with Confucius.  This family compound is the largest landlord 
manor in Chinese history and served both as the lineage office building and family 
residence of the Yansheng Duke. Its uniqueness is marked by the fact that the 
administration of the Confucius Mansion was modeled after that of the central 
government, in that the former had six ministries while the latter had six departments, 
such as the departments of rites and music. This was a privileged organizational structure 
permitted by the imperial court, which actually granted the Confucius Mansion ranked 
officials. The head of each department, for instance, was a grade-four official. 75 
Yongzheng emperor in 1731 provided as many as forty official posts ranked grade three 
to nine to help with the management of the Kong sites.76
Another unique feature of the Confucius Mansion is the Double Gate, which, like 
the Qufu south gate, was reserved only for emperors and distinguished visitors only.  It 
was a feature not observed in any other noble houses in the country. The Mansion’s 
residential section had a special living quarter for females, and those who trespassed upon 
it would be harshly dealt with. The upkeep of the Confucius Mansion was handled by 
state-granted servant households who were exempt from taxes and corvee labor. These 
households provided such specific services as supplying fireworks and music for 
sacrifices or even weeping and wailing at family funerals.
 The Yansheng Duke could fill 
these state-sponsored positions with whomever he deemed fitting for them.  
77
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further enhanced by two imposing lions at its main gate where a couplet unabashedly 
proclaims its importance, “As long-lived as the heavens, the house of the Learned Sage of 
Moral Excellence.”   
The Decline of the Kong Lineage in Modern China: 1800-1949  
The dawn of modern China heralded the beginning of the end of the golden age of 
Confucianism and Qufu. Modern China falls into three distinctive phases: decline and 
crises (1800-1850), rebellions and reforms (1851-1900), and wars and revolutions (1900-
1949).78  The fate of Qufu and the Kong lineage was closely tied with the vicissitudes in 
each phase. While the Opium War (1839-1842) during the first phase opened China’s 
door to Christian missionaries and allowed them to compete with Confucians in the 
religious and moral fields, its impact on the Kong lineage was minuscule compared with 
the main problems facing the Qufu Kongs during that time, namely, the lineage’s 
declining political influence and economic power. As the Manchu empire struggled to 
deal with internal revolts and external pressure, the Kong lineage also found itself facing 
falling donations, decreasing revenues, and challenges to its judicial authority.79
However, the rebellions and reforms during the second phase of modern China 
posed more direct and tangible challenges to Confucius’s birthplace and descendants. The 
first major challenges came from the anti-Confucian, anti-Manchu Taiping Rebellion 
(1850-1864), and the Nian Rebellion (1851-1868), each responsible for extreme violence 
and destruction. Fortunately for Qufu, the Taiping forces did not manage to move into the 
Qufu area and the Nian rebels left Qufu alone as their primary target was the Qing state. 
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Although Qufu survived the threat to its physical existence and welcomed the revival of 
Confucianism during the post-Taiping years, more serious challenges were on their way. 
In the 1898 One Hundred Days Reform, reformers advocated modernizing the education 
system at the expense of the Confucian establishment, but the critical situation was 
diffused by Empress Dowager Cixi through a coup.  
The Qufu Kongs had barely managed to breathe a sigh of relief when the Boxer 
Rebellion (1899-1901) swept over northern China and ushered China into the phase of 
wars and revolutions. While the anti-foreign Boxers did not pose any threat to the 
physical existence of Qufu, the Confucian establishment paid for the ultimate price for 
the “sins” of the Boxers in that the sweeping institutional reforms that Empress Dowager 
engineered stemmed from the lessons she learned from the Boxer debacle. These reforms 
led to the 1905 abolition of the imperial examination system—practically the coup-de-
grace for institutional Confucianism and the foundation of the Kong lineage’s social 
status. By 1911, all the reforms and the radical changes in the preceding years culminated 
in the sudden collapse of the Manchu empire and, along with it, Confucianism’s place as 
the state creed. Thus, in the last decade of the Manchu empire and imperial China, the 
Kong lineage lost most of the ideological and institutional ground upon which its 
prestigious social status was built.  
The impact of the 1911 regime change not only cost the Kong lineage its hereditary 
revenues, such as imperial gifts, official posts, and the annual stipend for the Yansheng 
Duke, but it also ushered in the warlord period and an era of great uncertainties. 
Gradually, the Kong lineage faced even more financial stress and erosion of their social 




challenges kept coming. The warlord problem was compounded by the advent of the anti-
Confucian, anti-tradition New Cultural Movement which started in 1915 but culminated 
in the anti-imperialist May Fourth Movement of 1919. While neither movement 
presented any meaningful physical threat to Three Kong Sites, the arrival of the 
revolution did. As a result of revolutionary wars and their guiding ideologies, the survival 
of Qufu’s Confucian establishment came into question.  
The hardest years for Qufu and the Kong lineage fell between 1927 and 1930 when 
Qufu’s Confucian establishment was economically strangled, ideologically attacked, and 
physically assaulted. Early in 1927, the radical Northern Expedition troops composed of 
both Chinese Nationalists and Communists swept across the country and attacked 
Confucian establishments in their path, causing great alarm in the pro-tradition and pro-
Confucian community across the country.80
But it was in April 1930 when a massive physical assault befell the walled city of 
Qufu and the Three Kong Sites. The assault resulted from the Central Plains War—a 
military confrontation between two factions of the Nationalist government. A fierce battle 
was fought in the very town of Qufu. The Shanxi troops besieged Qufu for eleven days 
and relentlessly shelled it with bombs landing all over the city. Townspeople all over 
 In 1928, anti-Confucian fever reached its 
zenith. Cai Yuanpei, the new government’s Minister of Education and a former key 
player in the May Fourth Movement, presented a “draft proposal for reforming Qufu’s 
Confucius Cemetery and Temple” when he called on the nationalization of the Kong 
properties. In 1929, students in the Second Teachers’ College of Shandong in Qufu 
performed a play “Confucius Meets with Duchess Nanzi” in which they publicly mocked 
Confucius and humiliated his descendants.  
                                               




Qufu flocked to the Confucian complex as they customarily did many times before 
during wars to seek a safe haven, but shells indiscriminately rained on the Confucian 
complex anyway, causing a total of some 3,000 casualties in Qufu.81 Even the nine-year-
old Yansheng Duke, who was hiding under a table below many layers of protection 
inside the Confucius Mansion, barely survived the bombing; a few shells landed near 
where he was hiding but failed to explode.82
After eleven days of besiegement and shelling, the Shanxi troops finally retreated as 
their rival’s reinforcement troops arrived. The aftermath of the battle was horrific. The 
combat inflicted significant damage to the Three Kong Sites: fifteen different locations of 
the Confucius Temple were damaged, including a punctured ceiling in the Hall of Great 
Perfection and a hole in the northwest corner of the Kui Literature Pavilion.
 
83 Qufu’s 
Confucian establishment was so distraught and alarmed that it issued a public statement 
calling on any warring parties to protect this holy land of China. No wonder a Western 
observer referred to 1930 as the year when Confucianism “had touched the nadir of its 
fortunes.”84
Respite and relief finally came to the Qufu Kongs when Chiang Kai-shek in 1934 
launched the New Life Movement. Chiang designed this movement to promote the 
Confucian virtues of politeness (li), righteousness (yi), integrity (lian), and self-respect 
(chi). He had hoped to achieve social regeneration by addressing such issues as hygienic 
practices, promptness, and courtesy. While the movement failed to revive Confucianism 
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as an appealing ideology, it did provide the Kong lineage with an opportunity to forge a 
solid alliance with a powerful new partner and brought it back to the public life. 
A whirlwind of activities kept the young Yansheng Duke on his toes. On the 
anniversary of Confucius’s birthday in 1934, he hosted top Kuomintang party and state 
officials, who came to Qufu to perform sacrifices to Confucius. On January 18, 1935, 
after terminating the 800-plus-year old Yansheng Duke system, the Nationalist 
government issued an official decree that appointed Kong Decheng as the Sacrificial 
Officer of the Great Accomplished and Most Sacred Teacher.85
Just as the Kong lineage was relishing its remarkable return to prominence, its good 
fortune ended abruptly at the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945). To 
prevent the Japanese from using the head of the Kong lineage as a propaganda tool, 
Chiang Kai-shek hastily evacuated Kong Decheng to the war capital Chongqing. On 
January 4, 1938, Qufu fell into Japanese hands. China was subsequently divided between 
the Chinese defenders and Japanese invaders. These two forces were further divided into 
five political forces of the Chinese Nationalists, Chinese Communists, Wang Jinwei’s 
puppet regime, the Manchukuo under Japanese control, and the Japanese occupiers.  
Interestingly, other than the Chinese communists, all warring parties seemed to agree on 
one thing: they all identified with Confucianism and each claimed Confucianism to be on 
  On July 8, 1935, the 
fifteen-year-old Kong Decheng went to Nanjing where he was officially sworn in as the 
Sacrificial Official to Confucius. Marginalized Confucianism had finally found its way 
back to the officialdom, and the Kong lineage had returned to the limelight and put itself 
on the government payroll again. 
                                               





their side. Even Mao Zedong put Confucius on a par with Sun Yat-sen, the founding 
father of republic China. Whether this rare agreement stemmed from political 
expediency, ideological affinity, or nationalistic instincts, The Kong lineage and the 
Three Kong Sites largely remained intact throughout the eight-year-long war.  
The devastating war finally ended in August 1945, but it was immediately followed 
by a brutal civil war between the old adversaries—Communists and Nationalists. Land 
reform was part of the communists’ war strategy as it would help the CCP win over the 
peasants, among other reasons. The Kong lineage, with its enormous landownership, 
became a natural target of land reform. Consequently, soon after the communist takeover 
of Qufu on December 31, 1945, tenant peasants of the Kong lineage began to look for 
ways to seek some economic justice from their famed landlord. The Kong lineage had 
every reason to be very concerned: it was the largest landowning entity in Qufu with 
about ten percent of the land in the area in its possession, not to mention the “exploitative 
and coercive tactics” that were associated with Confucius Mansion’s rent collection 
practices.  Much to the relief of the Kong lineage, however, the new communist 
government sent someone to the Confucius Mansion to tip them off about a forthcoming 
peasant mass rally and revealed to them all the demands that were to be made of them, 
thus allowing the Kong lineage ample time to prepare for their responses.86
Having made detailed arrangements with the Kong lineage, the new government 
staged a massive peasant rally. On March 25, 1946, some 10,000 tenant peasants of the 
Kong lineage from the general Qufu area marched into the center of Qufu and held a rent-
and-interest rates reduction rally. They held a large flag on which four demands they 
   
                                               





made of the Kong lineage were listed: “implement the twenty-five percent rent reduction, 
abolish the ‘Hundred Servant Households,’ stop the Confucius Mansion’s security force 
from physically and verbally abusing people, and allow those who had to change their 
last name from Kong to other last names to restore their original name.”87
Kong Lingyu, the interim chief administrator of the Confucius Mansion, sent a 
representative, Kong Jieqing, to meet the peasants and respond to their demands. Kong 
Jieqing met the peasants and calmly addressed each and every demand, noting, “The 
system of the Hundred Servant Households should have been abolished a few hundred 
years ago. Rent reduction is even more reasonable. Plenty of grain had already been 
prepared for this purpose so this demand can be met immediately.” After responding to 
all thirteen extra demands, Kong Jieqing added, “The feudal nature of the Confucius 
Mansion must be reformed based on the law of social progress. All the demands that you 
have raised point to the areas where the Confucius Mansion has fallen behind the times. 
We must and will expedite the changes.”
   
88  With that, a rally of 10,000 peasants that had 
every potential for a violent end came to a peaceful conclusion. The intellectual circles in 
Qufu were so impressed with the way the situation was handled that they reportedly 
remarked, “Communists and peasants do not dismiss history. [This rent reduction 
espisode] both reduced rent and left the Sage totally unharmed!”89
The Kong lineage’s relief was short-lived, however. Soon, an all-out civil war broke 
out in June 1946 and quickly intensified, turning Qufu into a “gray area” caught in the 
crossfire between the Nationalists and Communists. To Qufu’s east were the “old 
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liberated areas” occupied by the communists; to its west was the city of Yanzhou held by 
the Kuomintang troops. To make the matters even more complicated, the intensification 
of the war also drastically radicalized the land reform policies and practices as rent-and-
interest rates reduction was replaced by hostile land confiscation and expulsion of 
landlords from their homes, causing both sides to engage in a bloody war of retaliations. 
Casualties rose sharply for both sides. Just in Qufu alone, 1,100 peasant activists were 
killed as a result of such retaliations.90
Even the Kong lineage became involved in this conflict as it took the opportunity to 
nullify all the terms it had to accept earlier, generating animosity between the Kong 
lineage and the tenant peasants. Although historically there did not exist any serious 
tension between the landlords and peasants or between the rich and poor in the villages, 
the land reform and revenge of the landlords completely changed this situation.
 
91  The 
genie was out of the bottle and the centuries-old unequal but steady landowner-tenant 
relationship became antagonistic and could never return. Even the hometown of China’s 
First Sage, to which aesthete George Kates once referred as a “tender place,” had now 
become hardened to such bloody retaliations and slaughters.92
The tug-of-war continued. On June 11, 1948, the communists retook Qufu and turned 
the newly liberated area into a secure communist base. The senior management personnel 
of the Confucius Mansion fled Qufu before the communist takeover for fear of reprisals. 
Nine days later on June 20, the CCP East China Bureau had already issued a directive 
titled "Suggestions on How to Handle the Confucius Temple, Cemetery, and Land.” The 
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directive stipulated the inclusion of Kong lineage members in the Confucius Temple 
Management Commission, the reprinting of the 1946 announcement for the protection of 
the Kong sites, and immediate deployment of armed protection of the Kong sites.93
While the directive also encouraged efforts to persuade the Kong lineage members 
who had fled Qufu to return home, it made no mention of the lineage head Kong 
Decheng.
  
94 But Kong Decheng was not in a hurry to return to Qufu. To him, the road 
home was closed once again. Qufu was firmly in communist hands. Senior members of 
his management team had fled Qufu for fear of their lives. All three Confucian sites were 
nationalized and all Kong lineage land was confiscated and given to the former tenant 
peasants. The Confucius Mansion was already officially under the management of a trade 
union that only answered to the communists. Shandong was also irrevocably lost 
following the Huai-hai Campaign in late 1948, and the whole country followed suit 
shortly thereafter.95
In December 1949, Kong Decheng left for Taiwan, which turned out to be his trip of 
no return. It was an extraordinarily difficult decision for someone whose life mission was 
to stay at home and ensure proper sacrifices to his ancestors. Kong Decheng weighed the 
pros and cons and followed his instinct.  He would know in seventeen years if he had 
made the right decision.   
 The Nationalist government’s political, military, and social 
institutions crumbled. The tidal wave of changes engulfed anyone in its way. 
                                               
93 Zhang Peiying, “hui yi wo shao nian shi he kong decheng zai yi qi” [Recollection of My Childhood 
Years with Kong Decheng] Qufu Wenshi [Qufu’s culture and history] 2 (1982): 12. 
94 Jie fang zhan zheng shi qi Shandong de tu di gai ge [land reform in Shandong during the war of 
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95 The Huai-hai Campaign (November 1948-January 1949) was one of the three major military campaigns 
during the Chinese civil war of 1945-1949. Chinese communists’ victory in this campaign was a turning 





The Kong lineage enjoyed unsurpassed imperial patronage and commanded 
unmatched respect from people from all walks of life throughout imperial China. The 
advent of modern China presented major challenges to the Kong lineage and the Three 
Kong Sites in its care. However, through perseverance and resilience, the Kong lineage 
survived the May Fourth Movement and the iconoclastic fervor during the Northern 
Expedition. It even enjoyed a brief rally in the 1930s and survived two debilitating wars 
thereafter.  With the takeover of China by a group of committed revolutionaries who 
subscribed to an ideology that was the antithesis of core Confucian values of moderation, 
compromise, and nonviolence, Confucianism seemed to have outlived its usefulness for 
the powers-that-be and the Kong lineage as a result had lost its raison d’etre.  The 
unsettled and unsettling questions were: What would happen to China’s Mecca in the 
hands of the heirs of The May Fourth iconoclasts who called themselves communists? 
What would happen to the Three Kong Sites that had always been in meticulous care? 
What would happen to the people of Qufu and the descendants of Confucius who had for 




Chapter III: Defending the Three Kong Sites 
 
The Prelude 
When the largest ever contingent of foreign diplomats in China descended on 
Confucius’s birthplace on May 20, 1966, Qufu was still enjoying a respite from the 
radical political and economic campaigns that dominated the first seventeen years of the 
People’s Republic.  By 1966, the Great Leap Forward had already been abandoned and 
the Three Bitter Years had become a recent memory.1
The Qufu government proved to be competent stewards of these national 
treasures. Cui Xuyi, Director of the Qufu Cultural Relics Commission, ably maintained 
and promoted the Three Kong Sites. These sites meant the world to the local officials, 
who viewed themselves as the proud guardians of these national treasures. They knew 
that the Three Kong Sites were the only reason why a steady flow of high-profile 
domestic and international dignitaries from Mao Zedong to Ho Chi Minh had come to 
this otherwise inconspicuous rural community. In 1966, Cui, who had already added an 
international guesthouse in the Confucius Mansion, was still busy making reprints of the 
famous Pictures of the Traces of the Sage Confucius (shengjitu) for visitors. He even 
 Although Qufu residents endured 
tremendous hardships during those tumultuous years, the Three Kong Sites not only 
remained intact but continued to bring pride, privilege, and state subsidies to the little 
town of Qufu. It was as though the revolution did little to the Three Kong Sites, save for 
the change of their caretakers.  
                                               
1 The “Three Bitter Years,” also known as “Three Years of Natural Disasters” or “Great Famine,” refers to 
the period of 1959-1961 which saw widespread famine across China caused by the policies of the Great 




instructed Kong Zhaopei, a former top administrator of the Confucius Mansion and now a 
consultant for Cui’s office, to write to the last Yansheng Duke Kong Decheng in Taiwan 
to assure him that “all was well in Qufu” and that the new government was taking 
excellent care of his ancestral home.2
However, all was not well in the nation’s capital. By the time the foreign 
diplomats arrived in Qufu on May 20, 1966, the tension between the chairman of the 
party Mao Zedong and the president of the state Liu Shaoqi had already come to a head 
and a series of significant political events had unfolded that set the stage for the Cultural 
Revolution. By May 16, Mao had already ousted Beijing’s party boss Peng Zhen, a 
protégé of Liu, through organized attacks on Beijing’s cultural establishment. The May 
16 Circular released that day euphemistically referred to Liu as China’s “Khrushchev 
types sleeping right next to us” and announced the formation of the Central Cultural 
Revolution Group to lead the Cultural Revolution.
 
3  Intensified attacks on the party 
establishment ensued. On May 25, Nie Yuanzi, a party branch secretary at Peking 
University, put out the first “Marxist-Leninist big-character poster” attacking the party 
committee at Peking University. The spark that Nie’s poster lit spread across college 
campuses like a prairie fire. Liu responded by sending work groups en masse to college 
campuses across the country to contain the situation and “put out the fire.”4
But the fire fueled by Mao through the CCRG refused to be contained. Opposition 
to Liu’s crackdowns grew quickly. By mid-June, students from as many as thirty-nine 
       
                                               
2 Song Yongyi, ed., Xin Bian hongweibing ziliao; [A New Collections of Red Guard Publications], Part II, 
vol. 29. 11392. (hereafter XBHZL)  
3 “Zhongguo gong chan dang zhong yang wei yuan hui tong zhi” [The Chinese Communist Party Central 
Committee Notification] (May 16, 1966), in ZWDGW.   
4 Work groups are a unique CCP ad hoc trouble-shooting mechanism composed of party officials. They 
were usually formed in response to a pressing situation but disbanded after the situation is resolved; Yan 




universities in Beijing tried to throw out the work groups.5
Frustrated by the setbacks, Mao ended his retreat in Hangzhou and returned to the 
capital on July 18 to “personally lead the Cultural Revolution.” With the help of CCRG, 
he disbanded the work groups and rehabilitated the persecuted students.  In the ensuing 
Eleventh Plenum of the CCP Eighth Central Committee in early August, Mao wrote his 
famous  big-character poster “Bombarding the Headquarters” in support of the persecuted 
students and oversaw the creation of the Sixteen Articles (shiliutiao), another 
“programmatic document” providing guidelines for the Cultural Revolution. This 
document clearly defined the main target of the Cultural Revolution as “those within the 
party who are in authority and are taking the capitalist road.”
 Using the party’s long-
established authority and prestige, Liu directed the party establishment to put down the 
burgeoning dissent by turning the heat on the rebellious students. From June 1 to July 20, 
work groups suppressed the rebellious students using highhanded tactics, creating what 
Mao later called “fifty days of white terror” and “the bourgeois reactionary line.”  
6
Unable to unseat Liu and rally the party base, Mao resorted to his personal 
charisma and turned to those to whom he now had a quasi-religious appeal—the Red 
  In so doing, Mao hit the 
reset button of the Cultural Revolution and directed its focus back to Liu and the party 
establishment. Despite Mao’s fresh offensive, the party establishment remained in power 
and party officials and bureaucrats at all levels of the government stayed loyal to the 
incumbent government. 
                                               
5 Guo Jian, et al, Historical Dictionary of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, (Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow 
Press, 2006), xx.  
6 Zhongguo gong chan dang zhong yang wei yuan hui guan yu wu chan jie ji wen hua da ge ming de jue 
ding” [Communist Party of China Central Committee’s Decision on the Great Proletarian Cultural 




Guards—to create “great disorder under heaven” to achieve “great order under heaven.”7 
Exploiting the Red Guard movement and the Cult of Mao, the Chairman reviewed one 
million fervent Red Guards in the Tiananmen Square on August 18—the first of eight 
such Hajj-like pilgrimage events—and then unleashed them to engage in destructive acts 
through the campaign against the Four Olds and spread the Cultural Revolution to the 
provinces through the Great Exchanges of Revolutionary Experience (dachuanlian).  
Almost overnight, the fire of the Cultural Revolution set the country ablaze at both the 
center and localities. Teenage Red Guards roamed across the country destroying anything 
they deemed as belonging to the “Four Olds” and spreading the “Cultural Revolution 
fire.”8
 The sudden eruption of the campaign against the Four Olds posed a direct and 
credible threat to the Three Kong Sites in Qufu. Although all three sites were among the 
180 historical places declared in 1961 by the State Council as “Key National Cultural 
Protection units” and had been managed by the state since 1948, the effectiveness of this 
designation was rendered almost nil due in part to the loose definition of the “Four Olds” 
and the indiscriminate nature of Red Guards’ destructive acts.
  By the end of August, the Cultural Revolution that started in the Beijing party and 
cultural spheres in early 1966 and moved to college campuses in June and July had 
finally spread to the entire country.  
9
                                               
7 Roderick Macfarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, Mao’s Last Revolution, 52,  
 As soon as CCP vice-
chairman Lin Biao endorsed the concept and practice of “destroying the Four Olds” at the 
August 18 mass rally celebrating the Cultural Revolution, Red Guards attempted to raid 
the Forbidden City on the very same night despite the fact that it was a Key National 
8 The original “old” Red Guards were comprised of middle school and high school students in their teens.   
9 Among the 180 Key National Cultural Protectionunits, thirty three of them were “revolutionary sites” 
associated with the peasant and communist revolution, including, ironically, former Confucius temples that 




Cultural Protection unit right in the heart of Beijing and under the nose of the State 
Council. With daily encouragement from top party publications and state media, the 
emboldened Red Guards stopped at nothing in their wanton destruction of the nation’s 
cultural heritage.  Soon, other prominent cultural sites in the Beijing area were attacked 
by rampaging Red Guards, including two other Key National Cultural Protection units: 
the Summer Palace and the Ming period Great Wall. Ming wall tiles ended up being used 
for “building dams, repairing roads, walling pigsties, and making toilets.”10
 The campaign against the Four Olds quickly spread beyond Beijing after August 
23 when the People’s Daily gave official endorsement of Red Guards’ violence against 
the “Four Olds” and the Liberation Daily issued its support through an editorial titled: 
“You did it right! You did it well!”
 
11
The Red Guards declared war on countless cemeteries and graves as soon as the 
campaign against the Four Olds started on August 19. The prominent burial and 
memorial sites that the Red Guards vandalized included the state-protected grave of 
Southern Song patriot general Yue Fei (1103-1142) noted for combating the Jurchens. 
Yue’s grave and temple were both destroyed and the famous statue of Yue Fei at his 
gravesite in Hangzhou “disappeared without a trace.”
  Across the country, Red Guards descended on one 
crown jewel of the nation’s cultural heritage after another. Nearly all prominent state-
protected sites had now become prominent targets. Many such sites bore similarities to 
the Three Kong Sites—cemeteries, temples, Confucian monuments, or Key National 
Cultural Protection units.  
12
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 The grave of Huo Qubing, (140-
117 BC) another patriot general of the former Han dynasty famous for fending off the 
11 Editorial, People’s Daily, 23 August 1966; Editorial, Liberation Daily, 23 August 1966.  




Xiongnu confederation, was yet another state-protected site that Red Guards desecrated 
and destroyed.13 In Hohhot, Inner Mongolia, the Memorial Park for Genghis Khan was 
pillaged by local cadres, workers, and peasants. All cultural relics and exhibits in the park 
were “thoroughly looted.”14  The frenzy reached such a white-hot level that Red Guards 
destroyed not only the graves of such obvious targets as the pro-Confucian figures Yuan 
Shikai and Kang Youwei, but also the ancestral burial grounds of prominent state and 
party leaders such as PRC vice president Madame Song Qingling and ousted top 
communist leaders Deng Xiaoping and Yang Shangkun.15
The Red Guards total war on the “Four Olds” also targeted temples and other 
places of worship. In Beijing, the Biyun Temple, the Reclining Buddha Temple, and the 
Buddhist statues on top of the Longevity Hills in the Summer Palace all became targets 
of attack.
 Never before had China 
witnessed such an all-out war on the nation’s dead, and, through them, the living.   
16 In Hangzhou, teenage Red Guards tried to assault the world-renowned 
Lingyin Buddhist Temple.17 In Henan Province, the White Horse Temple outside 
Luoyang city, a state-protected site known as the “cradle of Buddhism in China,” was 
attacked and looted by the local peasants. In Shanxi Province, Wutai Mountain, one of 
the most sacred Buddhist pilgrimage sites in China and a state-protected site, was 
branded “the home of demons and spirits” and “pillaged and left to deteriorate.”18
                                               
13 Ding Shu, “cong shi xue ge min dao wa zhu feng” [from revolutionary in historiography to digging of 
ancestral graves] (November 1996) http://www.cnd.org/CR/ZK96/zk105.hz8.html May 2007).  
  
14 Yijinghuolou Qi Zi [The History of the Yijinhuolou Banner], (Hohhot: nei menggu ren min chu ban she, 
1997). 56.  
15 Ding Shu, “cong shi xue ge min dao wa zhu feng” [from revolutionary in historiography to digging of 
ancestral graves] (November 1996) http://www.cnd.org/CR/ZK96/zk105.hz8.html May 2007);   Yan Jiaqi 
& Gao Gao, Turbulent Decade, 71.  
16 Yan Jiaqi & Gao Gao, Turbulent Decade, 70.  
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As the “cradle of Chinese civilization,” the culturally rich Shandong Province 
where the Three Kong Sites were located was among the hardest hit by the onslaught of 
the Red Guards. Even though approximately half of the CCRG members were Shandong 
natives (Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng, Zhang Chunqiao, Guan Feng, and Qi Benyu), they did 
not spare Shandong from the Red Guards’ wrath. Among the most atrocious acts of 
violence committed by Shandong Red Guards was the destruction of the grave of Wu 
Xun, a nineteenth-century Shandong beggar committed to Confucius’s ideal of universal 
education and raised money to fund education through any means within his reach. Red 
Guards from his hometown “exhumed Wu Xun’s corpse, walked with it to a nearby 
public square, held a mass sentencing rally, and finally broke it into pieces and burned 
it.”19
Violence against the Four Olds quickly spread to the city of Tai’an just thirty 
miles away from Qufu. Qufu and Tai’an are like sister cities. Whereas Qufu is home to 
the Three Kong Sites, Tai’an is home to the Daimiao Temple, a replica of the Imperial 
Palace, and a gateway to Mount Tai. Throughout Chinese history, rulers and emperors 
would make a pilgrimage to Mount Tai to seek legitimation for their rule from heaven 
and then come to Qufu to seek ideological support for their rule. On August 23, Red 
Guards from the local Tai’an Hydraulic Academy along with some traveling Red Guards 
created havoc on Mount Tai.  They smashed their way from the foot to the top of Mount 
Tai, destroying all the tombs, steles, stone tablets, and engravings that they considered to 
be part of Four Olds.
   
20
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As if this ominous development was not enough of a threat to Qufu’s Three Kong 
Sites, the rampant destruction of artifacts and historical sites associated with Confucius 
and Confucianism also intensified in volume and frequency. Although by 1966 most of 
the once-flourishing Confucius temples across China had either been destroyed or 
repurposed, a few had survived the vicissitudes of time and remained standing.  However, 
the Cultural Revolution labeled Confucian tradition as the root of the Four Olds and made 
all Confucian-related artifacts and sites fair targets for attack by Red Guards. Thus, 
across the country, the remaining Confucian monuments received devastating blows to 
their existence. In Beijing, the Confucius Temple that was once known as the National 
Academy of Imperial China became Red Guards’ chosen site for torturing dozens of the 
nation’s top writers and artists and burning huge piles of theater props and costumes.21  In 
the remote city of Lanzhou in the Northeastern province of Gansu, a college-based Red 
Guard organization burned a complete set of the family genealogy of the Kong lineage 
consisting of 108 volumes and 9,000 pages.22  In Quzhou, Zhejiang Province where the 
southern branch of the Kong lineage is located, Red Guards ransacked the Confucius 
Temple there, which is second in importance only to the Confucius Temple in Qufu.23  In 
Shandong Province, the majestic and venerable Confucius temple in Laiyang county was 
torn down and gone.24
With Red Guards wreaking havoc all over the country and in the vicinity of Qufu, 
the fate of the Qufu’s Three Kong Sites was left hanging in the balance. Many questions 
arose, but answers to them were hard to come by. Would Qufu’s Red Guards lay their 
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hands on the Three Kong Sites? How would Qufu’s general population respond to 
possible violence against the crown jewels of Qufu’s culture? If worse came to the worst, 
would Premier Zhou Enlai come to the rescue? After all, didn’t he make the Forbidden 
City off limits to Red Guard attacks and stop hordes of Red Guards in Hangzhou from 
destroying the Lingyin Temple?25
Early Attempts of Red Guard Vandalism in Qufu 
 Time and again, Qufu faced impossible odds in China’s 
long history and, time and again, she survived the unsurvivable.  Would Qufu remain 
unassailable this time or had she run out of luck?   Uncertainty, it seemed, was the only 
certainty facing Qufu. 
As Mao’s birthplace of Shaoshan became China’s new Mecca, the glory of Qufu 
quickly dimmed.  The click-clack of trains crisscrossing the country carrying Red Guards 
to create disorders everywhere finally jolted Qufu’s local officials out of their false sense 
of security. Just two months before in May, they proudly hosted a large group of foreign 
diplomats. When word came in June that Red Guard organizations had appeared at the 
local Qufu Teachers College (QTC), they felt curious and asked, “Why do we need Red 
Guards since we already have our People’s Militia (minbing)?” 26  Even by July when 
Mao’s portraits were omnipresent across China, not a single one was to be found in the 
Confucius Mansion. When Red Guards from QTC provided five portraits of Mao to be 
displayed in the Confucius Mansion, Cui Xuyi asked rhetorically, “Do you really think 
this is an appropriate place to display Chairman Mao’s portraits?”27
                                               
25 After making the Forbidden City off limits to Red Guards attacks, Zhou Enlai proposed a list of other 
sites to be protected across the country but Mao vetoed this idea and Zhou did not persist, in Roderick 
Macfarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, Mao’s Last Revolution, 119.  
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The local cadres’ lack of political sensitivity, though astonishing, was not totally 
unexplainable. Not only had the Three Kong Sites never been an intentional target for 
any serious attacks throughout history, but the communist officials had always gone out 
of their way to protect and preserve the Three Kong Sites, as was the case in 1946 and 
1948 when they first captured and then recaptured Qufu.  The new government 
maintained its funding for the upkeep of the Three Kong Sites even when the Great 
Famine devastated much of the country. Given the history, there was naturally some hope 
on the part of the local officials that, somehow, the Three Kong Sites would survive this 
political storm. Little did they know, however, that this truly unprecedented revolution 
was exceptional in making no exceptions. No sooner had the Beijing Red Guards 
declared war on the Four Olds on August 19 than footsteps of their brethren were already 
heard at Qufu’s gates. Red Guards of all factions, motivations, and origins immediately 
found their way to Qufu, first in a trickle, then in a flood.  
 The first appearance of Red Guards was noticed in mid-August when some 
traveling Red Guards were spotted in Qufu. Soon after, the local Red Guards started to 
become restless as well. Qufu’s local officials became both confused and nervous. 
Although the Sixteen Articles clearly indicated that the vast majority of officials were 
“good” or “fairly good,” officials at all levels came under even more and harsher attacks 
by both the local and traveling Red Guards after August 18.28
                                               
28 CCRG member Zhang Chunqiao noted that by the end of September, almost every provincial and 
municipal party committee was under siege. See Wang Nianyi Da dongluande nianda, [Turbulent Years],  
(Beijing: ren min chu ban she, 2009). 69.  
  Things were especially 
challenging for Qufu officials who happened to be the guardians of the Three Kong Sites, 
which had acquired a new identity as the source of all Four Olds. They knew the Three 




and perplexing for them not to be prepared for the worst.  They held their “disaster 
planning” meetings in the safety of the PLA barracks in Fangshan Commune to avoid 
detection by the Red Guards.29 A decision was soon reached to strengthen the leadership 
of the Cultural Relics Commission in charge of the Three Kong Sites by adding the 
Deputy County Commissioner Wang Huatian to the management team in order to protect 
the Three Kong Sites from either Red Guards from outside or their own employees from 
within.30
 Soon, the first phase of the campaign against the Four Olds erupted in Qufu. It 
was spearheaded by local Qufu Red Guards with neither support nor interference from 
the local government. These Red Guards committed the usual destructive acts associated 
with this campaign, such as changing street names and assaulting local academic 
authorities. Somehow, whether out of their reverence for the Three Kong Sites or respect 
for the State Council protection steles, the Qufu Red Guards seemed totally oblivious to 
the existence of the Three Kong Sites that occupied the center and the bulk of the city. 
However, the Kong sites were too obvious and too large a target to escape the notice of 
outside Red Guards, who did not share local Red Guards’ possible reverence for their 
cultural heritage. So in they came, one after another.  
  
The first batch of marauding Red Guards came to Qufu on August 20. Upon 
arrival, they demanded entry to the Confucius Mansion. Staff members at the mansion 
declined their demand, citing ongoing renovations as the reason. Some Red Guards 
wanted to stay in the International Guesthouse inside the Confucius Mansion but they 
were also refused. Two days later on August 23, the local officials learned that Red 
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Guards from the neighboring Tai’an Hydraulic Academy were smashing cultural relics 
all over the nearby Mount Tai and claimed that Qufu would be their next target. The little 
town of Qufu was immediately abuzz with this disturbing news. Alarmed local officials 
leapt into action and adopted a two-pronged strategy. First, they took proactive measures 
to prevent the local Red Guards from joining forces with the outsiders by asking the 
school officials at the First Middle School of Qufu and Qufu Teachers School to keep the 
students there under control. The county officials then used two reliable constituencies to 
preempt the anticipated assault. The first constituency was the party-faithfuls in the 
student bodies from these two schools; the other was the local peasantry—the party’s 
traditional ally. 
This strategy proved to be effective. Upon hearing the news, outraged local 
students asked, “Who are they to smash our Three Kong Sites?” and wanted to debate 
with the intruders from Tai’an. To them, the Tai’an students were troublemakers who 
were trying to destroy state properties in Qufu. Overnight, students from the First Middle 
School closed three side-doors to the Confucius Temple and posted banners on its main 
gate that read, “Rise up immediately to prevent any destructive acts of the class enemy!” 
and “Long Live Proletarian Dictatorship!” Students from Qufu Teachers School also 
covered the ground outside the main gate of the Confucius Mansion with big-character 
posters and banners and promised swift retribution to anyone who dared to step on 
them.31
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 To intercept the Tai’an students from entering the city, some students were 
dispatched to the eastern, southern, and western gates of the city. As if this was not 
enough to block a small team of teenage Red Guards, peasants were also mobilized to 




these peasants simply put on their chests a piece of red cloth, on which was written their 
indisputable revolutionary credentials, “poor and lower-middle peasants.”32
Having taken these preventative measures, Qufu officials anxiously waited for the 
arrival of the intruders, but the much-anticipated assault by Tai’an Red Guards somehow 
did not materialize on the night of August 23. However, local officials were not taking 
any chances. As a committed communist with impeccable revolutionary credentials, 
Qufu’s Party Secretary Li Xiu made a clear distinction between the Three Kong Sites as a 
symbol of feudalism and the Three Kong Sites as state properties. He viewed the State 
Council protection stele as his license to legitimately block any vandalistic attempts.  
  
On August 24, Li convened an urgent cadre meeting where he outlined his top 
two reasons for protecting the Three Kong Sites: First, they were state property; second, 
they were protected by the State Council. But Li also hastened to underscore the need to 
handle the Red Guards with tact. Li was very confused about the Cultural Revolution, but 
he was not at all confused about the fact that the Red Guards had Chairman Mao’s 
blessings. Just two days before on August 22, a party central document warned against 
any hostility towards the Red Guards.33 Li told the local officials at the meeting to avoid 
confrontations and to make sure to “courteously escort the Red Guards out of Qufu.”34
Just as Qufu officials were busy making plans to keep the outside Red Guards at 
bay, their own backyard was suddenly on fire. It happened when some students from 
QTC met on the night of August 24 to discuss what happened over the past two days.
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They felt ashamed that outside Red Guards were doing their own revolutionary work and 
concluded that they should fire the first shot at the Three Kong Sites. On the morning of 
August 25, three groups of QTC-based Red Guards marched to the Confucius Mansion, 
where they posted big-character posters, chanted Mao’s quotations, and demanded entry 
to the Confucius Mansion. Wang Huatian and Cui Xuyi, two top officials of the newly 
created “crisis management team,” immediately tried to block the Red Guards by citing 
the familiar reasons that Li Xiu iterated at the meeting two days before and that they had 
now learned by heart, “the Confucius Mansion is state property and a state-protected 
cultural unit.” Pointing at the State Council protection stele, Wang Huatian stated 
emphatically, “The State Council protection stele is right there. Take a close look at it. 
Whoever engages in destructive acts will be breaking the law of the land!”36
Unable to challenge the authority of the State Council under Zhou Enlai, the local 
Red Guards took out their frustration on Wang Huatian. Calling him a watchdog of 
Confucius, the Red Guards began to rough Wang up when dozens of mansion workers 
suddenly emerged from the Confucius Mansion and confronted the Red Guards. 
“Chairman Mao did not say the Confucius Mansion is Four Olds,” they told the students 
bluntly. “All we know is this mansion is the work of generations of our forefathers. If you 
want to smash it, show us government papers!”
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  Unable to respond, the students had to 
abandon their attempt. But they were frustrated. Chairman Mao said “to rebel is 
justified,” but they did not know how to overcome the two overwhelming barriers to their 
rebellion: the protection steles and mansion workers with far superior proletarian 
credentials. 




 Just as the fire in the backyard was temporarily contained, the threat from the 
outside Red Guards returned. On the evening of August 25, the much-feared Tai’an Red 
Guards finally appeared in Qufu. Upon arrival, they networked with the Qufu Hydraulic 
Academy students and worked on their plan to storm the Three Kong Sites the following 
morning. Deputy County Party Secretary Zhang Yumei found out their plan and went to 
meet them in hopes of persuading them to give up their plan, but to no avail.38
August 26 was an eventful day in Qufu’s history.  Early that morning, Li Xiu 
gathered party secretaries from all brigades in the Chenguan Commune for another “pre-
battle” talk.
 The assault 
by Tai’an students had now become a matter of time.  
39
As soon as the meeting was over, members of Red Rebels—Qufu’s first peasant 
Red Guards organization under the leadership of Nanguan Brigade Party Secretary Zhang 
Fuhai—immediately set out to stand guard at the Confucius Mansion and began 
patrolling the city.
 He compared students’ attempts to storm the Confucius Mansion to the 
1956 Hungarian Revolt and called on peasants to unite to protect state properties. Li’s 
urgent meeting was not just a knee-jerk reaction. As the meeting was going on, Red 
Guards from QTC who were rebuffed the day before were out on the Qufu streets again 
posting banners attacking the two “watchdogs of Confucius” Wang and Cui, who blocked 
their attempts to rebel against the Kong sites the day before.   
40
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 Using peasants was a calculated move on the part of the Qufu 
officials. They had all the security personnel they needed to guard the Kong sites, but 
39 Chenguan Commune is closest to the city of Qufu.  
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Red Guards and peasant Red Guards. Members of this peasant Red Guard organization were mostly 
militiamen and Communist Youth League members, which was quite common for peasant Red Guard 




they chose to let the peasants handle the Red Guards as they knew only the politically 
correct peasants had the necessary credentials to handle the students backed by the Great 
Leader.    
 On the afternoon of August 26, twenty-nine Tai’an students finally marched to 
the now well-guarded Confucius Mansion. As they began to read the Sixteen Articles, a 
ritual practice in those days, to justify their demands, scores of peasant Red Guards led 
by Zhang Fuhai rushed to the Confucius Mansion to handle the intruders. A brief scuffle 
between the peasants and students ensued, but the greatly outnumbered Tai’an students 
were quickly out-muscled by the peasants before they even had a chance to make their 
arguments. Instead, they were called “hooligans” and “fake Red Guards” by the 
peasants.41
The scuffle outside the Confucius Mansion became the talk of the town 
immediately. That evening, crowds of townspeople began to congregate around the 
Confucius Mansion and discussed the day’s events when they witnessed yet another Red 
Guard attempt to clear the hurdle to an assault on the Kong sites. At about 8 p.m., about a 
dozen Red Guards from QTC showed up before the Confucius Mansion and specifically 
demanded to see Qufu’s party boss Li Xiu. The students had learned the lesson of their 
fellow Red Guards from Tai’an and decided to avoid any direct confrontation with the 
peasants or workers. Instead, they went after the peasants’ backers, namely, the 
 In the face of the overwhelming power of the Qufu party apparatus and the 
peasants under its control, the much-feared assault on the Confucius Mansion by the 
Tai’an students simply fizzled out.  The party-peasant alliance proved to be an effective 
model for fending off marauding Red Guards.  
                                               




politically inferior and vulnerable local party leaders. It was a savvy strategic move in 
theory, but it did not even stand a chance in practice.   
As soon as the students demanded to meet Li Xiu, Zhang Fuhai, the party 
secretary-turned leader of the recently formed peasant Red Guards, tried a stalling tactic 
by asking the students to come back the next day while sending for reinforcements at the 
same time. The students refused to leave. The situation quickly deteriorated, but Zhang’s 
reinforcements arrived at the right moment. They were peasants from other brigades of 
the nearby Chenguan Commune led by their respective party secretaries. Meanwhile, 
enraged townspeople began to swarm towards the Confucius Mansion to show support 
for the defenders of the Kong sites. To make the situation even more explosive, over 100 
Red Guard reinforcements from QTC also arrived to support their fellow Red Guards. 
Immediately, the short Donghuamen Street on which the Confucius Mansion was situated 
was packed with partisans from both sides.42
Chaos ensued. The two camps, one the Red Guards from QTC and the other the 
peasants, militia, and residents, got into heated arguments. With all the shouting, 
screaming and pushing around, the situation began to spiral out of control. A team of 
PLA soldiers suddenly appeared out of nowhere to separate the two sides but they soon 
lost control of the situation too. Before long, what happened in the afternoon repeated 
itself: The attackers were hopelessly outnumbered by the defenders, who strong-armed 
their opponents into small groups and then pushed them around and roughed them up. 
Some female students even had their clothes torn off and were heard screaming.
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Faced with adversaries with sounder revolutionary pedigree and greater physical 
strength, the students quickly retreated. But even fleeing became a struggle for some 
students as they continued to be harassed and beaten. Some were even pushed into the 
Confucius Mansion and roughed up inside it. What started as a daring challenge to the 
county party leadership for their protection of the Kong sites ended as a fiasco for the 
attackers.  The confrontation became so lopsided in favor of the defenders that a vice 
president of QTC sympathetic to the Red Guards called the behind-the-scene county 
officials and threatened them with grave consequences unless they ordered the peasants 
to free the students immediately. It was a credible threat. The county officials summoned 
the peasant leaders and ordered the immediate release of the students, but it was not until 
three o’clock the next morning when the crestfallen students managed to return to the 
QTC campus.44
Preventing Future Attacks 
 
Although the Qufu government prevailed over some loosely connected Red Guard 
organizations, the county officials knew only too well that their success was attributable 
to the fact that they had support from or control of local students, peasants, townspeople 
and the military as well as the backing of the party establishment and the State Council. 
While the Red Guards’ defeat was practically a foregone conclusion, the county officials 
also knew that it was Red Guards that they defeated, not the traditional class enemies. 
They realized their victory might be temporary and proceeded to take preventative 
measures to avert possible future assaults.  
                                               




To begin with, they reported the events of August 26 to the Ministry of Culture 
and the provincial government. They were relieved to learn that, while all the commotion 
was going on on August 26, some students from the First Middle School of Qufu actually 
telephoned the State Council and were told that cultural relics must be protected and not 
willfully vandalized. The students posted the State Council’s instructions all over the 
town to prove the righteousness of Qufu’s responses to the Red Guard attacks.45
Another piece of encouraging news came on September 3 when local officials 
learned from a QTC Red Guard leaflet that, also on August 26, five QTC students 
actually had a dialogue in Beijing with some officials of the Bureau of Cultural Relics 
under the Ministry of Culture about how to handle cultural relics in the Cultural 
Revolution. The outcome of this meeting also confirmed the appropriateness of the way 
Qufu officials handled the crisis. The State Council made it clear that cultural relic sites 
should be closed off, rather than destroyed, and the handling of the Palace Museum in 
Beijing served as a good model for other cultural relic sites.
  
46
As if to confirm and reinforce this message, the State Council asked the Qufu 
government to send an official and a student representative with party membership to 
attend a special meeting in Beijing to discuss the issue of how to properly handle the 
Three Kong Sites. On September 5, Qufu County Commissioner Gao Keming went to 
Beijing with QTC Red Guard Wang Zhengxin to attend this meeting but, Wang, who was 
not a party member, was replaced by a QTC student who was. Gao and the student were 
  There seemed little doubt 
now that the State Council disapproved of any vandalism or destruction targeting the 
Three Kong Sites. 
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to have a three-party meeting with an official in the Ministry of Culture. However, before 
the meeting, this official had a one-on-one meeting with Gao without the knowledge of 
the student. Gao updated the official on the events of August 26, and the two discussed 
ways to handle the student representative at the meeting.47
The subsequent three-party meeting began with the student representative 
accusing the Qufu government of protecting the Four Olds and suppressing the student 
movement and Commissioner Gao defending the county government’s response. At this 
point, the official from the Ministry of Culture stopped their wrangling and helped them 
reach an agreement. It stipulated that there was going to be incremental reform of the 
Three Kong Sites based on a 1965 blueprint of the Qufu government for the reform of 
those sites. No physical destruction would be involved in the process, but the Three Kong 
Sites would eventually be open to the public and serve a “class education” purpose. Gao 
and the student representative both agreed that this reform would commence after the fall 
harvest.
 This process was not unlike 
what happened in 1946 when the new government negotiated conditions and tactics with 
the administrators of the Confucius Mansion behind the backs of the peasants before the 
massive peasant rally against the Confucius Mansion took place.  
48
Although as a result of this meeting the immediate threat to the Three Kong Sites 
was removed, Qufu officials felt it was important to make a public statement that they 
wanted to protect the Three Kong Sites for a sound political reason but that they were by 
no means opposed to destroying “legitimate Four Olds” per se. To prove this, they 
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launched a second round of the campaign against the Four Olds in Qufu in early 
September.  
The second round of the campaign had a few distinctive characteristics of its own. 
First, it happened at a time when the nationwide Destroy the Four Olds frenzy that flared 
up in “Red August” had already significantly waned. Second, it was carried out in the 
entire culturally rich county of Qufu rather than just the city proper, as was the case in the 
first round in late August. Third, it was a top-down operation completely initiated, 
planned, and implemented by the Qufu government as all the personnel in the county 
apparatus, from militia to members of the Communist Youth League were involved. By 
contrast, the nationwide campaign against the Four Olds was almost unanimously a 
“spontaneous” bottom-up mass movement with very limited, if any, direct involvement 
on the part of the local government. Fourth, it happened at a busy season in rural China, 
and the Central Committee had issued a circular around the same time that specified that 
the campaign against the Four Olds in rural China should be conducted only during the 
non-peak time.49
In this second round, all the “Four Olds” in the possession of either the “class 
enemies” or the poor peasants were fair games. Other than the Three Kong Sites and the 
Temples to Duke Zhou and Yan Hui that were marked as off limits, countless other 
cultural and historical relics in Qufu were methodically identified and physically 
destroyed. The Qufu government even created a special incentive whereby whoever 
pulled down any historical or cultural relics got to keep any reusable materials from 
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them, such as stones and bricks.50
Despite all that had been said, done, and agreed upon, Qufu officials still felt the 
Three Kong Sites were not out of the woods yet. This was because the mind-boggling 
Cultural Revolution was still evolving at a head-spinning pace and traveling Red Guards 
would still stop by and ask about why the Kong sites were left untouched. By late 
September as the personality cult of Mao and the revolutionary fanaticism reached 
another all-time high, an opportunity suddenly presented itself to Qufu officials. A Red 
Guard organization at the Beijing Institute of Aeronautics invented a new fad whereby 
they attempted to turn China into a “Red Sea” by painting bright red revolution slogans 
and images “on all available space” including doors, houses, and even toilet walls.
 Soon, house by house, village by village, and 
community by community, a significant part of what made the millenniums-old Qufu one 
of the preeminent world culture centers was systematically dismantled for the first time in 
history—not by any wartime intruders or natural disasters, but by its own people in 
peacetime. Qufu was in mourning, but there was still some consolation to be had in this 
state-initiated self-destruction campaign: the Three Kong Sites and the Temples to the 
Duke of Zhou and Yan Hui remained standing, erect and intact.  
51
The Qufu Cultural Relics Commission also exploited this upsurge of zealotry to 
conceal some valuable items and statues in the Confucius Mansion and Temple with 
revolutionary slogans and Mao’s quotations in hopes of discouraging attempts to damage 
the items behind or beneath the slogans. They covered the stone lions at the front gate of 
the Confucius Mansion with Mao’s quotations “We must believe in the masses; we must 
 This 
new fad soon spread near and far, turning the country into a “red sea.”  
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believe in the Party. These are two fundamental principles.” The county leaders were so 
proud of this innovative idea that they went one step further by relocating the entire Qufu 
County Agricultural Exhibition from a nearby location to the Hall of Great Perfection in 
the Confucius Temple. They tried to cover the statue of Confucius, the four correlates and 
the twelve philosophers with various decorative pictures and exhibits.52 Similar “cover-
up” practices were also widely adopted all over the country. They became so successful 
that eventually the CCRG banned this “devious” practice of painting everything red and 
Zhou Enlai also described it as a “deliberate attempt to boycott big-character posters.53
By the end of September and in early October, the Destroy the Four Olds frenzy 
had already peaked and the Qufu officials had every reason to congratulate themselves 
for having accomplished a tour-de-force in protecting their cultural assets. After all, they 
were guarding the “root of all Four Olds” which had been targets for relentless and 
continuous attacks by Red Guards of all colors and shades. Compared with other 
prominent historical sites, Qufu did especially well. Other than the Palace Museum that 
was closed off and then guarded by the military allegedly at the order of Zhou Enlai, all 
other sites were attacked by teenaged Red Guards across the country. Wherever Red 
Guards attacked, there was often spontaneous or organized resistance to the attacks by 
local officials, residents, and oftentimes college students, but most defensive measures 
were unsuccessful.  This was why Qufu officials and community stood out so 
remarkably. They soundly beat back every attempt at the Three Kong Sites. The only 
time any Red Guards were in the Confucius Mansion was when they were pulled in and 
beaten by the defenders on August 26.  
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By early October, Qufu officials were finally able to put the safety of the Three 
Kong Sites aside for a while and began to busy themselves with the “grasp revolution and 
promote production” campaign and the preparation of the fall harvest and planting. They 
could tackle the reform of the Three Kong Sites later, or so they thought. Little did they 
know, however, that another storm was already brewing in the nation’s capital—one that 
was soon going to engulf Qufu with earth-shattering consequences.   
Conspiracy in Beijing  
Qufu officials’ sense of security stood in sharp contrast with the rapid 
development of the Cultural Revolution at the nation’s capital. Having failed to dislodge 
Liu Shaoqi and win over the party establishment under him, Mao launched the campaign 
against the bourgeois reactionary line in early October, 1966.54  On October 3, a Red Flag 
editorial titled “March Forward along the Broad Road of Mao Zedong Thought” fired the 
first salvo of the nationwide campaign to criticize the “bourgeois reactionary line,” 
namely, Liu and the entire party establishment under him that resisted Mao’s Cultural 
Revolution. On October 6, the “Red Third Command Post,” a coalition of college Red 
Guard organizations in Beijing, held a mass rally of over 100,000 people to denounce the 
bourgeois reactionary line and its representatives Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. From 
October 9 through October 28, Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping repudiated themselves at 
the Central Work Conference.55
                                               
54 The campaign against the bourgeois reactionary line was launched by Mao in late 1966 to purge the party 
establishment and incumbent bureaucracy. It was synonymous with Mao’s effort to remove his former 
comrades from the party and the government who were supposed to have followed “bourgeois and 
reactionary” policies and practices.  The eventual outcome of the campaign was the removal of the old 
government and the establishment in 1969 of a government loyal to Mao.  
  The fall of Liu and the old party establishment was 
followed by the rise of several political upstarts. Chief among them were the CCRG and 




the pro-CCRG college Red Guards. Two individuals from each group were going to 
collaborate and plunge Qufu into another round of confusion, disorder, and chaos. 
On the afternoon of October 25, Tan Houlan went to see Lin Jie. Tan was the 
head of the Jinggangshan Regiment, a Red Guards organization at the Beijing Normal 
University. Lin was Tan’s mentor and an editor at the Red Flag, an official party 
theoretical journal. Earlier that month, Tan’s organization stormed the Da Qing 
Exhibition in Beijing at Lin Jie’s suggestion in an attempt to discredit Liu’s officials Yu 
Qiuli and Tao Lujia. That afternoon, Tan went to Lin’s place to give him a progress 
report on a project that Lin proposed earlier. Lin wanted the Jinggangshan Regiment to 
“take the Cultural Revolution to the Da Qing Oilfield” in Northeast China as a follow-up 
operation of their earlier attack on the Da Qing Exhibition. Tan had already made 
concrete plans for this trip but wanted to seek Lin’s further guidance. 
 Tan and Lin had forged a unique partnership and fought together through thick 
and thin. Born in Hunan Province in 1940, Tan joined the party in 1958 and worked as a 
middle school teacher of political education in Hunan until she joined the BNU as a 
cadre-turned student.56
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 Although a rather average student, Tan, due to her sound political 
background, was “loaned” to the Red Flag at the end of 1965 when she was a graduating 
senior. Tan’s job was to assist Lin Jie, an influential and well-connected editor at the 
publication, with research for his attack articles on the Beijing party establishment and 
cultural circles, most notably the “Three Family Village.” This chance meeting between 
Tan and Lin was a life-changing event that was going to transform Tan the ordinary 




gained access to a great deal of inside information but also became acquainted with 
nearly all the leaders of the CCRG who happened to be associated with this influential 
journal, such as its editor-in-chief Chen Boda, deputy editor-in-chief  Guan Feng, and Qi 
Benyu, the head of the journal’s history group.57
But it was Lin Jie who exerted the most influence on Tan. Lin and Tan had much 
in common. Both were party members before they became teachers and both were cadre-
turned students at BNU. After he graduated from BNU in 1961, Lin landed a job at 
CCP’s mouthpiece Red Flag as a writer in the philosophy and history group under its 
chief Guan Feng whose worldviews and modus operandi exerted significant influence on 
the younger Lin. He soon proved to be a worthy follower of Guan, with his first major 
essay attacking Confucius and his second targeting Confucian scholar Feng Youlan. 
Before long, he joined the ranks of prominent leftist writers, such as Yao Wenyuan and 
Qi Benyu, and endeared himself to top CCRG members Kang Sheng, Chen Boda, and 
eventually even to Mao himself.
 
58
Lin and Tan were eight years apart, but they formed a mutually beneficial 
relationship. Although Lin was technically not a member of the CCRG, he was 
nonetheless closely connected with some ultra-radical members of the CCRG, such as Qi 
Benyu and Guan Feng, and had a reputation for being the voice for the CCRG.  
Oftentimes, Red Guards would sound out Lin Jie first before deciding if a high-profile 
project would be worth the effort and risk.
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privy to a great many confidential CCRG discussions and decisions.60
The two put their partnership to work at every opportunity. As soon as the 
People’s Daily published Nie Yuanzi’s big-character poster on June 2, for instance, Tan 
returned to the BNU on June 3 to post her own even more radical big-character poster 
attacking the BNU party chief. BNU people began to wonder who this daredevil Tan 
Houlan was and many more wanted to debate with this “anti-party student.”  But Tan was 
nowhere to be found as she had already returned to Red Flag as soon as she “set the fire” 
at the BNU. It was not until two days later on June 5 when the People’s Daily carried an 
editorial supporting attacks on party authorities on campuses did people begin to realize 
that Tan was ahead of them and toeing the CCRG line.
 Consequently, she 
was able to keep her husband abreast of the goings-on at the CCRG and enabled him to 
have the “information advantage.” Through Lin and her own exposure to the day-to-day 
activities at Red Flag, Tan gained insider’s knowledge on the latest developments in the 
Cultural Revolution. This proved to be critical for Tan’s eventual rise to stardom. Lin, on 
the other hand, used Tan as a means to increase his revolutionary credentials as well as 
his eyes, ears, and, at times, fists. 
61
Despite isolation from her fellow students and persecution from the work group 
for her June 3 poster, Tan became even better known just two weeks later. On June 20, 
Tan Houlan and sixteen other BNU students put out a big-character poster attacking Sun 
Youyu, head of the BNU work group. Sun dismissed their criticisms and labeled the 
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students “counterrevolutionaries” and “cow demons and snake spirits.”62
Tan’s gamble paid off when her problems began to be her political asset. With 
Lin Jie’s intervention, the CCRG came to Tan’s rescue even before the “Fifty Days of 
White Terror” was over.
 Many students 
collapsed under the pressure. They repented or committed suicide, but Tan refused to be 
subdued; her contact with Lin assured her that she was on the side of the winning team 
despite temporary setbacks.  
63  As early as July 10 when the “anti-interference campaign” that 
Liu launched to crack down on rebellious students was still raging on campuses, the new 
mayor of Beijing Wu De was already at the BNU where he fired the work group and 
publicly vindicated Tan.64
Tan was victorious and her popularity continued to rise, especially after Mao’s 
return to Beijing on July 18 to “personally lead the Cultural Revolution.”  On July 27, 
key members of CCRG Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng, and Chen Boda attended a BNU rally. 
Each spoke in support of the persecuted students.  Kang Sheng specifically accused the 
BNU work group of trying to use Tan to “target comrade Lin Jie, a leftist from the Red 
Flag.” He went so far as to publicly proclaim that Lin Jie was supported by Guan Feng, 
who was in turn supported by Chen Boda and himself, practically acknowledging Tan 
  On July 12, Cao Yiou, wife of CCRG key member Kang 
Sheng, came to the BNU on behalf of the CCRG to investigate the work group’s 
persecution of Tan. On July 16, Sun Youyu was officially relieved of his duty as head of 
the BNU work group.  
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was doing the job for the CCRG. Kang Sheng then introduced Lin Jie to the rally as a 
BNU alumnus and a CCRG-trusted member. 65 As a result, Tan’s political capital rose 
sharply again. But good tidings kept coming for her. On July 29, Tan attended a rally for 
Cultural Revolution activists at the People’s Hall and was received by Mao. With her 
“correct” political position publicly recognized, Tan’s fame was guaranteed.66
After the 11th Plenum of the Eighth Party Congress in early August and following 
Mao’s August 5 “Bombarding the Headquarters” in support of the students as well as the 
release of the Sixteen Articles on August 8, Tan’s popularity soared.  On August 23, she 
formed her own organization Jinggangshan Regiment, served as its commissar, and 
became a prominent student leader. She became so well known that even Mao 
affectionately called her “an empress” and “a tough woman.” 
  
67
After Tan became rehabilitated and a magnet to her former BNU opponents, she 
continued her alliance with Lin, except her work now was made easier since she had an 
organization at her disposal. In a race for radicalism, Tan plunged herself into taking out 
one CCRG target after another, including the aforementioned Da Qing Exhibition. 
Despite all these special operations, Tan still paled in comparison with her fellow, more 
charismatic student leaders, each of whom had a special badge of honor, whether it was 
Nie Yuanzi’s first big-character poster, Kuai Dafu’s hunger strike, Han Aijing’s famous 
sit-in, or Wang Dabing’s four trips to the Ministry of Geology.”
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fellow Red Guards referred to her as “the least impressive of all five student leaders.”69 
To make matters worse, towards the end of October, an internal split within the 
Jinggangshan Regiment emerged with some members accusing Tan’s faction of being 
“old men” (laotouzi) and too “measured (wen).”70
While the “chili girl” from Mao’s hometown of Xiangtang County was 
determined to find a public relations success, the pool of targets was running low towards 
the end of October. With so many college Red Guard organizations in Beijing, there was 
a kind of “Enclosure Movement” where college Red Guard organizations were racing 
against one another to see who could hit new and big targets first so as to earn their 
bragging rights. Marshall Peng Dehuai had two teams of Red Guards competing with 
each other to bring him from Sichuan to Beijing to be harassed and persecuted.
 Tan badly needed her own legendary 
experience to boost her public profile and quell the emerging internal revolt.   
71
Rallying the Troops   
 Tan did 
storm the Da Qing Exhibition, but it did not create enough publicity. She badly needed 
something newer, bigger, and more novel.  
Suddenly, the “earth-shattering project” for which Tan had been hoping emerged. 
At her meeting with Lin on the afternoon of October 25, when she was to update him on 
her organization’s preparatory work for the trip to the Da Qing Oilfield, Lin asked her if 
she was personally interested in participating in the Great Exchanges of Revolutionary 
Experience. Tan responded almost by reflex with an enthusiastic “Of course!” Pleased 
with her reply, Lin continued, “I suggest a place, a good place. It is Confucius’s 
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hometown in Qufu, Shandong. Go there and rebel against Confucius.” Lin went on to 
explain the significance of the proposed Qufu expedition—to finish the unfinished job 
left from the May Fourth Movement and to attack the Confucian Family Shop which was 
the root of Four Olds.  The tasks, Lin stressed, “have now fallen on the shoulders of the 
Red Guards who should take the lead in completing the unfinished work left by those 
with historical limitations.” Lin asked Tan to go back to the BNU to “fan some flames” 
and find out if her organization had any interest in going to Qufu.72  Tan was overjoyed to 
be trusted with this high-sounding, promising project where she could combine 
completing the unfinished work of the May Fourth Movement with eradicating the root 
of the Four Olds. It was a defining moment for her as a Red Guard leader. Tan’s ego 
“simply exploded” upon hearing Lin’s suggestion.73
 Lin was pleased with Tan’s reaction. The mission ahead was actually far more 
complex and challenging than Lin was ready to admit to Tan at this initial meeting. He 
revealed enough to get Tan excited. Tan bit on the enticing bait immediately, but this 
skillful agitator chose to walk carefully this time. A successful expedition to Qufu was as 
much Tan’s ticket to glory and fame as it was his, but Lin was keenly aware that this 
particular path was paved with potholes and roadblocks. One wrong move and he could 
jeopardize his own political career. But it was too tempting an opportunity for him not to 
give it a try.  
 She hopped on her bike and rushed 
back to the BNU to share the great news with her fellow Red Guards and “fan some 
flames.”  
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Lin had been studying the political benefit and feasibility of this project for quite 
some time. As one who made his first pot of “political gold” attacking Confucius in the 
early 1960s, he was intimately familiar with the political sensitivity of the debate 
surrounding the role of Confucianism in the PRC. He knew his mentor Guan Feng was 
snubbed at the 1962 Confucius Forum.  He also knew that on July 30, Mao’s wife Jiang 
Qing, the de facto chief of the CCRG, publicly denounced the 1962 Forum at the Chinese 
Science Academy, calling it a “pilgrimage conference [to Confucius]” and connecting it 
to the pro-regime [Liu] conservative intellectuals.” He further knew Chen Boda on 
September 16 also made a public speech at a mass rally in which he repeated Jiang 
Qing’s characterization of the 1962 Forum.74 On October 23, Lin met Zhao Yiming at 
Guan Feng’s home. Zhao was a teacher from Qufu’s QTC and a mutual friend of Lin and 
Guan as he joined Guan in the 1962 Confucius Forum and worked with Lin at the Red 
Flag in early 1966 in their attacks on the Beijing cultural circles. At this meeting, Zhao 
briefed Lin and Guan on the Red Guard debacles in Qufu on August 26.75
Lin was intrigued by this information and his acute political sensitivity helped 
him recognize an opportunity of a lifetime. He realized that a Red Guard expedition to 
Qufu could be a stone that could kill multiple birds. First, it would hit Qufu’s Three Kong 
Sites or “the root of all Four Olds” for the first time. Second, it would further damage the 
reputations of old “black gang” members of Zhou Yang and Wu Han, who backed the 
1962 Confucius Forum.
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 Third, it would further diminish the status of the fast-falling Liu 
Shaoqi, who borrowed Confucian notions of cultivation in his signature book on how to 
75 KFDJN, 67.  




be a good communist. Fourth, it would undermine the authority of Liu’s party base in 
both Shandong Province and Qufu. And last, but not least, it would challenge the 
authority of the State Council—its stone steles were a major cause of Red Guards’ 
humiliating defeat on August 26 and its chief Zhou Enlai had been a persistent but hard-
to-remove barrier to the CCRG’s radical political agenda.  A Red Guards expedition to 
Qufu in the name of the campaign against the Four Olds could potentially hit CCRG’s 
old, current, and potential targets all at once. 
 Operationally, the politically shrewd Lin also recognized two factors that would 
contribute to the success of the expedition. First, Lin was no longer just a theorist and an 
armchair general but someone with a real organization at his disposal, namely, Tan 
Houlan’s Jinggangshan Regiment that had been hitting Lin’s targets at the snap of his 
fingers. Second, the political circumstance was ideal for the expedition—the Work 
Conference of the Party Central had just ousted Liu Shaoqi, and the CCRG became the 
only correct and legitimate voice from the top. Neither Shandong provincial nor Qufu 
local governments were likely to effectively resist the Red Guards this time because the 
Qufu-bound Red Guards would have the full support of the CCRG, which in turn would 
have the full support of Chairman Mao. Of course, there was another apparent motive for 
Lin’s interest in the Qufu expedition: this pet project of his would further endear him to 
both CCRG top leaders Jiang Qing and Chen Boda and boost his own status in Mao’s 
inner circle. In short, notwithstanding some possible political risks, the benefits of the 
Qufu expedition seemed limitless and the political circumstances for it couldn’t have 




Lin was totally convinced of the merit of his bold ideas, but he knew he needed 
the endorsement and blessing of his superiors to ensure the smooth operation of the 
expedition. Consequently, he consulted with his mentor Guan Feng. However, Guan was 
not supportive because he felt Tan’s organization, with a membership of 500 from a 
campus of 5,000 students, was too small for this major operation. “They had barely 
gained their foothold at the BNU,” Guan recalled in 1991, “What business did they have 
going to Qufu?”77 Lin also consulted Qi Benyu, an influential member of the CCRG who 
was at that time also serving as Mao’s personal secretary. Qi lent his full support to Lin 
and the idea was approved.78
Lin’s initial conversation with Tan proved to be a good start. Upon her return 
from Lin’s place on the evening of October 25, Tan convened a meeting of the leaders of 
the Jinggangshan Regiment where she relayed Lin’s proposal and her own thoughts on 
the proposal. As expected, Lin’s lofty ideas associated with the Qufu expedition 
resonated well with the key members of her organization. They were not only 
mesmerized by the political significance of the expedition, but they also knew that, from 
a practical standpoint, Lin was a voice for the CCRG and therefore a safe person to 
follow.  A decision was soon made to broadcast the expedition through the BNU campus 
public announcement system to recruit people immediately in order to have enough 
participants since so many people were involved with the Great Exchanges of 
 Having weighed all the pros and cons and secured necessary 
support from the top, Lin proceeded to implement his audacious and creative project.  
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Revolutionary Experience away from the capital city. Over 200 people signed up as soon 
as the word got out on the BNU campus.79
Having successfully “fanned some flames” and attracted sufficient people to the 
expedition, Tan returned to Lin’s place to update him on her progress and told Lin that 
her organization would be ready for the Qufu expedition shortly.  Lin was pleased to see 
the enthusiastic response to his proposal but, as Tan’s mentor, he also realized this was a 
teachable moment. He calmed her and educated the politically naïve Tan about the 
complexity of the Qufu expedition.  “Are you going to rebel against just Confucius?” Lin 
asked rhetorically and then continued, “Confucius has been dead for over 2,000 years and 
you are still going to rise against him. Before you go to Shandong, you need to figure out 
the practical significance of your mission first.”
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Lin elaborated on the last point. He pointed out the fact that both the 1961 State 
Council steles and the 1962 Forum had the blessings and fingerprints of Premier Zhou 
although ostensibly they were the projects overseen by Zhou’s subordinates Zhou Yang 
 For a moment, Tan could not decipher 
what her mentor was getting at and looked perplexed. Lin expected this and proceeded to 
give her a quick overview of the real purposes and challenges of the Qufu expedition. He 
began by showing Tan Chen Boda’s September 16 speech on the 1962 Confucius Forum 
and gave her an overview of the Three Kong Sites as Tan knew practically nothing about 
Qufu and Confucianism. He then proceeded to cover all the important and sensitive 
aspects of the expedition that he made no mention of in his initial conversation with Tan, 
including the 1962 Confucius Forum, the Red Guards’ humiliating defeats on August 26, 
and how and why State Council’s protection steles contributed to their defeat.  
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and Lu Dingyi (Vice Premier of the State Council).   Lin went on to reveal the most 
important objective of his proposal: “Your trip to Qufu is more than just targeting the 
dead. You must connect the dead with the living and Confucianism with the current class 
struggle and line struggle.”  Lin then posed a surprising question to the now perplexed 
and startled Tan, “If you targeted the Confucius Family Shop, would the premier not 
intervene? What are you going to do if he did?”81 He urged Tan to recognize the 
challenges and be prepared both organizationally and ideologically but cautioned her 
against any rash action, “This is not the time yet when you can point your fingers directly 
at the premier.” Tan had followed Lin for a while now and completed a few daring acts 
Lin assigned her, but she never thought Zhou Enlai was on the other side and could be a 
fair target too. She asked Lin, “Does this mean the premier has been a member of the 
black line too?” Lin replied, “It does, doesn’t it? You can figure it out for yourself.”82
Having confided in Tan the more important reasons for the Qufu expedition, Lin 
proceeded to guide her on how to best approach it. “Before you go to Shandong,” Lin 
suggested, “you should prepare a few documents. One is a declaration of war on 
Confucius; one is a declaration to smash the protection steles; and one is a letter to the 
people of Shandong.” Lin was fully aware of the causes of the August 26 debacles and 
his three steps would help address each of those causes. The declaration of war on 
Confucius would provide the ideological legitimation for the expedition; the declaration 
to smash the steles would help remove both the operational obstacles and the ultimate 
barrier to attacks on the Three Kong Sites; the letter to the people of Shandong would 
drive a wedge between the local authorities and their support base, namely, peasants, 
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townspeople, and conservative students, who thwarted Red Guards attempts in August. 
To ease any concern Tan might have once they arrived in Qufu, Lin also assured Tan of 
local support from his friend Zhao Yimin at QTC. He then instructed Tan to work out a 
concrete plan with her fellow Red Guards.  
 Tan returned to the BNU and gave her fellow Red Guards a watered-down 
version of what Lin just shared with her. Using the language familiar to her comrades, 
she educated them about how the supporters and protectors of the Three Kong Sites were 
actually the pro-Liu Royalists (baohuangdang), such as the State Council and reactionary 
academic authorities. She elevated the purpose of the expedition from “combining 
Destroying the Four Olds with completing the unfinished work of the May Fourth 
Movement” to “combining the campaign against the Four Olds with the campaign against 
the bourgeois reactionary line.”  At a time when the bourgeois reactionary line was 
practically the strongest curse word everywhere in China, nothing could have been more 
exciting and motivating for the Red Guards than combining two grand missions of the 
Cultural Revolution into one trip. Everyone was thoroughly sold on Tan’s new 
justifications for the Qufu expedition. No one realized that Tan actually did not disclose 
what Lin Jie told her about Zhou Enlai’s role in it. It was from that point on that Tan’s 
purpose of the Qufu expedition took on a different meaning from that of other 
participants of the expedition.83
 Excited about the noble objectives of the expedition, Tan and her fellow Red 
Guards followed Lin’s instructions to produce a concrete plan for the expedition and 
proposed eleven actionable items. Quite a few of them were elaborations of Lin’s original 
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recommendations, including forging an alliance with the local Red Guards and 
mobilizing the local peasantry. Some items were a radicalization of Lin’s original 
recommendations, such as switching “A letter to the people of Shandong” to “A letter to 
the whole country” and Tan’s suggestion to change “the declaration to smash the steles” 
to “a letter of protest to the State Council” to point the finger directly at the State Council. 
Some items were purely their own creations, including burning Confucius statues, 
leveling the Confucius tomb, establishing an anti-Confucius liaison station to unite all 
Red Guard organizations, and sending one advance team each to the Shandong and Qufu 
governments to secure their support for the mission of the expedition.84
Recognizing the critical importance of support from the CCRG, Tan and her 
fellow Red Guards also included in the plan three items that would ensure support and 
guidance from the CCRG through Lin Jie during the expedition. One was the 
establishment of a “home office” in Beijing responsible for communication with the 
CCRG and Lin Jie during the expedition; one was the decision to have Lin Jie review and 
approve all the related documents for the expedition; the third one was to request Lin Jie 
to make a pre-expedition pep talk to expedition members.
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 Having mobilized the key members of her organization, Tan moved on to 
motivate all other members of Jinggangshan Regiment. On October 28, she held a 
meeting for the lower-level cadres of the Jinggangshan Regiment where she once again 
successfully excited her audience with the same rhetoric of combining the campaign 
against the Four Olds with the campaign against the bourgeois reactionary line. After 
  With this long list of 
thoughtfully chosen items, a blueprint for the Qufu expedition was born.  
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having Zhang Daoying, the designated head of the advance team to Qufu and a graduate 
of QTC, introduce Qufu to those cadres, Tan took over the floor and began to reveal a bit 
more of what Lin Jie told her was the true purpose of the Qufu expedition. “We are going 
to Qufu not just to denounce Confucius,” Tan reminded everyone, “Rather, we must 
combine denouncing Confucius with the practical class struggle and line struggle.” She 
cautioned everyone against the resistance they were going to face but asked them to rebel 
against anyone who dared to stop them from rebelling against the Confucius Family, 
“whoever he is and whatever his position, seniority, and prestige.”86
Tan’s motivational skills produced impressive results. After several mobilization 
speeches, more people signed up for the expedition, including some junior faculty 
members and those who were not members of Jinggangshan Regiment. The rank-and-file 
Red Guards were truly motivated and wrote “resolution letters” to show their resolve. 
Their sincerity was reflected in the comments by Zhang Daoying, head of the advance 
team to Qufu, who recalled years later, “We were truly inspired by an ideal. Others used 
the Great Exchanges of Revolutionary Experience for pleasure trips…but we went to 
Qufu to dig out the root of Four Olds.”
 It was code language 
frequently used by members of the CCRG to attack Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and even 
Zhou Enlai.  
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No matter how impressive Tan’s motivational skills, she realized and people 
knew that there was no Tan Houlan without Lin Jie. Although Lin was rejected and 
unpopular at BNU in the earlier months of the summer for his support of Tan Houlan and 
 Few had ever imagined that, five years later, 
they would all be investigated for plotting to use the expedition to attack Zhou Enlai. 
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meddling with the Cultural Revolution at BNU, the campaign against the bourgeois 
reactionary line changed everything. By October, Lin became an undisputed 
representative of the CCRG and his words were deemed authoritative. Tan knew a 
mobilization talk by Lin Jie to everyone would be critical to boosting the morale, 
confirming the legitimacy of the expedition, and affirming the endorsement of the CCRG.  
Lin Jie did not let them down. On the evening of November 2, a day before the 
departure of the advance teams, he spoke to an enthused and enthralled audience in a 
packed classroom at BNU.  Lin was a skilled backstage schemer and always more at 
home behind the curtain than before the curtain. His speech that evening was 
“instructive” but incoherent. Following a stream of consciousness, he rambled on 
disjointedly on many topics. He educated a roomful of current and future teachers who 
were ill-informed about the most prominent teacher in Chinese history whose home and 
birthplace they could not wait to assault. Lin characterized Confucius as a “running dog” 
for the “slave-owning class” and compared Confucius to the defenders of the bourgeois 
line. He asked everyone to follow the policies and protect cultural relics, but he then 
asked everyone to be daring enough to “storm into the Confucius Mansion” and “pee and 
poo right before Confucius’s statue!”88 Despite his rambling, some critically important 
information can be gleaned from his meandering remarks: he defined the primary purpose 
of the expedition as a part of the two-line struggle;89 he also assured everyone the Qufu 
expedition had his approval and, therefore, the support of the CCRG.”90
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Although Lin’s remarks were not particularly rational, there was nothing 
irrational about his decision not to mention the State Council during the mobilization talk, 
much less Zhou Enlai. It was a calculated move on Lin’s part to use the Red Guards’ 
enthusiasm about the campaign against the Four Olds and their intense hostility towards 
the bourgeois reactionary line to accomplish the implicit objectives of the expedition, 
which only members of the CCRG, himself and Tan Houlan, had in mind.  Lin was an 
accomplished Machiavellian strategist who summarized his political strategies and tactics 
as “excluding ethical considerations from politics, forming cliques, and deliberately 
misguiding opponents into mistakes.”91
Moments after his talk, Lin had a brief meeting with Tan and her top lieutenants 
to wrap up the preparatory phase of the expedition. He commended them for their good 
work and complimented them on their change of the “a declaration to smash the steles” to 
“a protest letter to the State Council,” noting once again that the steles were the “trump 
card” for their opposition. “If you dare to beard the lion in his den and remove this trump 
card,” Lin assured them, “you would be setting an example for the masses.”
  As such, he played by no prescribed formal rules 
and had employed similar tactics many times before. He would continue to do this until 
he outsmarted himself and landed himself in Mao’s jail just a few months later.  
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 He 
concluded his brief remarks with a surprise gift: he would send two cameramen from the 
Beijing Film Studio to go with them and make a film of their activities in Qufu. “The film 
would be good material for an exhibition for Red Guards Accomplishments later,” Lin 





 The next day on November 3, the advance teams set out for Jinan and Qufu as 
planned. On the morning of November 7, members of the expedition team gathered in 
Tiananmen Square for their pledge ceremony before Chairman Mao’s portrait. The 
pledge was a compilation of many radical slogans: “We must let Mao Zedong Thought 
shine all over the world! Confucianism is a barrier to the absolute authority of Mao 
Zedong Thought! We will defend Chairman Mao and Mao Zedong Thought to our 
death!”
 He asked them to stay in touch with him and then bid farewell to the Red 
Guards. He had completed his agitation and mobilization. It was now time for the Red 
Guards to put the blueprint into action.  
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The assault on Qufu was now for all intents and purposes a matter of time. The 
plan was made, the clock was ticking, the advance teams had been dispatched, and a new 
but disastrous chapter of Qufu’s history was going to be written momentarily.  
  The pledge consisted of nothing but stereotypical language—there was no 
mention of the black gang, the bourgeois reactionary line, or State Council. However, it 
did provide a public performance and initiated the participating Red Guards into a radical 
group committed to a particular ideology and mission with which they would forever be 
associated.  
Conclusion 
By all accounts, it was nothing short of a miracle that the Three Kong Sites 
survived the height of the campaign against the Four Olds unscathed, despite the fact that 
they had all the quintessential identifying characteristics of the Four Olds as they 
consisted of China’s best-known and longest-lasting lineage cemetery, feudal family 
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manor, and Confucius temple. Practically all similar sites across the country fell victim to 
Red Guard attacks whether or not they were protected by the State Council. Indeed, there 
was no shortage of Red Guards attempting to assault the Three Kong Sites. Waves of 
them came from near and far, making local officials feel like they were playing a game—
barely had one group of Red Guards been hammered down when another group had 
already popped up. Despite all that, Qufu authorities stood their ground and resoundingly 
fended off one attack after another.  
Their success was attributable to many factors. For one thing, Qufu officials 
skillfully used the party’s long established authority and bureaucratic hierarchy to 
mobilize the general public and organize an effective defense. For another, some local 
residents identified with Qufu leaders’ efforts and assisted them to protect the Three 
Kong Sites.  But the most important contributing factors to the successful defense of the 
Three Kong Sites were the peasant Red Guards and the State Council’s protection steles. 
Not knowing how to deal with the peasant defenders and the steles symbolizing the 
authority of the State Council under their beloved premier Zhou Enlai, the ideologically 
driven but politically unsophisticated teenage Red Guards had to abandon their attempts 
and make a humiliating retreat.  All these contributing factors can perhaps be 
characterized as the local defenders’ “August advantages,” so characterized because these 
advantages existed only during the unique circumstances of late August 1966.  
The “August advantages” soon gave way to “October disadvantages,” however. 
The game changer was the campaign against the bourgeois reactionary line that flared up 
in early October. This campaign greatly empowered the CCRG and radical Red Guards 




result, most of the advantages the Qufu authorities enjoyed in August, such as the 
authority of local officials, local government’s effectiveness in mobilizing the public, and 
the local population’s unquestioning support of Qufu authorities, began to erode in 
October.  
The campaign against the bourgeois reactionary line further saw the sharp rise of 
an important power player, Lin Jie, who recognized an opportunity in the resulting 
reconfiguration of the power structure and took advantage of this optimal moment to 
revisit the Qufu case. Through his communication with various national and regional 
Cultural Revolution activists, Lin realized that a new attack on the Three Kong Sites 
would not only improve his own revolutionary credentials but also fulfill some important 
ideological agendas of the CCRG to which he wholeheartedly subscribed. To begin with, 
the fact that the Three Kong Sites as “the root of all Four Olds” remained untouched was 
a symbol of defeat for the Cultural Revolutionaries and totally unacceptable, but a 
successful Qufu mission could resolve this situation. Besides, both leading black gang 
members Wu Han and Zhou Yang and the head capitalist roader Liu Shaoqi had some 
connections with Confucianism or Qufu and these connections needed to be explored to 
deliver further blows to CCRG’s political opponents. Moreover, the Qufu government’s 
successful defeat of Red Guards attacks in August was a demonstration of the power of 
Liu’s support base in the provinces, and a Red Guard trip to Qufu could help weaken or 
even crush that power base. Finally, since Qufu authorities repeatedly used the State 
Council’s protection steles to thwart Red Guard attacks, a successful Qufu expedition 
would undermine the authority of the State Council and its chief Zhou Enlai whose “old 





But just having the motives to attack the Three Kong Sites was not enough. For 
their plan to have a reasonable chance of success, the obstacles that contributed to the 
Red Guards debacle in August must be removed. By all accounts, the Qufu officials’ 
victory over the Red Guards stemmed from Qufu authorities’ effective use of the 
bureaucratic method of mobilization, whereby the local officials used their bureaucratic 
authority, hierarchical structure, and established rules and procedures to mobilize the 
Qufu public, isolate the Red Guards, deny them access to the Three Kong Sites, and repel 
their attacks. As long as Qufu officials continued to have those advantages, any 
additional attempts to attack Qufu would probably be futile.   
 All these factors became compelling reasons for Lin and his 
backers at the CCRG to initiate a fresh assault on Qufu. 
However, changes occurred quickly during the Cultural Revolution. At the 
nation’s capital, the bureaucratic advantages in question were already greatly weakened 
in late July and August after Mao bypassed the bureaucracy and ordered the recall of 
work groups.96
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 The campaign against the bourgeois reactionary line further tilted the 
balance and enabled Mao’s personal leadership to replace party hierarchy. This drastic 
change both strengthened and facilitated the charismatic method of mobilization whereby 
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made it possible to “mobilize people without the benefits or constraints of formal 
organization.”97
Charismatic mobilization proved to be critical for the mobilization of the Red 
Guards and planning of the new attack on the Three Kong Sites. The ability to bypass or 
ignore the established bureaucratic procedures and party principles allowed Lin Jie to get 
approval for the Qufu attack directly from the CCRG, rather than from any government 
or party intermediaries. It also allowed him to directly approach Tan Houlan to plan for 
the Qufu trip without worrying about following any “chain of command.” It further 
allowed Tan Houlan to mobilize BNU students for the Qufu trip and recruit over 200 
people into the Jinggangshan Regiment within two hours without seeking any approval 
from above or being concerned about any breach of rules. This was astonishing, 
considering it could often take years for an application for communist party membership 
to be considered and approved in the pre-Cultural Revolution years. Last but not least, the 
characteristics of charismatic mobilization allowed Lin Jie and the leaders of 
Jinggangshan Regiment to predict the extent of local resistance to the expedition and plan 
accordingly. Indeed, without charismatic mobilization, it would not have been possible 
for Lin Jie and the Red Guards leaders of Jinggangshan Regiment to complete the highly 
complex process of deliberations, planning, and mobilizations for the Qufu expedition in 
just three days from October 25 to October 28.  The unanswered question, however, was 
whether or not charismatic mobilization would help Tan Houlan and her comrades 
overcome the predictable challenges once they got to Qufu. They would find out soon.  
   
On November 7, 1966, the curtain for the first act of the drama concerning the 
Three Kong Sites came down with a large contingent of future teachers from China’s top 
                                               




teachers’ university standing ready to assault the birth and burial place of China’s model 
teacher of all ages, level his tomb, and topple his statue. For over 2,000 years, Qufu 
survived numerous brushes with destruction, but the seemingly unassailable holy city of 
China now faced another unprecedented challenge. The stage was set for the next act. 




Chapter IV: Organized Destruction 
 
Advance Team  
Sixty-seven days after the August 26 debacle, Red Guards returned to Qufu. On 
November 4, 1966, the advance team of the BNU Jinggangshan Regiment descended on 
Qufu to lay the groundwork for the BNU Qufu Expedition scheduled to arrive five days 
later. Unlike their failed predecessors, these Red Guards were not only better organized 
and disciplined but also backed by the CCRG, which was fast becoming the only 
legitimate voice for the central government and Mao.   
Such favorable circumstances notwithstanding, the traumatic memory of the 
August 26 debacle was still fresh in the minds of many.  Questions remained as to the 
Red Guards’ chances of success at their new mission to rebel against the well-protected 
Three Kong Sites. Would the local officials still dismiss them as mere troublemakers and 
treat them as such? What would happen if the Qufu peasants were to take orders from the 
local officials and rough them up again? Would they be outnumbered and out-muscled 
again by the hostile townspeople? Would the myriad local or regional Red Guard 
organizations challenge their legitimacy and leadership? What would happen if the local 
officials were to use the State Council’s protection steles to refuse cooperation?  Worse 
still, would the State Council intervene? Would attacking the Three Kong Sites be viewed 
as attacking the State Council and its chief Zhou Enlai? Indeed, BNU Red Guards’ tasks 
were daunting, their potential obstacles formidable, and their chances of success anything 




Recognizing the tall order the Qufu expedition would face, BNU Red Guards 
chief Tan Houlan deliberately sent her top lieutenant Zhang Daoying to head the advance 
team. Zhang was probably the most qualified candidate to lead this team by any measure. 
He graduated from Qufu Teachers College and joined the BNU as a graduate student in 
the History Department. He was the most familiar of anyone Tan could find with Qufu’s 
history, culture, society and the significance of the Three Kong Sites. But Zhang did not 
need Tan’s orders to motivate him to go to Qufu. He had long been resentful of various 
school officials who denied him membership to the Communist Youth League and the 
CCP throughout his student career despite his impeccable academic achievements. To the 
school ideological workers, Zhang was sufficiently “expert” but inadequately “red.”  
They viewed Zhang as too “egoistic” and “wrongly motivated” and therefore unfit for the 
Youth League and the CCP.1
Now that the Cultural Revolution allowed him to rebel against the oppressive 
party establishment, Zhang turned the neglect he received from the now-disgraced party 
officials into his political capital and turned himself into a fervent devotee of the Cultural 
Revolution. He truly subscribed to Mao’s idea of capitalist roaders within the party and 
wanted to help cleanse the system of its impurities. Before Tan had organized the Qufu 
expedition, Zhang was already eager to go to Qufu to rebel against the Confucian 
establishment instead of engaging in the popular “red tourism” through the Great 
Exchanges of Revolutionary Experience.  Tan’s Qufu expedition was a godsend to 
Zhang, who finally found a CCRG-backed Red Guard leader who recognized his unique 
combination of knowledge and motivation and put them to good use. No longer was 
Zhang viewed as “egoistic” or “wrongly motivated.” He was going to take the campaign 
   
                                               




against the Four Olds to the root of all Four Olds. It was Zhang’s moment to realize his 
self-worth and make history, and he was resolved to dedicate every ounce of his being to 
making it a splashing success.  
Consequently, upon arriving in Qufu on November 4, Zhang and his cohorts 
rolled up their sleeves and got down to work. Their primary tasks were to put Qufu 
officials on notice, raise public awareness about their mission, and establish connections 
with local Red Guards. On the very evening of the day of the team’s arrival, Zhang was 
already knocking on the door of Zhao Yimin, the team’s local contact person designated 
by Lin Jie. As an anti-establishment teacher at QTC, Zhao was not only a contrarian like 
Guan Feng in the 1962 Confucius Forum, but he was also often at odds with the 
conservative QTC school authorities as well. Zhao was labeled by the QTC party 
committee as a “black gang” member at the start of the Cultural Revolution, but a letter 
from his close friend CCRG member Guan Feng saved him from the fate of a black gang 
member and turned him into an even more committed follower of the CCRG.2 Long 
frustrated with the slow progress of the Cultural Revolution in Qufu and bitter about the 
“wrongs” that he had suffered at the hands of QTC authorities, the disgruntled Zhao was 
elated to be tapped by the CCRG to be a mentor for Tan’s expedition team. Thus when 
Zhang visited him to seek his guidance, Zhao obliged, noting that he was expecting them 
as Lin Jie had asked him to assist and advise BNU Red Guards.3
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 With little effort, an 
alliance between the BNU Red Guards and a critically important local resource person 
was forged.  




This alliance was put to work the very next day. On the morning of November 5, 
accompanied by Zhao Yimin, Zhang and his team members stopped by the Qufu party 
committee headquarters to officially announce their arrival and demand support. “We are 
supported by the Central Cultural Revolution Group and have come to Qufu to rebel 
against Confucianism,” Zhang emphatically told the local party apparatchiks, “We would 
like to tour the Three Kong Sites today. We ask the Qufu party committee to please 
facilitate this for us.”4
Qufu officials found themselves in a difficult position. No sooner had the advance 
team disembarked at the neighboring Yanzhou train station the day before than the local 
officials there warned their Qufu colleagues of the “trouble” coming their way. They 
were at a loss how to deal with the uninvited visitors this time. They knew the political 
dynamic in the nation’s capital had drastically changed; these Red Guards were not 
ordinary marauding youths doing sightseeing in the name of revolution. Qufu officials 
could neither afford to offend them nor forfeit their obligations as the guardians of the 
state-protected historical sites. Their bureaucratic instinct and inertia told them to look for 
directions from the editorials of the major party publications such as Red Flag and 
People’s Daily.
  Zhang’s demand was polite but nonnegotiable.  
5
Unable to get any encouraging news from the leading party publications, the local 
officials turned to the Shandong provincial government for instructions on how to handle 
 Ironically however, the editorials were either written or managed by 
those who sent the BNU Red Guards to Qufu in the first place, such as Lin Jie and Chen 
Boda. The leading party publications were getting increasingly more radical and of no 
help to Qufu officials.  
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the advancing Red Guards. But under siege and struggling for its own survival, the 
provincial party leadership simply instructed the Qufu officials to both support the Red 
Guards and protect the Confucian sites—an impossible order as the two charges were 
mutually exclusive. Caught in a catch-22, Qufu officials resorted to their old isolation 
tactic. They forbade all local officials and peasants from engaging the Red Guards in any 
debate, having any contact, providing any information, or participating in any of their 
activities, in the hopes that these measures would somehow give them some time and 
help prevent the unthinkable.  
With this coping strategy, the local officials handled their uninvited visitors on the 
morning of November 5. Kong Qingzhuang, head of the Qufu County Cultural 
Revolution Office, became the natural contact person for the advance team. Upon hearing 
Zhang’s request for a tour of the Confucius Mansion and Confucius Temple, he complied 
without resisting and accompanied the Red Guards during the tour.  With Zhao Yimin as 
their guide, the advance team made its first foray into the Confucius Mansion and the 
Confucius Temple.  Both sites were eerily quiet and so were the visitors. Nobody was 
talking except their tour guide Zhao Yimin, but everyone noticed clear signs of 
concealing Confucius statues and other “four-old items” by the local officials.6
Having put Qufu officials on notice of their arrival and following a site visit of the 
Confucian Complex, the advance team went on to carry out its other objectives. They 
distributed the three documents prepared in Beijing, namely, “Set the Confucius Family 
Shop on Fire—an Anti-Confucian Manifesto,” “A Letter to the Country” and “A Letter to 
 The Red 
Guards entered and exited the complex without causing any disturbance. Yet, without any 
commotion, they completed an important reconnaissance visit.  
                                               




the People of Shandong.”7
Therefore, within the first three days of the advance team’s stay in Qufu, Zhang 
had visited almost every campus in Qufu to rally the local Red Guards behind the BNU 
Red Guards and motivate them for the “big moment.”  Zhang assured his excited but 
skeptical local Red Guard brethren that their actions on August 26 were justifiable and 
that the BNU Red Guards, backed by the CCRG, were in Qufu to complete their 
unfinished work. When asked about how to handle the State Council’s protection steles, 
Zhang dispelled their concerns by asserting that the steles were set up by the notorious 
black gang members Zhou Yang and Lu Dingyi and were therefore legitimate targets.
 They also visited various schools in Qufu to forge an alliance 
with a variety of local Red Guard factions. This was both important and necessary not 
only because the local residents were afraid to interact with them but also because some 
local Red Guard factions might actually challenge their authority. Furthermore, many 
local Red Guards still had the nightmarish memory of the August 26 debacle and 
remained resentful but fearful. It was BNU Red Guards’ job to exploit their resentment, 
allay their fears, and turn them into part of a coalition against Qufu authorities.   
8
Having successfully started, Zhang decided to confront the Qufu party committee 
with substantive issues. On the evening of November 7, he summoned three county 
officials to the QTC to brief the advance team on the progress of the Cultural Revolution 
in Qufu but used the opportunity to characterize the August 26 incident as an act of Qufu 
officials following the bourgeois reactionary line. He then made eight demands on the 
Qufu party committee, including publicly apologizing for the August 26 incident, making 
Confucian sites accessible to Red Guards, and allowing the Red Guards access to rural 
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communities. The three officials only agreed to relay the demands to the Qufu party 
committee.9
First Engagement  
 With this, the advance team had achieved its primary objectives of raising 
public awareness, networking with local Red Guards, and putting local officials on notice 
of their arrival and mission. They had opened a small crack in the huge wall of resistance 
against their overall mission. It was now time for Tan and the whole expedition to enlarge 
that crack and eventually tear down that wall.  
On November 9, ten days after the CCRG and the State Council publicly urged 
Red Guards all over the country to discontinue their participation in the Great Exchanges 
of Revolutionary Experience, Tan and the entire expedition team arrived in Qufu in six 
trucks following an overnight train ride from Beijing. For the first time in China’s long 
history, students, and teachers from the country’s leading teachers’ university had come 
to the birthplace of the country’s Foremost Teacher for the express purpose of digging up 
his grave and burning his statue. Local Red Guards gave their high-profile visitors a 
hero’s welcome at QTC, the expedition’s chosen site for its headquarters.  
Tan immediately convened a cadres’ meeting to assess the situation and map out 
their strategies. It was soon decided that their most immediate priorities were to establish 
rapport with all other Red Guard factions and obtain cooperation from the Qufu party 
committee. “Without the Qufu government’s assistance and facilitation,” Tan stressed, 
“nothing could be accomplished.”10
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  Consequently, they planned to meet with the Qufu 
officials the following day and to demand both access to the Three Kong Sites and 
material support necessary for their operation. Tan was determined to leave a “deep first 




impression” on the local “capitalist roaders” who had yet to learn what it was like to be 
on the receiving end of revolutionary violence.  
Day two was an action-packed day. On the morning of November 10, Tan led her 
troops to launch their offensive through a series of aggressive and highly visible moves. 
They put out leaflets and posters all over the town with messages like “Set the Confucius 
Family Shop on Fire.”11 The posters and slogans caused widespread alarm and panic 
among cadres and townspeople, many of whom literally thought that the Red Guards 
were going to burn down all Three Kong Sites. BNU Red Guards also launched the 
Denounce Confucius Battlefield Report, the official publication of the campaign where 
they associated the Three Kong Sites with the Four Olds and connected the protection of 
the Three Kong Sites with the bourgeois reactionary line and its Qufu followers. The 
inaugural issue of this publication also methodically refuted all the “excuses” that had 
been used to oppose the BNU Red Guards’ planned attack on the protected historical 
sites, especially the use of State Council’s protection steles to deter attempts to rebel 
against the Kong sites. More important, this key publication clearly identified the 
campaign’s objectives, namely, to burn Confucius’s statue, level Confucius’s tomb, and 
publicly parade the “Confucius-worshiping” reactionary academic authorities.12
Having set the public awareness and mobilization campaign in motion, Tan and 
her troops marched from QTC to the Qufu party committee headquarters to demand 
support for their mission. When over 200 BNU Red Guards reached the Qufu party 
headquarters, they were surprised to be greeted by some 200 local government officials 
and employees, all neatly lined up, each holding a copy of Mao’s Little Red Book. The 
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Red Guards ritualistically began their face-off with the local officials with the rhythmical 
chanting of Mao’s quotations: “To rebel is justified! Dust won’t disappear by itself 
without a broom!”13  This quotation recitation was followed by Tan’s reading of the 
expedition’s key document “Set the Confucius Family Shop on Fire: an Anti-Confucius 
Manifesto.” They then sang one Cultural Revolution song after another at the top of their 
lungs to overwhelm their opponents. To their dismay, the county officials confidently 
responded to the challenge by reciting in unison Mao’s Three Old Articles14. The poise, 
discipline, and preparedness of the local officials caught BNU Red Guards by surprise. 
Frustrated, they resorted to shouting, “Burn the Confucian Family Shop in fire! 
Thoroughly denounce the bourgeois reactionary line!”15
Not only were Beijing Red Guards unsuccessful in staring down Qufu officials, 
but they began to encounter resistance from their presumed natural allies as well. Some 
visiting Red Guards of Jinan No. 1 Middle School challenged their leadership position 
and dismissed them as “representing just one school.”  They would debate with BNU Red 
Guards at every opportunity and believed that the pompous BNU Red Guards should 
 They had no idea that the county 
government, in anticipation of the arrival of the Red Guards that day, ordered the 
government officials to recite the Three Old Articles for their anticipated clash with the 
Beijing Red Guards. The local government’s disaster-preparedness plan paid off 
handsomely. Tan was hoping for a powerful start, but Qufu officials effectively 
neutralized her aggressive push through a recitation contest of Mao’s quotations.    
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“pay close attention to what the poor and lower-middle peasants have to say” instead of 
ordering everyone around haphazardly. They told Kong Fanshen, an employee of the 
Confucius Mansion, to ignore the BNU Red Guards and continue his preservation and 
maintenance work.16 Even more blunt and hostile were some visiting Red Guards from 
Xuzhou No. 2 Middle School, who blasted the BNU Red Guards for “acting like 
bandits!”17 Some Qufu peasants took issue with them too. One frustrated peasant 
remarked, “If only we peasants were not as loosely connected as we are, or else we could 
be organized and reason with them!”18
Despite the emerging resistance and rejection, Tan was not to be discouraged or 
deterred. After all, setbacks characterized her life in the past several months. Time and 
again, she was mocked, isolated, and struggled against; 
  All these rumbling complaints were indicative of 
the bumpy road ahead for the visiting iconoclasts.  
19
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 and time and again, she beat the 
seemingly impossible odds and emerged victorious. However, a strong resolve alone was 
not enough this time.  To turn things around quickly, Tan needed a breakthrough—some 
turn of events that would dispel people’s doubts about their intentions and justify the 
righteousness and legitimacy of their mission. Fortunately for Tan, such a turn of events 
occurred almost as soon as she needed it. Immediately following their shouting match 
with the Qufu officials on the morning of November 10, Tan and Zhang led a group of 
Red Guards to search the Confucius Mansion for incriminating evidence. They moved in 
17 Ibid. 
18 XBHZL, 91.  
19 To “struggle against someone” means to denounce and criticize someone publicly in a group meeting or 
at a mass rally. It was commonly used in the Chinese communist revolution, especially during the Cultural 




and out of various rooms and halls in this long-closed palatial mansion in search of 
“noteworthy items.” 
Soon, Zhang noticed a closed storage area in the Qiantang Building towards the 
rear of the mansion. Upon close examination of the miscellaneous items stored in this 
dark space, filled with spider webs, dust, and mold, the Red Guards were astonished to 
see items that immediately made that dark, dusty space look like a “crime scene.” 
Unfolding before their eyes were a Kuomintang flag, portraits and instructions of Chiang 
Kai-shek, a Japanese sword from Chiang Kai-shek’s minister of finance Kong Xiangxi, a 
dagger from Shandong warlord Han Fuju, pictures of Confucius Mansion elders with 
Japanese officers and officials of the Wang Jingwei-led puppet regime, and a 
Kuomintang hit-list for the “Country Cleansing Campaign” used to purge communists 
during the 1945-49 Civil War….20
Tan reveled in her initial success. The outcome of this search far exceeded her 
expectations as she had no idea such “reactionary items” were still housed in the 
Confucian Complex. Even Lin Jie in his pre-expedition orientation of the Kong sites did 
not allude to the possible existence of such a “crime lab.” Tan’s limited, partial 
knowledge about the role of the Confucian establishment in modern China made it 
difficult for her to fully understand the historical circumstances related to these artifacts. 
Naturally, she and her fellow Red Guards were outraged that people’s “blood and sweat 
money” were spent on the preservation and protection of such “reactionary items.” It 
seemed crystal clear to them that the Confucius Mansion was used to preserve and protect 
not only the Four Olds but also various vestiges of other “reactionary forces” as well.  
The accidental discovery of the damning evidence provided undisputed moral clarity and 
  
                                               




authority for their mission and became a critical turning point for both the defenders and 
the attackers of the Kong sites. No longer would the local officials be able to use 
“protecting cultural heritage” as the reason to block Red Guards’ actions.  
Encouraged by this critical development, the Red Guards went on to search the 
International Guesthouse on the east side of Confucius Mansion. There, they saw a 
portrait of Liu Shaoqi on the wall and evidence of “bourgeois creature comforts,” such as 
mattresses, bathtubs, sofas, and carpets. The Red Guards insisted that guesthouse 
personnel take down and tear up Liu’s portrait because he was China’s “No. 1 capitalist 
roader,” but they were refused cooperation. The rebuffed Red Guards simply took down 
the portrait and tore it up themselves.  They then called on the guesthouse employees to 
rise against their superiors and displayed the sofas and mattresses in public to show how 
the International Guesthouse was used as a “bourgeois nest for repose and pleasure.”21
As the Red Guards advanced into their opponents’ territory, Qufu officials began 
to retreat. The incriminating evidence had turned them into protectors of an “evil 
institution.” What little advantage they gained from the quotation shouting match 
evaporated into the thin air. Their newly discovered vulnerability compelled them to take 
defensive measures to both protect themselves and the cultural relics in their control.  As 
a Deputy County Commissioner and the head of the Qufu Cultural Relics Preservation 
  
The findings from this search further convinced the Red Guards of the righteousness of 
their mission.  All in all, the entire search of the Confucius Mansion was an exhilarating 
and rewarding experience for the BNU Red Guards. Within thirty hours of their arrival in 
Qufu, they had already obtained incriminating evidence that was going to serve as a 
catalyst for all the drastic events that ensued.  
                                               




Bureau, Cui Xuyi knew the items that the Red Guards discovered in the Qiangtang 
Building were kept there because of central government’s instructions. But Cui was 
politically astute enough to know that using such government instructions to justify 
keeping these items would only prove the Red Guards’ argument that they were 
following the old bureaucratic apparatus and therefore the ‘bourgeois reactionary line.” 
Realizing he could not argue and reason his way out of his trouble, Cui decided to burn or 
hide these items to avoid trouble for himself and his colleagues.22
As the chief guardian of the Three Kong Sites, Cui knew the collections there like 
the back of his hands. He also knew what the Red Guards found during the day was just 
the tip of the iceberg. There were incriminating photos in the warehouse as well as 
miscellaneous Buddhist statues and other religious figurines in the Buddhist Building. 
They were kept there as a result of a government directive stipulating that all things in the 
Confucius Mansion were to be displayed exactly “as they were before liberation.” If the 
Red Guards discovered those quintessential “Four Olds” items the next day, the 
consequences would be even harder to imagine. Cui decided to defuse these “time 
bombs” by hiding or destroying the evidence before the Red Guards got to them.  
  
He shared his ideas with the county commissioner Gao Keming. Gao not only 
supported his ideas but also asked him to hide some highly valuable cultural items to 
“protect the state property.” So, under the cover of the night, Cui and a few trusted 
employees broke into the Buddhist Building already sealed by the Red Guards during the 
day and hurriedly “stole” some religious items and threw those items into a well behind 
the Confucius Mansion. They then gathered and burned much of the entire photo 
collection in the Confucius Mansion all night to destroy the evidence. Finally, they buried 
                                               




the “Shang-Zhou Ten Sacrificial Vessels” in an inconspicuous courtyard near the back 
garden. These items were classified as first-grade national cultural relics that were 
personally given to the Kong Lineage as a gift from Emperor Qianlong in the eighteenth 
century and treasured by the guardians of the Confucius Mansion for centuries.23
While the Qufu cultural officials were busy hiding, burning, and burying the 
would-be evidence, the nervous Qufu party officials were also in a frenzy to contain the 
situation and prevent further damage.  They had to figure out a way to prevent what was 
perceived to be the real possibility of Red Guards actually setting the Kong sites on fire. 
Losing the Kong sites to fire would certainly be dereliction of duty on their part and 
would lead to disastrous ramifications. The frightened officials frantically called the 
central government in Beijing in a desperate attempt to find any authoritative figures to 
help prevent the feared calamity.  Despite their repeated attempts, however, they couldn’t 
get anyone to answer their call. Little did they know that, on November 10, the 
government itself was in the epicenter of a political earthquake where the entire old party 
establishment was crumbling. The central leaders from whom Qufu officials used to get 
advice were like the clay Buddhist figurines in the Confucius Mansion that could not take 
care of themselves. But the desperate Qufu bureaucrats knew no other way to handle a 
crisis of such magnitude. Their bureaucratic instinct and party principles compelled them 
to call the higher-ups for directions. So they kept calling and hoping.
  
24
While the Qufu officials were forced into a crisis management mode, Tan decided 
to step up the offensive. The events of the day gave her much-needed persuasive power 
which she could use to sway and mobilize the skeptical public. On the evening of 
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November 10, Tan summoned an emergency cadres’ meeting in the operation 
headquarters at QTC for a strategy session for the following days. It was decided that 
they were going to seize the momentum to launch a propaganda campaign. They would 
use the incriminating black materials they seized to forge an alliance with all factions of 
Red Guards, mobilize the peasants, and unite the wavering elements. But it was Tan who 
cut through the chase and pointed out their foremost priority: “It is clear that State 
Council’s protection steles are the stumbling block. We must kick out this stumbling 
block!”25
Words turned into actions the following morning. On November 11, Red Guards 
launched a mass media blitz. They bulldozed their way into the Qufu streets and flooded 
them with even more leaflets and posters. Copies of the Denounce Confucius Battlefield 
Report that detailed the “black materials” discovered in the Confucius Mansion were also 
disseminated, lending more legitimacy to Red Guard actions and shaking locals’ 
confidence in Qufu officials. One resident asked a Cultural Bureau employee 
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  As the drumbeat of “setting the Confucius Family Shop on fire” grew 
louder, the local officials panicked, but all they could do was keep calling higher 
authorities in Beijing for directions. Finally, they got through to the State Council. The 
panicked official briefed the State Council on the chaos in Qufu since the arrival of BNU 
Red Guards and sounded the alarm on the phone, “Beijing Normal University Red 
Guards are going to burn down the Confucius Mansion and Confucius Temple!” But all 




they heard from the other end of the phone was a brief and emotionless, “Stay tuned for 
instructions from central leaders.”27
While the nervous Qufu officials were eagerly awaiting government’s response, 
the Red Guards were already intensifying their offensive. On the morning of November 
11, just a few hours after Cui Xuyi hid and destroyed some cultural treasures and 
historical artifacts, a special team of about thirty Red Guards led by BNU Red Guard Hu 
Wensong invited themselves into the Confucius Mansion and declared their intention to 
be stationed there. County officials strongly objected to the intrusion, but their objections 
fell on deaf ears. Upon entering the Confucius Mansion, the Red Guards immediately 
followed the leads they had received about possible clandestine counterrevolutionary 
activities inside the Confucius Mansion and searched for an alleged underground radio 
station and a hiding spot for illicit weapons.
  
28
As Hu’s team was turning things upside down inside the Confucius Mansion, 
another group of Red Guards led by Zhang Daoyingwere ratcheting up the pressure on 
  Although their search turned out to be 
futile, the Red Guards wasted no time before working on their next project—the 
preparation for a class education exhibition to be opened to the public two days later on 
November 13. They had only two days to turn the Confucius Mansion from its “pre-
liberation form” to a class education facility where all the “trophies” they had discovered 
and other related items would be on display and used to educate the public of the 
“heinous stories and facts”  regarding the Kong family. They had said enough about the 
evils of the Confucius Mansion in all their public campaigns, but seeing is believing—it 
was time now for the public to bear witness to the actual manifestations of such evils.    
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the Qufu party leadership.  On the evening of November 11, they interrupted a business 
meeting chaired by County Commissioner Gao Keming.  Zhang demanded a copy of the 
script of Gao’s welcome speech that he used the day before as well as a response to the 
eight demands that the advance team made on November 7. Gao used all kinds of stalling 
tactics to refuse cooperation. Frustrated, Zhang told Gao that they were going to smash 
the State Council protection steles because they had been used to protect the “black 
materials.”29
Central Directives: A Catalyst for Change 
  Gao refused to budge an inch on this issue. The county committee couldn’t 
afford to make any concession on the steles, as they were the last and only line of defense 
left against the impending ruin of the Kong sites in their care. Neither side blinked in this 
test of wills. A stalemate had set in, and no one was yet strong enough to break the 
impasse. The county government was on the defensive but still had the State Council 
protection steles to fall back on; the Red Guards claimed to be sent by the CCRG, but 
they could not produce any ironclad proof to substantiate their claim.  As a result, they 
not only received no cooperation but also risked repeating the fate of their August 26 
debacle. Already, Red Guards who ventured into the villages to galvanize the peasants 
were ignored or even harassed by the peasants and rural cadres. The first engagement 
between the BNU Red Guards and the Qufu authorities ended in a deadlock. Some 
external intervention was badly needed to break the impasse.  
The external intervention unexpectedly arrived at 11 p.m. November 11 when Tan 
received a telegram from Chen Boda and a telephone message from Qi Benyu, both high 
priests of the CCRG. Chen’s telegram read: “Do not burn down the Confucius Temple, 
                                               




Mansion, or the Confucius Cemetery. Keep them as museums of the feudal system and 
the Kong lineage as a landlord family, like the Rent Collection Courtyard. Confucius’s 
grave may be dug up.”  
Qi Benyu’s telephone message was similar but more specific “Han dynasty steles 
should be preserved, as should be steles from before the Ming dynasty. Qing dynasty 
steles may be smashed. The Confucius Temple can be repurposed, like the Rent 
Collection Courtyard.  Confucius’s grave may be dug up. Find someone knowledgeable 
on cultural relics to take a look.”30
These two directives proved to be a turning point for the campaign. Apparently, 
they were the “instructions from the central leaders” that the Qufu county committee was 
waiting for from the State Council. Interestingly, they came from the CCRG instead of 
the State Council. This was a clear sign that the nation’s power center had shifted to the 
CCRG. Even more interestingly, the directives came first to the Red Guards who did not 
request them rather than the Qufu party committee who did.  
  
Tan and BNU Red Guards were unprepared for this “midnight gift” from above 
and had mixed reactions. They were pleased because the recognition and support from 
two prominent firebrands of the CCRG gave the expeditionary force a boost at a time 
when their campaign was bogged down. The two directives were sure to send an 
unmistakable message to the entire Qufu community about who was behind the BNU 
Red Guards and confirm the legitimacy of their mission. But they were also upset 
because both directives made clear that Chen and Qi actually believed that the BNU Red 
Guards truly intended to burn down the Kong sites. Apparently, Qufu officials and the 
public were not quite used to such incendiary revolutionary expressions as “smash 
                                               




someone to a pulp” and “fry someone in oil.”  Failing to distinguish between rhetoric and 
reality, they took a figurative “Set the Confucius Family Shop on Fire” to mean a literal 
“Burn down the Kong sites” and sounded the alarm to the central government.   
Tan, however, was convinced that Qufu officials deliberately misinterpreted their 
intentions and went behind their backs to misrepresent their intentions to central 
authorities in order to smear their name and undermine their mission. She convened an 
impromptu midnight meeting where she relayed the two directives and strategized on 
what to do next. It was decided that they were going to debunk the rumors before the 
Qufu public and create a coalition of all Red Guard organizations in Qufu under the 
umbrella title of “The Revolutionary Liaison Station of Completely Smashing the 
Confucian Family Shop and Establishing the Absolute Power of the Mao Zedong 
Thought,” (Liaison Station). The creation of this organization would unite the scattered 
Red Guard organizations, give them a group identify, create a clear us-against-them 
environment, and work towards a common cause endorsed by the CCRG.  
Before Tan had the opportunity to put her plan into full operation, she received 
two unlikely visitors. At 7 a.m. November 12, Qufu county leaders Gao Keming and 
Zhang Yumei came to QTC to request a meeting with Tan.  Local officials had tried to 
avoid and isolate the BNU Red Guards since their arrival in Qufu, but this time the 
unwilling hosts came to consult the unwelcome guests because local officials received the 
same directives from Chen and Qi via the Shandong government early that morning. The 
directives were a mixed bag for Qufu officials. On the one hand, they were relieved to 
know that the CCRG disapproved of burning down the Kong sites and had spared them 




involve elaborate and complex planning. Faced with the indisputable evidence of CCRG 
support for the BNU Red Guards, local officials realized the rules of the game had 
changed. Their party principles and bureaucratic instinct compelled them to choose 
consultation over confrontation with the BNU Red Guards. Thus, they hurried to consult 
those whom they rejected just hours ago.31
However, Tan viewed the Qufu officials as the targets of the Cultural Revolution 
and refused to accommodate. She decided to follow her own agenda and use the CCRG 
directives to push for more gains. Therefore, upon seeing her subdued visitors, Tan 
blasted them for spreading rumors and using the State Council protection steles to protect 
the “Four Olds.” She told them the Red Guards were going to smash the steles and 
demanded the Qufu government’s support for it. Recognizing that the steles were from 
the State Council under Zhou Enlai, county leaders refused to cooperate and the talk 
broke down.  
  
Tan was not going to take “no” for an answer from capitalist roaders and kept up 
the pressure. She sent Red Guards to the county committee headquarters to denounce the 
Qufu government and to demand that the party committee clear up the rumors across the 
county about Red Guards’ intention to burn down the Kong sites.  Tan had great 
confidence in making these demands, as Lin Jie had called her that day and shared with 
her the reassuring news: Chen Boda had already instructed the Shandong party committee 
to assist the BNU Red Guards’ mission in Qufu.32
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 The CCRG had already spoken on this 
issue. To defy them was to commit political suicide.   Tan’s political calculation proved 
correct. The following day, Deputy Commissioner Zhang Yumei issued a public 




statement through the countywide wired broadcast network. In it, he apologized to the 
Red Guards for smearing their image by spreading misinformation about their intentions 
to burn down the Kong sites and called on his listening audience to support Red Guards’ 
revolutionary actions.33
Tan proceeded according to plan and good news kept coming. On the afternoon of 
November 12, the Liaison Station under the de facto control of the BNU Red Guards 
came into being without difficulty. Apparently, the CCRG directives had a decisive 
impact on the seven Red Guard factions that joined this organization, some of which had 
previously challenged BNU Red Guards’ authority. They realized BNU Red Guards truly 
had the full support of the CCRG and wanted to be on the right side of history by siding 
with the BNU Red Guards. The formation of this organization marked the alliance of 
capital Red Guards and local Red Guards and presented a united front to their opposition. 
To ensure its success, Tan appointed Zhang Daoying as the head of the Liaison Station 
and made the newly published the Denounce Confucius Battlefield Report its official 
publication. Henceforth, the Liaison Station became the official headquarters and public 
face of the campaign. The campaign was now organizationally well-positioned to forge 
forward.  
 With that, the capitulation of the county leadership began. 
The ripple effect of the CCRG directives continued into the next day. On 
November 13, all Three Kong Sites, off limits to the public for centuries, were finally 
open to anyone who cared to step in and take a look. Despite county officials’ ban on 
contact with Red Guards and participation in their activities, Qufu residents from near 
and far swarmed into the Three Kong Sites.34
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in 1948, access to the Confucius Mansion was left to the discretion of its owners. For 
visitors and tourists, it was usually a matter of a small fee. This was how Mao Zedong 
managed to catch a glimpse of it in early 1919. Many locals were fairly familiar with the 
Confucius Mansion too as the entire community revolved around the Confucian 
establishment and frequently came into contact with it for one reason or another. 
However, after the communist takeover in 1948, the Kong sites were closed to the public 
except for a few special occasions such as the tenth National Day in 1959. Consequently, 
the vast majority of the locals had never set foot inside the Confucian Complex since 
1948. They had long been awe-struck by its outward grandeur but had no clue what was 
behind the tall walls. Since they were kept away from it, they never had the opportunity 
to develop any emotional attachment to it. They felt like they knew it well as it occupied 
the center of the city and they walked around it every day; but they also felt they knew 
nothing about it at all as it was a place for the highly-placed people and foreigners only.  
When the locals finally had an opportunity to tour the Three Kong Sites on 
November 13, they did not see a serene and stately treasure trove of Chinese culture. 
Instead, they saw a hastily assembled “class education” site and had an incredible eye-
opening experience. As they casually walked past Confucius Mansion’s main entrance 
and strolled through its famous Double Gate, previously reserved for emperors and heads 
of the state, they saw evidence of the opulent lifestyle of the Confucius Mansion’s former 
residents in stark contrast to their own life at the subsistence level. They saw ironclad 
evidence of Qufu officials’ complicity in covering up the evils of the Confucius 
Mansion’s former owner, such as the stone lions at the gate of the Confucius Mansion 




Perfection, the first time for most of them, with Confucius’s statue plastered with slogans 
such as “No. 1 Scoundrel!” And they saw Cui Xuyi, chief guardian of the Three Kong 
Sites and one of their “father-and-mother officials” standing at the gate of the Confucius 
Mansion wearing a melon-shaped hat and a Kuomintang flag as a Qufu “black gang” 
member.35
The local officials could only stand by and watch this unfold with disbelief and 
helplessness. Repurposing the Confucius Mansion as a class education site was a 
mandate from the CCRG directives and the local officials were duty-bound to support it. 
Any opposition would be futile. Already, their fellow official Cui was “betrayed” by a 
trusted employee and ferreted out for covering up evidence of reactionary and “Four 
Olds” items. It was a chilling example of the consequences of defying the Red Guards 
endorsed by the CCRG.  If Cui’s fall to disgrace was not enough to convince the county 
leaders as to who was truly in charge, the arrival of a provincial team dispelled any 
remaining doubts about the power of the CCRG directives. The team was made up of one 
provincial official and two experts on cultural relics. CCRG director Chen Boda had 
explicitly instructed the provincial government to assist the Red Guards, and Qi Benyu’s 
telephone message specifically mentioned the need for experts to help identify things for 
destruction or salvation. The local officials who greeted this team did not know what the 
next day might bring, but they did know tomorrow would probably be more ominous 
 As this went on, people’s awe for the Confucius Mansion and the traditional 
authority it represented gave way to resentment; their respect and obedience to the local 
officials and the party establishment behind it turned into puzzlement or disrespect; their 
confidence in everything they used to trust began to erode while their respect for and 
recognition of the “troublemakers” from Beijing began to rise.  
                                               




than today. Their last line of defense was the State Council protection steles. The BNU 
Red Guards had repeatedly threatened to smash them, but they had not yet put their 
words into action. Maybe they never would risk being accused of attacking Premier Zhou 
whose State Council erected the protection steles; maybe common sense would prevail in 
the end. 
Qufu officials were not the only people who had the protection steles on their 
mind. Tan had been thinking a lot about it too. Although the CCRG’s directives had been 
helpful and BNU Red Guards gained strength, Tan saw the protection steles as the 
ultimate roadblocks to the goals of her mission. Her concern was well-grounded. For one 
thing, the BNU Red Guards needed to secure from the local government significant 
logistical support and a sizable peasant workforce to achieve their original and newly 
added objectives, such as the leveling of massive amounts of Qing dynasty steles. Yet the 
local authorities had already proven unwilling to provide full cooperation, and their 
trump card was the protection steles. For the same reason, many local residents and even 
some Red Guards were not fully committed to support their mission either. To make 
matters worse, the CCRG directives did not mention if the protection steles could be 
smashed. Without the mandate from CCRG to remove the protection steles, the local 
officials would use the steles to confront the BNU Red Guards’ move at every 
opportunity. Tan knew removing the protection steles would be her next battle.  
On the evening of November 13, Tan convened yet another meeting of her top 
lieutenants where she assessed the situation and identified their priority. The central 
directives had reconfigured the nature of the conflict between the Beijing Red Guards and 




mission and their publicly stated objectives of burning Confucius’s statue, leveling 
Confucius’s tomb, and parading the Confucian scholars.”36 The roadblock to the 
implementation of their objectives was the State Council’s protection steles. The local 
authorities, who were obligated to obey the central directives but remained unconvinced, 
would use the protection steles to resist the BNU Red Guards. The local Red Guards and 
population also held the State Council in high regard and respected the State Council 
protection steles. Removing the protection steles would ensure support from the local 
Red Guards, assistance from the local people, and cooperation from the local officials. It 
was therefore a battle they had to win.37
Tan’s assessment and rational for removing the protection steles resonated well 
with everyone at the meeting and a unanimous decision was reached to hold a mass rally 
on November 15 to smash the “loyalist steles.”  It would be organized by the Liaison 
Station and Zhang Daoying would be in charge of the entire operation. Some important 
preparatory work was also conducted to facilitate the process and ensure success. Among 
other things, they secured the approval and support from the CCRG for this mass rally. 
They also composed a letter to be read at the rally titled “A Protest Letter to Some People 
in the State Council.”  
  
On the morning of November 14, Zhang Daoying got to work immediately. He 
had less than twenty-four hours to have everything in place. After directing the Red 
Guards to focus on preparatory and promotional work for the stele-smashing rally the 
following day, he headed to the Qufu Teachers School, where many local Red Guards 
expressed strong opposition to smashing the protection steles because they saw no 
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connection between an anti-Confucian campaign and the State Council. Using his oratory 
and political skills, Zhang easily dispelled their doubts through his usual tactic of 
associating the protection steles with the bourgeois reactionary line and those “black gang 
members.” It was the same line that Lin Jie used in his mobilization talk in Beijing to 
justify the expedition, and it was their favorite argument against any suggestion that 
smashing the protection steles was an attack on Zhou Enlai.  
Having allayed the concerns of the teenage Red Guards at the Teachers School, 
Zhang hurried to the County Cultural Revolution Office to announce to the county 
leaders the decision to hold a rally to smash the protection steles. In the name of the 
Liaison Station, Zhang demanded that all county leaders participate in this rally and 
expected them to ensure both the peasants’ participation and a trouble-free rally.38
Zhang’s nonnegotiable demands left the county officials scrambling for a 
response to this alarming development. They not only viewed the protection steles as 
their last line of defense, but as the state-appointed official guardians of the Three Kong 
 The 
county officials, who already had their back against the wall, were shaken by this 
alarming development. But they were no longer able to bargain with the Red Guards who 
considered them the absolute “other” and diehard loyalists of the old party establishment. 
Ironically, although they had become “incorrigible lackeys” of the old government 
apparatus, they remained “necessary evils” for the Red Guards who needed them as a 
“prop” for the audience during their violent public performance the next day.  Since Qufu 
leaders still held some sway over the locals and remained the symbol of government 
authority to the peasants, such “props” were critically important for the Red Guards who 
wanted to win over the fence-sitting Qufu public and ensure the rally’s success.  
                                               




Sites, they were also obligated to protect those steles and the cultural relics they 
protected. But the now powerless Qufu officials had exhausted their ideas on how to 
handle the Red Guards. To make matters worse, Li Xiu, Qufu’s party boss and chief 
decision maker, was still attending a mandatory conference in Jinan where all Shandong 
party chiefs at the provincial, prefectural and county levels were themselves under fierce 
attack from Red Guards. Having no one else to turn to, the frustrated county officials 
began calling on Li Xiu for help, hoping that somehow Li would wave a magic wand to 
ward off the unthinkable.  
On the evening of November 14, as Zhang convened a final meeting to put the 
finishing touches on the plan for the rally, Qufu officials finally succeeded in reaching 
their chief administrator Li Xiu in Jinan. When Li learned the news about the November 
15 rally to smash the State Council steles, he was both enraged and alarmed. Li quickly 
consulted two top Shandong party leaders: Su Zaiwen and Su Yiran. Together, they 
decided almost by reflex that they must report it to the State Council immediately. Li was 
just dictating the report on the phone when he was interrupted by Bai Rubing, a Secretary 
of the Secretariat of the CCP Shandong Committee. As the interim party chief of 
Shandong, Bai felt torn between his obligation to the State Council and his obligation to 
(or fear of) the CCRG. His really wanted to protect the State Council steles, but he knew 
the time was not right. He knew the CCRG’s November 11 directives meant CCRG’s full 
support for BNU Red Guards’ mission in Qufu. He also received instructions from Chen 
Boda specifically requiring the Shandong government to assist Tan. 
Considering all these factors, Bai vacillated. “I think we may not want to report 




explaining the consequences it might cause: “We could be in even deeper trouble if this 
report were to lead to another directive from Chen Boda.” Bai then instructed Li to tell 
Qufu officials to wait so that they could study the situation first.39 Bai’s decision to tread 
carefully both intensified and prolonged the agony of top Qufu officials. The rally was 
literally just hours away, but they still did not know how to react to the impending 
catastrophe. Fortunately, before long the phone rang again.  Gao grabbed the phone, his 
heart racing. From over the phone came Bai Rubing’s strong and resolute voice, “Protect 
the State Council’s steles at any cost. Whatever happens, someone will take responsibility 
for you.”40
Gao was relieved to finally receive a definitive answer from his superiors. 
However, Bai’s instructions were long on what to do but short on how to do it. They 
would not address various scenarios that could easily escalate into unmanageable 
situations. Despite that, Gao followed the order as best he could. He relayed Bai’s 
“protect at any cost” message to his fellow county leaders the same night. Together, they 
decided to make one last attempt to dissuade the Red Guards from smashing the 
protection steles. Should that attempt fail, they were going to adopt a “three no’s policy,” 
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 With that, the stage seemed set for a confrontation between the crusaders and 
the defenders the following day.   
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Defending the Protection Steles  
At 7:30 a.m. on November 15, county leaders Gao Keming and Zhang Yumei 
came to see Tan in a last-ditch effort to talk her out of holding the rally. Gao began by 
explaining to Tan the explosive situation they had on their hands. “The vast majority of 
the masses do not support smashing the protection steles,” Gao cautioned. “Many 
peasants are already in town and many more are on their way. Smashing the steles would 
cause serious clashes with unthinkable consequences. Please do not smash them.”42 But 
Gao’s pleading fell on deaf ears. Tan not only refused to listen but also demanded that 
county officials participate in the rally scheduled for 11 a.m. that day. That was a 
nonstarter for Gao and Zhang who angrily refused to accommodate her and responded to 
Tan’s demand with their own “three no’s policy.”43
As Tan and county leaders were exchanging arguments at QTC, Zhang Daoying 
was already busy getting ready for the rally. It was going to be a busy day for him, as a 
rally of this magnitude and complexity required careful planning. He had already formed 
stele-smashing teams with strong-muscled Red Guards. At 9 a.m., several hundred BNU 
and QTC Red Guards marched to the Confucius Mansion where they merged with Red 
Guards from other schools. As many as 2,000 Red Guards were packed in the short 
Donghua Street outside the Confucius Mansion. Many more non-Red Guards— 
townspeople and peasants—came to be part of this once-in-a-lifetime spectacle.
 The last attempt to avert the smashing 
failed.  
44
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time when Qufu experienced an event that generated this much excitement and 
commotion was the funeral of the last Yansheng Duke Kong Lingyi on November 19, 
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1920 when almost everyone in Qufu came out to pay their last respects to the town’s 
patriarch and catch a glimpse of his corpse for good luck.  
Near 11 a.m., the crowds grew larger and the atmosphere became more intense. 
The stele-smashing team and all the smashing equipment were ready, but there was no 
sign of the rally starting soon. Just as people began to wonder what was going on, they 
saw Commissioner Gao Keming and Deputy Party Secretary Zhang Yumei being 
escorted by Red Guards onto the scene. The two county officials were “invited” by the 
Red Guards to be part of the rally. Despite their adherence to their “three no’s policy,” 
they had been hustled into the rally site by the frustrated Red Guards. Once they actually 
arrived at the scene, however, the two county leaders were astounded by the chaos they 
witnessed. They realized that there were peasants, townspeople, and conservative Red 
Guards in the crowds that were opposed to the rally. If nothing was done about the 
pandemonium, the situation could quickly spiral out of control and the ramifications 
would be unthinkable. The two officials immediately decided to turn their passive 
resistance into active intervention. Zhang Yumei quickly left the scene and entered the 
county theater where he held an impromptu emergency meeting with all party secretaries 
of all brigades of the Chenguan Commune. There Zhang warned them against any 
physical conflict between the Red Guards and peasants and ordered them to go into the 
crowds to restrain the peasants from their own brigades.45
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were nothing but “capitalist roaders” in the eyes of the Red Guards, their words were still 
official to the grassroots rural cadres who immediately started reining in their people to 




As Deputy Party Secretary Zhang Yumei was defusing a pending crisis, county 
commissioner Gao was hustled by Red Guards into the County Cultural Revolution 
Office where he was asked to join the presidium of the rally and make statements in 
support of smashing the steles at the rally. Gao adamantly refused to cooperate. Red 
Guard leader Zhang daoying made a concession and told Gao that he could remain silent 
but he must sit on the stage of the rally on behalf of the county party committee. Gao 
raised his voice and told Zhang, “Let me say it one more time: I do not agree with 
smashing the steles. Therefore, I will not join the presidium!”46 But Zhang refused to 
back off. As the head of the Liaison Station and the Master of Ceremony for the rally, he 
knew it was his moment to make history by ensuring the rally’s success. Although the 
practice of “kick out the party committee to make revolution” started in early October, 
Zhang also knew it was not yet the right time to exclude the local party committee from 
the political process. He needed a Qufu party committee representative to be on the stage 
for the public to see. Nothing would send a stronger message to the agitated Qufu 
peasants, the biggest threat to the rally’s success, than a subdued and compliant top Qufu 
leader on the stage. In view of these factors, Zhang refused to give an inch to Gao. “You 
must attend today’s rally. The county party committee must have a representative on the 
stage!”47
Although Commissioner Gao steadfastly adhered to the “three no’s policy,” he 
was not sure if the provincial leaders would steadfastly hold on to their “protect the State 
Council steles at any cost” position. After his talk with BNU Red Guard leader Tan fell 
 Zhang insisted. As 11 a.m. drew nearer, a stalemate seemed to have set in, to the 
dismay and panic of the rally organizers. 
                                               
46 KFDJN, 128.  




through that morning, Gao immediately reported Tan’s new demands to the provincial 
leaders and asked for further instructions. He had been waiting for a reply since then. 
Now that he had reached another stalemate with the rally organizers, he became even 
more eager to know how the provincial leaders would like to handle the volatile situation. 
It was at that critical moment when his secretary found him. Gao eagerly asked the 
secretary, “Did you get a reply yet?”  “Yes,” his secretary replied, “Provincial Party 
Secretary Bai said, ‘Just let it go. Do not resist anymore’.”48
The Collapse of the Last Line of Defense  
 Hearing this, Gao felt like a 
deflated balloon. As the interim top administrator of Qufu, he had led the Qufu 
government to resist the BNU Red Guards from the day they set foot in Qufu, but all the 
efforts were for nothing. The caving-in of the provincial government to the Red Guards 
signified the end of any meaningful resistance on the part of the local government. It was 
now time to accept the reality, acknowledge Tan’s authority, and cooperate with the Red 
Guards.  
At 11 a.m., the “Completely Crush the Confucian Family Shop Oath-taking 
Rally” officially began before the Confucius Mansion. Speaker after speaker took the 
stage accusing government officials of using the steles to protect “cow ghosts and snake 
demons.” Document after document was read to expose the evils of the Kong lineage and 
those who protected them, including the “A Protest Letter to the State Council.”49
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 As this 
was going on, the crowds began to be boisterous and started to surge forward. There were 
those who tried to get closer to the State Council steles to witness the smashing; there 
were those who wanted to take a close look at the now legendary Red Guard leader Tan 




Houlan; and there were those peasants, conservative Red Guards, and townspeople who 
wanted to confront the Red Guards and stop the imminent destruction of the steles. An 
incredible pandemonium ensued. The chaos Gao Keming warned Tan about in the 
morning was closer to becoming a reality.  
As the chief organizer of the rally, Zhang Daoying tried frantically to keep the 
crowds under control, but his voice was hopelessly drowned out by the din. In despair, 
Zhang turned to Gao Keming and yelled at the top of his lungs, “Commissioner Gao, you 
must immediately stop the chaos. If anything should go wrong with the rally, the county 
party committee would be held fully accountable!”50 Gao was sitting on the stage as a 
“prop” for the rally, but the tumultuous circumstances turned the “prop” into a main actor 
and an unexpected “fire extinguisher.” Gao stood up, moved a few steps forward, and 
held out his hands to signal for calm and order. Miraculously, without a single word 
uttered, people began to calm down and the crowds stopped moving.51
With the crowd under control, Zhang resumed the rally and concluded the ritual 
opening ceremony with the recitation of the “Stele-Smashing Oath” by all participating 
Red Guards: “We pledge to overthrow any protection umbrella of the ‘cow ghosts and 
snake demons’! We will smash to pulp any loyalist steles that impede revolution!” With 
that, Zhang solemnly declared, “The stele-smashing will now begin!”
  Gao proved that 
the local government still commanded significant respect among the Qufu residents 
despite Red Guards’ efforts to undermine their public image in recent months.  
52
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pandemonium resumed. The excited crowds surged forward again to catch a better view 
of this historic moment. Among them were also some conservative Red Guards shouting 
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“Smashing the steles is to attack the State Council!”53
Despite the strong muscles of the attackers, the State Council stele was made of 
such quality granite that it refused to be smashed easily. The Red Guards had to use ropes 
to pull down the base of the stele first and then took turns to smash it. With their fellow 
Red Guards’ rhythmic chanting of Mao’s quotation: “Be resolute, fear no sacrifice, and 
surmount every difficulty to win victory,” the stele-smashing team finally smashed the 
1,000 pound heavy granite stele into pieces—along with the authority it represented.
 However, their shouts were 
drowned by the even more deafening shouts and noises of the crowd. 
54
Ironically, as soon as the Red Guards broke the stele into pieces, they were asked 
to piece it back together again, and they gladly accommodated. This was because a 
Xinhua News Agency photographer assigned to take photos of the rally was stuck in the 
crowds and did not catch the live smashing of the stele. Therefore, he asked the Red 
Guards to reassemble the stele and then re-smash it for the photo opportunity.
 
The idea of smashing the State Council steles was conceived in Beijing, resisted in both 
Jinan and Qufu, opposed by people from all walks of life in Qufu, but finally delivered by 
the BNU Red Guards.  
55
The domino effect of the fall of the protection steles was both swift and violent. 
As soon as the stele before the Confucius Mansion fell, Zhang led a group of Red Guards 
 While “A 
picture is worth one thousand words,” a picture of Red Guards smashing the State 
Council’s stele was worth even more. The photo captured the fall of the authority and 
prestige of the State Council and the futility of all resistance to the CCRG and its storm 
troops.  
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and locals to the Temple to the Duke of Zhou. There, they smashed the State Council 
protection stele for that site and even pulled down the centuries-old statue of the Duke of 
Zhou, which crumbled into pieces.56 Some Red Guards and locals marched into the 
Confucius Cemetery where they not only destroyed the State Council stele for the 
Confucius Cemetery but also started smashing some prominent symbols of the Confucius 
Cemetery, such as the “Most Sagacious Cemetery” Memorial Archway.57
The Confucius Temple was not spared devastation either. A group of Red Guards 
stormed into the Confucius Temple followed by local mobs. They climbed onto the 
shrines of Confucius’s disciples and knocked down the heads of these statues one after 
another. Those who couldn’t get on the shrines kicked the fallen heads back and forth like 
soccer balls. A man in his thirties climbed on to the statue of Confucius and pried into a 
crack on its chest. He first pulled out some cotton and then, on second try, discovered a 
string of silver internal organs and a bronze heart-protecting mirror.
   
58 When he dug in 
further, he found a copy of Confucius’s Book of Rites. The onlookers followed suit and 
searched the interior of the other now headless statues and discovered more silver internal 
organs, bronze mirrors, and copies of various Confucian classics such as The Book of 
Change, and The Analects. Together, they took out seventeen silver internal organs, 
seventeen bronze mirrors, and dozens of vintage Confucian classics. The only head that 
was spared during this violent and sudden assault was that of Confucius. The Red Guards 
saved it for special use in the next phase of their campaign.59
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The extensive, rampant destructive acts immediately following the rally boded ill 
for the Three Kong Sites. Those acts were neither clearly mandated by the CCRG 
directives nor previously announced. Yet they erupted violently and abruptly with no one 
attempting to stop them. What was even more ominous was that, from the very start, the 
locals were more violent and extreme than the Red Guards, who knew their specific 
objectives and demonstrated some discipline and constraints.  What is also worth noting 
was the contrast between people’s reaction to the destruction of the protection steles and 
to the Kong sites: there was strong objection to the destruction of the symbols of state 
authority, but there was little public anger and outcry over the violence against the 
symbols of traditional authority and Chinese culture. 
 The events of November 15, 1966 marked the demise of the last line of defense 
for the Three Kong Sites. Not only was their physical symbol of protection lost, but the 
psychological line of defense for the local residents and cadres was lost too. The loss of 
the protection steles was an ominous harbinger of what was coming next. Indeed, each 
violent performance was a rehearsal for the next one. The signal for the final assault was 
given; the floodgates for waves of violence were loosed, and the ancient town of Qufu, 
sitting helplessly in the cold winter of 1966, waited for the impending calamity.  
Planning the Final Assault 
On November 16, the Red Guards, while still relishing the sweet victory of the 
day before, were already contemplating their next moves. They developed some ideas to 
exploit their victory, but it was the radical leader Lin Jie in Beijing who again brought his 
trusted Red Guards a complete set of ideas for the next phase. Lin had followed his “pet 




expeditionary force’s special envoy to Beijing. On the evening of November 16, this 
special envoy relayed Lin’s instructions to the heads of the BNU Red Guards: they were 
to combine the anti-Confucian campaign with the campaign against bourgeois reactionary 
line.60
Tan was once again struck by Lin Jie’s insight and vision. Indeed, the events of 
the past few days clearly indicated the existence of a “peasant problem.” Tan knew how 
the peasants were instrumental in the local Red Guards’ debacle on August 26. She 
remembered how on the evening of November 13 some BNU Red Guards, who ventured 
into a village to mobilize the peasants, were harassed, ridiculed, and held up by some 
peasants with the encouragement of village cadres.
 Their foremost priority was to mobilize the peasants. Without thoroughly 
awakening and mobilizing the peasants, the Red Guards’ victory would be superficial and 
incomplete.  
61
Having digested Lin’s instructions, Tan introduced a four-step plan to carry them 
out. The first step was to ask Zhao Yimin, the aforementioned rebel-teacher at QTC, to 
“educate the educators”; that is, Zhao would educate the Red Guards about the “evils of 
 She certainly had a fresh memory of 
how much the peasants respected Commissioner Gao. During the stele-smashing rally 
when peasants were clashing with the Red Guards, it was Gao who, with a wave of his 
hands, stopped the pandemonium. Tan knew the peace between the Red Guards and the 
peasants stemmed from the peasants’ recognition of the Red Guards’ power, but Tan 
wanted to turn their recognition of power into recognition of the anti-Confucian 
campaign as a mutually beneficial cause for both the Red Guards and the peasants. Tan 
had to accomplish this in order to complete the objectives of the campaign.  
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the Kong Lineage” and those who protected it, and the Red Guards would then bring the 
messages to the villages to educate the peasants.  The second step was to send BNU Red 
Guards to rural Qufu to mobilize the peasants. The third step was to fetch some 
prominent scholars who participated in the 1962 Confucius Forum and “worshiped 
Confucius.” The fourth step was to get more people to visit the Confucian sites to raise 
their awareness and consciousness of the “evils of the Confucius establishment.” More 
specifically, they were to enhance the class education exhibition in the Confucius 
Mansion, send “Jinggangshan Light Calvary Propaganda Teams” to the streets to get the 
word out, and demand a three-day break for all Qufu government employees and peasants 
so that they could come to see the exhibition in the Confucius Mansion. Once these 
objectives were accomplished, the final rally and a full-scale assault would commence.62
The following days were spent on implementing this four-step plan.  On the 
morning of November 17, a general meeting for all BNU Red Guards was held where the 
rank-and-file Red Guards were informed of the four-step plan and given a general 
orientation about the evils of the Kong lineage by Zhao Yimin.  Zhang Daoying also went 
to the Qufu Cultural Revolution Office and demanded a three-day break for employees 
and peasants to visit the class education exhibition in the Confucius Mansion, which the 
government reluctantly obeyed.  On November 19, a team of Red Guards headed by Tan 
and Zhao Yimin went to the provincial capital Jinan to ensure the provincial 
government’s support for their final assault. Another team was dispatched to bring to 
Qufu various “reactionary academic authorities” for the grand finale of the campaign. 
The vast majority of the BNU Red Guards then went to rural Qufu to mobilize the 
peasants.  
  
                                               




To ensure the local government’s support of the Red Guards and avoid the past 
experience of peasants harassing Red Guards, the now compliant county government held 
a countywide cadre meeting where Commissioner Gao called on the officials to support 
the Red Guards. Liaison Station chief Zhang Daoying also delivered a powerful “carrot-
and-stick speech” at the meeting. He criticized Qufu officials for their roles in the August 
26 incident but also encouraged them to rise up against the bourgeois reactionary line.63
By November 20, the time of the final rally was announced through an open 
telegram that the BNU Red Guards sent to the whole country. It was titled “Ten proposals 
to completely overthrow the ‘Confucian Family Shop’ and establish the absolute 
authority of Mao Zedong Thought.”
  
Zhang’s tone of “you are either with us or against us” before Qufu’s number-one leader 
sent a strong message to the cadres at the meeting about who was really in charge in Qufu 
now. 
64
The following day, November 21, county Party Secretary Zhang Yumei held a 
“broadcast rally” through the countywide wired broadcast network in which he called on 
the peasants to support the BNU Red Guards. This was followed by yet another 
countywide cadre meeting on November 22 to ensure facilitation of Red Guards’ 
 Not only did it announce the end of November as 
the time for the mass rally, but it also spelled out the specific objectives of the rally, 
including the formation of a nationwide massive anti-Confucian campaign and the 
establishment of a nationwide liaison committee to “unite all anti-Confucian 
revolutionary organizations in the country.” The telegram was a clear effort on the part of 
Tan to expand the influence of the Jinggangshan Regiment to the entire country.  
                                               
63 KFDJN, 153-154.  




mobilization activities in the villages.  At this meeting, Qufu cadres were specifically told 
to “support BNU Red Guards, organize peasants to tour the class education exhibition in 
the Confucius Mansion, engage peasants in ‘grievance meetings,’ and actively prepare 
for the 50,000 people rally.”65
The Qufu cadres’ surrender to the Red Guards’ authority dovetailed well with the 
Red Guards’ comprehensive peasant mobilization project. BNU Red Guards moved into 
villages in Qufu where they practiced the “Three Togethers,” namely, “Eat Together, 
Live Together, and Labor Together [with the peasants] (santong).”
 This succession of meetings and follow-up meetings was 
indicative of an increasingly more powerful hand of the Red Guards in the local affairs as 
well as a clear sign of local cadres’ acquiescence or capitulation to the power of their 
“new boss.” These meetings sent a clear message to their silent audience—the peasants 
and Qufu public who watched the steady decline of the old leadership and unmistakable 
rise of the new power.  
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65 KFDJN, 154. “Grievance meetings,” also known as “speak-bitterness meetings,” were meetings where 
exploited, oppressed, and downtrodden people, such as workers and peasants, were given the opportunity to 
voice their grievances against those deemed responsible for their hardships and miseries. Such emotionally 
charged meetings served as an effective mechanism widely used by the Chinese communists to mobilize 
peasants and workers during mass movements.  
 Without the 
interference of the local cadres, they freely explained the significance of their anti-
Confucian campaign to the peasants. Their most significant roadblock was the mansion-
town relationship. Although Zhao Yimin gave them a quick orientation on the evils of the 
Kong lineage, demonizing and dehumanizing the Kong lineage to a rural population 
where twenty percent of the population was surnamed Kong was no small challenge.  
Although the Kong family was probably the largest landlord family in the nation and 
numerous local people toiled for it for centuries and generations, many peasants had 
66 “Three-togethers” was a popular communist practice aimed at making the government officials and 
intellectuals mingle with workers and peasants and know them better by sending them to factories or 




mixed feelings towards the Kong family: while they respected Confucius and had 
internalized many Confucian values, they did resent the economic hardships due to their 
status as tenants of the Kong lineage and were never given the chance to fully express 
their resentment. Besides, the new government since 1948 had also been protective of the 
Three Kong Sites, which had served to suppress any grievances they bore against the 
Kong family. Now that both the local cadres and Red Guards encouraged the former 
tenants and poor peasants to publicly air their pent-up grievances against the Kong 
family, the result was like the eruption of a dormant volcano. The Red Guards’ rural 
mobilization program was so successful that soon “Confucius” and “Confucian Family 
Shop” became curse words in villages that children would use to attack other children.67
On November 23, Tan returned from her trips to Jinan and Beijing where she 
secured provincial leaders’ commitment to support the rally and received further 
instructions from Lin Jie. That evening, she convened a meeting where she gave a 
progress report and concluded that the conditions were ripe for a major rally to conclude 
the campaign. A detailed plan was worked out at the meeting. The official time for the 
rally would be November 28-29.
  
Grievance meetings were an important communist peasant mobilization instrument and 
its effectiveness was proven one more time.  
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  After Tan’s meeting, Zhang Daoying as the head of 
the Liaison Station held his own meeting to work out the details for the rally, including 
the formation of a gravedigging team by the local peasants. Two days later on October 
25, the Qufu party committee made its own contribution to the preparation of the final 
rally by holding a countywide cadre meeting to mobilize the entire county in support of 




the students’ revolutionary activities. The Red Guards also ordered the Qufu government 
to get 100,000 people to attend the two-day rally and find 300 peasants to form a tomb-
digging team to work with the Red Guards on November 29. Suyuan Commune Party 
Secretary Chu Hongjiang was put in charge of gathering these peasants, who would 
receive 50 cents a day for their gravedigging work scheduled for November 29.69
As top Red Guard leaders were busy getting ready for the rally, their foot soldiers 
were already producing impressive and unexpected results out in the villages. After a 
highly successful mobilization session in the Lihuadian Village on November 25, the 
peasants became so agitated and emotional that they took the initiative to smash the tomb 
of a prominent descendant of Confucius who was buried outside the Confucius Cemetery. 
They did so without any direct encouragement from the Red Guards. It was the peasants, 
not the Red Guards, who fired the first shot for gravedigging. Two days later, peasants at 
Chenguan Commune held a spontaneous “Smash the Confucian Family Shop Rally” to 
express their resolve to assist the Red Guards to smash the historical sites and treasures 
that they defended with all their might on August 26.
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On the eve of the two-day rally, everything seemed to be ready for the big 
moment. Even the long-absent Qufu Party Secretary Li Xiu returned to Qufu for this 
 The significance of this was that 
Chenguan Commune and the peasants there were Qufu government’s “fire extinguisher” 
and had often been used to fend off Red Guards attacks. Now the “fire extinguishers” 
turned into “fire breathers.” They were going to breathe revolutionary flames into the 
oldest edifice of feudal China. Evidently, Lin Jie’s “peasant strategy” began to work. In 
fact, the peasants had already exceeded Lin Jie’s expectations.   
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occasion. Li had been attending the Shandong “Work Conference” in the wake of the 
“Central Work Conference” for the previous two weeks, where he and other provincial 
leaders were condemned for being loyalists and capitalist roaders.71
Mass Rally 
 When he finally 
returned to Qufu on November 26, he had to sneak into the city under cover of darkness 
to avoid detection by the Red Guards. After 18 days in Qufu, BNU Red Guards managed 
a thorough transformation of Qufu’s political, social, and cultural landscapes. The 
preparation for the final assault was complete.  
From November 28 to November 29, the two-day rally as announced in the open 
telegram proceeded precisely as planned. A human mass of about 100,000 Red Guards, 
workers, and peasants congregated at QTC’s sports field “to completely crush the 
Confucian Family Shop.”  Many participants started their journey very early in the 
morning; some were sent by the communes and many came of their own volition. Some 
Red Guards from neighboring localities even walked overnight to QTC. By 6 a.m. the 
Red Guards and peasants began to converge at the rally site “like red molten iron from all 
directions” with people waving flags of their organizations and Mao’s quotation book, 
turning Qufu Teachers College into a “red ocean.”72
The rally officially started at 10 a.m. Representatives of the Red Guards, workers, 
and peasants were sitting on the center stage, while the provincial and county party 
officials Shu Zaiwen and Li Xiu were sitting on the west side of the stage. As soon as the 
  
                                               
71 The Central Work Conference (October 9-28, 1966) was where the Liu-led party establishment began to 
collapse and both Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping repudiated themselves. The Shandong Work Conference 
was the provincial equivalent of the Central Work Conference where provincial, prefectural, and county 
leaders in Shandong became the targets of the Cultural Revolution.   




sound of The East Is Red died down and speakers were about to start their speeches, an 
unexpected commotion occurred along with the sound of drums.73 People were startled by 
this sudden disruption and began to swarm towards the west side of the stage from where 
the sound came. Soon, it became clear that the commotion was caused by “The Qufu 
Teachers College Red Guards,” which was one of the three factions of Red Guards at 
QTC. They came to rebel against Tan and her Beijing Normal Red Guards, who they 
claimed denied their opportunity to speak at the rally.  Chanting “We won’t allow Beijing 
Normal to monopolize everything!” and “Tan Houlan must get the heck out!” they tried 
to storm the stage to remove Tan from the platform.74
During the rally, speaker after speaker decried reactionary figures ranging from 
Confucius to the participants in the 1962 Confucius Forum.  The speeches were followed 
by struggle sessions against the “reactionary academic authorities.” Confucian scholars 
from all over China were hustled onto the stage where they were struggled against. The 
first day of the rally started on a high note but deteriorated somewhat due to disruptions 
 A general melee followed where 
the Red Guards on both sides engaged in shouting matches and physical fights. At one 
point, the attacking Red Guards seized the broadcast studio and began to blast “Beijing 
Red Guards get out!” through the loud speakers. County Party Secretary Li Xiu was 
asked by Tan to restore order, but Li was only effective when he stood up and tried to 
calm down the crowd. As soon as he sat down, the chaos would resume. It was not until 
the Red Guards on Tan’s side regained the control of the broadcasting studio and the 
public announcement system and defeated the attackers in the crowds that the rally was 
able to continue again.  
                                               
73 “The East Is Red” is an ode to Mao Zedong and a de facto national song during the Cultural Revolution.  




from fellow Red Guards. However, it was just a prelude to the main event. The most 
important agenda items of the rally were scheduled for the next day.  
Mission Accomplished 
On the morning of November 29, the rally resumed. It began with self-criticisms 
by provincial and county representatives Shu and Li, which was followed with 
concluding remarks by Tan.75  The rally ended with the reading of “Ten proposals to 
completely overthrow the ‘Confucian Family Shop’ and establish the absolute authority 
of Mao Zedong Thought” and “A Message of Greeting to Chairman Mao,” whereby they 
pledged their allegiance and loyalty to Chairman Mao the Great Teacher and informed 
him of the destruction that they were going to inflict on the monuments of China’s 
Foremost Teacher.  To the music of the popular song “Sailing on the Seas Depending on 
the Helmsman,” the fever of the participants reached its peak.76
Personal attacks and physical abuse began immediately following the rally.  
Master of Ceremony Dong Lianmeng shouted the agenda for the remainder of the day to 
the crowd: “Put the cow demons and snake spirits on the truck, start the parade, march to 
the Confucius Cemetery, burn down Confucius’s statue, and level Confucius’s tomb!”
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75 Self-criticism is a political ritual of the Chinese communists whereby people criticize themselves at 
public events for the wrongs they are supposed to have committed or weaknesses they are supposed to 
have.  
  
The Confucian scholars were then put on a waiting truck with a Confucius’s statue 
already on it. A tall dunce cap was placed on the statue’s head with the wording, “Down 
with No. 1 Scoundrel Confucius!” The scholars were made to stand next to or around 
Confucius’s statue. The parading trucks with Confucian scholars and other “cow demons 
76 KFDJN, 178-179.  




and snake spirits” then moved around the entire city stopping at various intersections for 
the public to see and ridicule. The loudspeakers on the propaganda truck introduced the 
“cow demons and snake spirits” as they passed by the onlookers. Finally, the crowds and 
the parading trucks stopped at a small bridge on the west side of the Confucius Cemetery. 
Beneath the bridge, a fire was already burning. Red Guards threw various cultural relics 
especially gathered for this occasion into the flames, including the tablet for “the Most 
Sagacious Teacher.” Finally, they unloaded Confucius’s statue from the truck and threw 
it into the flames as well. Cheers erupted and spiraled into the sky along with billows of 
black smoke.78
The assault on the Confucius Cemetery actually got underway early in the 
morning with some members of “the Red Guard Shock Brigade” starting the destructive 
work around the periphery of the Confucius Cemetery. By 9 a.m. a 300-strong peasant 
gravedigging team appeared on the “Sacred Path” leading to the Confucius Cemetery. 
They were immediately spotted by the cameramen from Beijing Film Studio whom Lin 
Jie sent to Qufu to film the historical event. The cameramen were elated to see the “poor 
and lower-middle peasants’ gravedigging team” and asked them to pose for the camera. 
The peasants were only too happy to oblige and thoroughly enjoyed this “rare 
privilege.”
 In just a few hours, two of the three main objectives of the expedition 
were accomplished, namely, burning Confucius’s statue and parading the reactionary 
academic authorities. The crowds headed to Confucius Cemetery to complete the last 
objective of the expedition—leveling Confucius’s tomb.  
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 They did not even get to see films often and now they were in a film.  




 Since the task of the day was to dig out the tombs of the first and last three 
generations of the Confucian lineage, the 300 peasants were split into two sub-teams—
200 of them were assigned to help Red Guards to exhume the tombs of Confucius, his 
son Kong Li and his grandson Kong Ji. The remaining 100 were assigned to assist Red 
Guards to dig up the graves of the last three generations of Kong lineage, namely, those 
of the Kong Lingyi, Confucius’s 76th direct descendent, and his father and grandfather.  
A ground-breaking ceremony was held for the exhuming of the tomb of 
Confucius. Red Guards chanted Mao’s quotations and Commissioner Gao Keming made 
remarks in support of their revolutionary actions. Following the ceremony, Red Guards 
and peasants began to dig out the graves of Confucius and his son and grandson 
simultaneously with crowds watching and cameras clicking. Qufu county party secretary 
Li Xiu and the prefectural party secretary also participated in the digging to show 
support. A representative from Shandong cultural relic preservation office provided 
technical assistance and advised the peasants on how to effectively dig out the tomb. A 
vehicle belonging to the People’s Bank of Qufu was parked nearby with bank employees 
ready to collect the much anticipated funerary objects from Confucius’s tomb.80
Digging up Confucius’s tomb proved to be far more time-consuming than 
expected. Following two days of hard work and after digging three meters into the 
ground, the gravedigging team and their advisors finally lost their patience. They drilled a 
few holes around the tomb, filled the holes with dynamite and then blew it up. When the 
dust settled, people swarmed to the gaping hole to catch the first glimpse, but they saw 
only an empty tomb. There was only yellow earth to be seen.
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absorbed into the yellow earth and became part of it. The gravediggers were 
disappointed. They used destructive modern explosives to dig out the body of an ancient 
sage, but no explosives, no matter how lethal and destructive, were going to find him—
the sage and the earth had become one.  
The digging of the graves for the last three generations of the Kong lineage turned 
out to be more dramatic. Of the 100 peasants assigned to dig out the tombs, fifty were 
assigned to assist to dig out the grave of Kong Lingyi, who was buried forty-six years 
before in 1920. After two days’ hard work, they finally succeeded. On November 30, 
with the assistance of state-assigned cultural relic experts and medical professionals, five 
well-preserved bodies were exhumed, emitting an unbearable stench that caused many to 
vomit. The officials from Qufu Cultural Relics Commission and employees of the 
People’s Bank in Qufu also helped collect the jewelry found in the graves and coffins. 
The jewelry greatly interested the onlookers. The tomb of Kong Linyi in particular 
attracted curious visitors from near and far for the next few days. The five exhumed 
bodies were eventually moved to a stretch of grass away from the tombs. Two of the 
female bodies were bundled together and hung from a tree as a prank by someone. 
Finally, Chu Hongjiang, the head of the peasant gravedigging team, disposed of the 
naked corpses because they were “unsightly.”82
At this point, all objectives of the rally had been successfully accomplished. With 
permission from the CCRG and central authorities, support from the government officials 
at various levels, technical assistance of the cultural and medical experts, and the fervor 
and zeal of tens of thousands of Red Guards and the Sage’s own descendants, the 
physical symbols of Confucius lineage came to an abrupt end. The action of every 
   
                                               




participant lived up to the spirit of Mao’s famous quote, “A revolution is not a dinner 
party…A revolution is an insurrection, an act of violence by which one class overthrows 
another,” to the fullest 
Conclusion  
 Despite their strong resolve and enormous zeal, the BNU Red Guards faced 
tremendous odds when they set out to accomplish their Qufu mission. The possible 
obstacles they faced were peasant harassment, conflict with local Red Guards, rejection 
by the local officials, a hostile community, and the State Council’s protection steles. Yet, 
during their twenty-eight days in Qufu, they scored a resounding victory in the end. This 
victory, however, was no accident but the consequence of a combination of factors and 
circumstances within or without their control.  First, there was the careful planning of the 
Qufu operation. Next, there was the accidental discovery of the incriminating evidence in 
the Confucius Mansion that lent justification and legitimacy to their Qufu mission. 
Further, there were the disciplined and tactful college Red Guards who knew how to 
handle the local officials.  
 But their advantages by themselves would not have guaranteed their victory in the 
absence of the critical developments that tipped the balance and transformed an initially 
hostile and skeptical Qufu community and bureaucracy to become enthusiastic supporters 
or reluctant collaborators of the Red Guards. Chief among those developments were the 
instructions from the CCRG that not only approved the destruction but also specified its 
scope. This, in turn, broke the stalemate and empowered and emboldened the Red 
Guards, who used the momentum the CCRG support created to smash the State Council 




the Red Guards and protect the Three Kong Sites. The then subdued Qufu officials and 
paralyzed party control in rural Qufu further enabled the Red Guards to move into the 
villages and mobilize the peasants completely unopposed. In effect, it was the combined 
effect of a paralyzed bureaucracy, a mobilized peasantry, a compliant community, and a 
coalition of CCRG-backed Red Guards organizations that ended the centuries of 
unassailability of the Three Kong Sites.  
 Tan and the BNU Red Guards brought the full wrath of the Cultural Revolution to 
Qufu and accomplished all of their stated objectives. But every solution creates new 
problems. The Red Guards’ victory gave rise to some uncertainties for the Qufu 
community, and some troubling signs began to emerge during their siege of Qufu. There 
was a paralyzed local government and a power vacuum. There were also the factional 
disputes among Red Guard groups that challenged even the CCRG-backed Red Guards. 
Qufu locals also engaged in spontaneous recreational violence and acquisitive vandalism 
and followed no rules. Finally, there was the eye-opening experience of seeing buried 
treasures being unearthed in the Confucius Cemetery by Red Guards and state 
employees. Would these factors create any problems once the BNU Red Guards departed 
Qufu? What would happen to the ransacked Three Kong Sites? Who would lead the 
“anti-Confucian movement” that the BNU Red Guards started?  There were many 




Chapter V: Rebellion of Confucius’s Descendants 
 
Hasty Departure    
Tan Houlan and her jubilant BNU Red Guards were still rejoicing over their 
victory when they were ordered to return to Beijing immediately. On December 3, 1966, 
just two days after BNU Red Guards accomplished the main objectives of their Qufu 
mission, Tan received an urgent telegram from the mission’s chief architect Lin Jie in 
Beijing.  The message was brief and clear, “An anti-Guan Feng, anti-Qi Benyu adverse 
current is making its way to the capital city. The Jinggangshan Regiment must 
immediately return to the capital.” 
Though it was on short notice, the withdrawal order was not much of a problem 
for either Lin or Tan. After all, they had successfully accomplished the Qufu mission, 
from which they received both ideological satisfaction and the political gain they desired: 
Lin through his skillful orchestrating of the entire mission had bolstered his credentials 
and credibility with the CCRG, while Tan had greatly increased her name recognition 
through her Qufu mission and earned the extra political capital she had long coveted.1
The situation in Beijing was indeed disconcerting. From mid-November to the 
end of that month, a strong resistance movement, referred to by the radical Red Guards 
and CCRG as the “Black Wind in November,” emerged to oppose the widespread attacks 
on the “capitalist roaders,” by whom they meant the incumbent party and government 
  
Besides, as the CCRG’s storm troop, Tan and her fellow Jinggangshan leaders were duty-
bound to defend their key backers in Beijing.  
                                               
1 Tan Houlan started her organization’s nationally circulated Jingganshan Battle Dispatch as soon as she 




cadres. Both Mao’s handpicked heir Lin Biao and the CCRG came under attack from 
various conservative forces.2
As the BNU Red Guards’ primary contact with the local Red Guards, Zhang 
Daoying held a meeting on the evening of December 4 announcing the news about BNU 
Red Guards’ forthcoming departure. The dismayed local Red Guards pleaded with 
Zhang, “Please stay a bit longer. Who is going to lead us when you are gone?”
 The Jinggangshan Regiment’s return to Beijing was a 
priority that easily trumped all others. Consequently, Tan immediately summoned a 
Jinggangshan Regiment headquarters meeting where they decided to leave Qufu in three 
days and turn over the unfinished business to their local allies.  
3
Zhang Daoying was not unsympathetic to their concerns, but he was neither able 
nor interested to accommodate their wishes. Instead, he rolled out an eight-point plan that 
spelled out the transitional steps and tasks ahead for the reluctant local Red Guards. The 
plan stipulated that the Confucian Complex was to be transformed into an exhibition hall 
  Their 
concerns were genuine and understandable. Qufu officials had often reminded people 
about the inevitable departure of the BNU Red Guards as a way to deter locals from 
getting too close to them. Now, just three days after they had violated the Three Kong 
Sites and Qufu, the BNU Red Guards were already getting ready to leave them. Their 
local allies were both concerned about reprisals from the Qufu authorities and unsure 
about their ability to carry on the anti-Confucian movement without the BNU Red 
Guards. After all, they did not have all the advantages that BNU Red Guards enjoyed—
the CCRG’s full support, dominance over local officials, and clout over various Red 
Guards factions.   
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for class education and the Confucius Cemetery was going to have all of its tombs 
leveled and be turned into an orchard.  The plan also designated Wang Zhengxin as the 
new head of the Liaison Station. 
With that, Zhang Daoying handed the seal of the Liaison Station to his 
replacement Wang Zhengxin without addressing a whole host of questions on the minds 
of his local allies: Would the local authorities fight back and retaliate? Would the Qufu 
peasantry switch sides and turn hostile to the rebel students again? Would the various 
Red Guards factions remain united under the Liaison Station? Most important of all, 
would Wang Zhengxin be strong enough to take Tan’s place and lead them to overcome 
the odds and achieve new objectives?   
The “New Sheriff” in Town 
  Wang Zhengxin viewed his sudden rise from sidekick to main player with both 
trepidation and excitement.  Like his fellow local Red Guards, Wang had his concerns 
about the challenges ahead; but unlike them, he welcomed those challenges and felt he 
was well-positioned to lead the Liaison Station and the anti-Confucian movement. While 
his fellow rebels were mostly rookie Red Guards in their teens, this 24-year-old 
nontraditional student was already a veteran Red Guard.  While the other Qufu students 
were participating in their abortive first assault on the Three Kong Sites, Wang was 
already in Beijing networking with the radical capital Red Guards. In fact, he was one of 
the very few Red Guards from Qufu who saw Chairman Mao during his second review of 
Red Guards on August 31, 1966.  
Wang’s early political activism and acumen were quickly recognized by QTC’s 




as the organization’s representative in Beijing.4
Wang did not let Tan down. Since his return to Qufu, he became the No. 2 figure 
of the Liaison Station and proved to be most instrumental in carrying out Tan’s 
operations. During the mass rally on November 28, for instance, it was Wang who led a 
team of Red Guards to regain the control of QTC’s broadcasting studio from the rival 
Red Guard faction. Wang’s total devotion to Tan’s Qufu mission, demonstrated 
resourcefulness, and proven leadership skills became the reasons for him to be chosen to 
fill the void left by the departing Tan.  
 In this capacity, Wang became closely 
acquainted with Tan’s Jinggangshan Regiment. When Tan was putting together an 
advance team for the Qufu mission, Wang was naturally one of those selected and soon 
became the team’s trusted Qufu guide and resource person.  
 Although Tan chose Wang and despite what they had in common—both were 
radical nontraditional students with some charismatic qualities—the two student leaders 
were worlds apart in personality and work style.  Where Tan was snappy, abrasive, and 
impulsive, Wang was tactful, methodical, and rational. Wang’s personal strengths 
became an especially important asset to him on December 4 when the gargantuan 
responsibility of succeeding Tan and leading the Liaison Station was abruptly thrust into 
his hands. Practically overnight, Wang had become the new leader of a coalition of 
loosely connected fledging Red Guards organizations and would assume responsibility 
for the fate of the Three Kong Sites. However, unlike the guardians of the Three Kong 
Sites before him whose duty was to preserve and protect those sites, Wang’s job was to 
engage in the “constructive destruction” of the Kong sites; that is, he was to level all the 
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tombs in the Confucius Cemetery and turn it into an orchard and convert the Confucian 
Complex into a facility for class education. Wang knew he had his work cut out for him, 
and he needed a quick success to establish his authority as Qufu’s new leader. This was 
going to be challenging.  Qufu’s leading officials were all politically discredited but 
administratively functional. To keep the Qufu community running, Wang needed the 
support of the bureaucrats but could not share his power with them.  He had yet to figure 
out how to accomplish this.   
Fortunately, an opportunity appeared before he had need of his leadership skills. It 
so happened that, at practically the same time as when Tan was passing the leadership 
baton to Wang, a rival Red Guard organization popped into being on the evening of 
December 3—one that openly challenged the Liaison Station’s authority in leading the 
anti-Confucian movement. The new opposition was spearheaded by the same group of 
Red Guards that had disrupted the November 28 mass rally. They had become a 
constantly recurring irritant for Tan. She was able to lord over the academic authorities 
and capitalist roaders, but she was simply unable to shake off this group of pesky Red 
Guards.  
That evening, this new coalition of defiant Red Guards, along with some 
dissenting local residents and peasants declared the formation of the “Shandong Qufu 
Denouncing Confucius Committee” to formally challenge the Liaison Station’s 
monopoly of the anti-Confucian movement. They obtained a letter of approval from the 





Tan was furious at the reemergence of her avowed foes, but she was shrewd 
enough to turn this crisis into an opportunity as she realized it created the perfect moment 
to initiate Wang Zhengxin into his new leadership position. She knew that this 
opportunity, if handled well, could boost Wang’s public profile, improve his name 
recognition, and help him make an impressive debut on Qufu’s political stage. As a 
result, Tan let Wang handle the crisis but threw her full support behind him.  
 Needless to say, the new competition was a slap in the face 
of the BNU Red Guards and the Liaison Station under its control.  
On the morning of December 4, Wang Zhengxin and his fellow Red Guards 
stormed into the Qufu government’s Cultural Revolution Office where they demanded 
that the county government invalidate its approval of the rival organization and issue an 
apology letter to be distributed across the country.6 The following morning, Wang led a 
mass protest parade in Qufu and organized a protest rally outside the Qufu Cultural 
Revolution Office.  As if this was not enough, Wang brought Qufu Party Secretary Li 
Xiu and the Shandong secretary of the secretariat Shu Zaiwen to the Confucius Temple 
where they affirmed their support for Wang’s Liaison Station. With the momentum he 
had created, Wang managed to confiscate the new office of the rival organization and 
smashed its signboard.7
Apparently, Tan’s crisis-to-opportunity strategy worked. As a result of those 
decisive and well-publicized actions, Wang was able to not only discredit the nascent 
rival organization but also make a name for himself in Qufu. To the participants and 
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audience of this political theater as well as his potential allies and foes, it became clear 
that Wang Zhengxin was not just an interim figurehead temporarily replacing Tan. 
Rather, he had demonstrated necessary skills and the qualities expected of a successful 
Red Guard leader.  
Tan came to Qufu a troublemaker but left Qufu a kingmaker. After leaving Wang 
this perfect “going-away present,” she bid her farewell to a conquered and disfigured 
Qufu on December 6 and led her troop to their next battleground.  It was now primetime 
for Wang.  
New Revolutionary Force  
The sudden departure of the BNU Red Guards literally catapulted Wang into the 
top leadership position overnight. It was both an exciting and sobering moment for him.  
On the one hand, he welcomed the autonomy and the latitude; it was a great opportunity 
to both differentiate and distinguish himself from his predecessors.8
                                               
8 Joel Andreas describes the absence of formal organizational links between the CCRG and local rebel 
organizations as a salient feature of charismatic mobilization structure during the Cultural Revolution. This 
situation enabled local Red Guards factions to enjoy much latitude. In Joel Andreas, “The Structure of 
Charismatic Mobilization: A Case Study of Rebellion during the Chinese Cultural Revolution” American 
Sociological Review 72 (2007): 450. 
   On the other hand, 
with autonomy and latitude came responsibilities and risks. Wang knew he was walking 
on an unbeaten path full of twists and turns. Tan left him with important mandates but not 
a roadmap of how to get there. To carry out those mandates, Wang had to engage in both 
destruction and construction: he was going to tear down many parts of the Three Kong 
Sites and convert them into a combination of a class education facility and an agricultural 
production base, which would involve quite some administrative decision and work for 




tearing down the old world. Now, in an irony of fate, he was going to assume 
administrative roles and walk in the shoes of those whom he had just toppled.  
Wang weighed his strengths and weaknesses and mapped out his own strategies. 
He knew he would never have the advantages that the BNU Red Guards enjoyed and 
must establish his own authority, forge his own alliances, and fight his own battles 
against his potential adversaries.  His experience over the past few weeks in dealing with 
various players on Qufu’s political stage made him acutely aware that he had many rivals 
biding their time to challenge him. He knew the seemingly subdued local officials could 
stage a surprise comeback at any moment.  He also knew that Tan and the CCRG might 
not be able to come to his rescue at a moment’s notice. He was going to be a lone warrior 
facing all challenges ahead. 
After much deliberation, Wang came up with the strategy which he put in his 
diary, “I must find ways to mobilize the peasants, make use of the power holders, employ 
some individuals within the Qufu party committee, and be tactful.”9
Creating his own peasant mobilization strategy, however, was no easy task for 
Wang.  Among other things, the power structure in rural Qufu in December 1966 was no 
longer the same monolith that the BNU Red Guards encountered on November 10. The 
  Apparently, he took 
a page from Tan’s operation manual by putting a premium on mobilizing the peasants. 
He knew it was Lin Jie’s trump card, having witnessed Tan’s brilliant execution of a 
peasant mobilization campaign. However, he could not simply copy their experiences. He 
had neither Lin’s CCRG background nor Tan’s aura, much less a team of battle-tested 
Red Guards like those BNU students at his disposal. He had to devise his own peasant 
mobilization strategy.  
                                               




havoc wrought by Tan had led to a reconfiguration of the once top-down rural Qufu 
power structure. The old hierarchical rural governing structure with power concentrated 
at the top had now given way to a power structure shared by three constituencies: (1) 
county and commune party secretaries, (2) peasants, and (3) grassroots rural cadres. 
While the county and commune party secretaries were still administratively functional, 
they were politically incapacitated and could only be used but not counted on. In contrast, 
the once compliant and obedient Qufu peasantry was greatly empowered by the Beijing 
Red Guards. On August 26, they dutifully followed the county officials’ order to expel 
the intruding Red Guards. By the end of December, however, they were busy forming 
their own rebel organizations and laying their own claims in the Cultural Revolution. 
Some of them even joined Wang’s rival organization and became a thorn in his side.  On 
the other hand, many peasants remained too timid and afraid to risk being involved with 
the Red Guards.10
As a result, the grassroots rural cadres became Wang’s only possible allies; 
fortunately, they happened to be good possible allies. The grassroots rural cadres were 
comprised of model peasants, heads of the poor and lower-middle peasants associations, 
women’s federations, and youth leagues, as well as brigade and production team party 
secretaries.
 The peasants, in other words, became a political force whose allegiance 
Wang coveted, but could not take for granted.  
11
                                               
10 Qufu peasants seemed extraordinary conservative. During the Four-Cleanup movement that was 
superseded by the Cultural Revolution, cadres stationed in Qufu experienced extreme difficulty in getting 
the peasants to open up and rise against the lineage elders or local cadres. Qiu Xuexing, “Qing li “shi qing” 
yun dong ” [Personal experience in the Four Clean-ups movement] Zhonghen 7 (2005): 58. 
 They served as the Qufu party establishment’s most important rural power 
base. Although their former superiors were recently stripped of their power, their own 
11 The system of “model peasant” was established in early PRC to recognize those peasants who were both 




peasant pedigree and lower ranks shielded them from the Red Guards’ wrath and helped 
them to remain a politically viable force in rural politics whose potential was yet to be 
fully recognized and realized.12
Interestingly, but not surprisingly, Wang’s goodwill resonated well with the 
grassroots rural cadres. Since the old bureaucratic chain of command was broken as a 
result of Mao’s purge of the old party establishment in late 1966, these grassroots rural 
cadres realized power was being redistributed at the expense of their former bosses. In 
order to stay relevant and viable, they had to decide on which side of the fence they 
would stand. Many grassroots rural cadres had by then already learned that if they did not 
take initiative and become politically active, they themselves might become the “struggle 
target.”
  Consequently, Wang decided to enlist their support and 
use them as the key to his rural peasant mobilization strategy. Not only would the 
grassroots rural cadres be administratively indispensable for Wang’s operations, but they 
were also politically reliable and maintained considerable influence on the local 
peasantry. Back in November, Wang had reached out to them and obtained their 
assistance in requisitioning the manpower needed to level the prominent tombs in the 
Confucius Cemetery.  
13
Seeking Peasant Advice 
 It was in the middle of their search for new political affiliations and allies when 
Wang reached out to them. A mutually beneficial alliance thus took shape.  
Mutual interest alone, however, was no guarantee of the grassroots rural cadres’ 
conviction in Wang’s cause and support for his leadership. In order to win their hearts 
                                               
12 Grassroots rural cadres were not declared targets of the Cultural Revolution.  
13 Peter J. Seybolt, Throwing the Emperor from His Horse: Portrait of a Village Leader in China, 1923-




and minds, Wang designed a unique forum whereby over ninety grassroots rural cadres 
from the Qufu area were invited to the Confucius Mansion to tour the Confucian 
Complex and then brainstorm about how to best move the anti-Confucian movement 
forward. 
Three such forums were held towards the end of December 1966. Each would 
begin with a tour of the “Exhibition on the Evil History of the Confucius Mansion” in the 
Confucius Temple with Wang as their tour guide. This carefully designed tour was 
intended to give the participants a memorable orientation in the “Evil Mansion” and 
arouse their class hatred. Wang knew very few of them had ever set foot in the Confucius 
Mansion because the Qufu government had initially banned the locals from any 
involvement with BNU Red Guards activities and the compliant grassroots rural cadres 
would be the first ones to comply. Therefore, Wang’s tour served as a kind of “remedial 
class education” for his guests. He was confident that there were enough “evils” in the 
exhibition for these rustic, hardscrabble peasant-based cadres to intensify their hatred of 
the Confucius Mansion and its protectors. Once the floodgates of their emotions were 
opened, Wang reckoned, conviction in his cause and loyalty to his leadership would 
follow.  
Despite heavy snows, three forums were conducted on December 26, 29, and 30. 
In his welcoming remarks, Wang succinctly stated the purpose of this forum, “After your 
tour of the Confucius Mansion, we hope to hear your thoughts on whether the Confucian 
sites should be smashed, if the class education exhibition should be held, and how to best 




most oppressed by the Confucian establishment. I hope you will all contribute your 
ideas.”14
While Wang’s remarks had elevated the peasant representatives’ status and made 
them feel valued, the tour that he had carefully designed had the effect of making them sit 
up and want to join the anti-Confucian movement immediately. Wang showed them not 
only those incriminating items discovered on November 10, such as the Kuomintang flag 
and Japanese sword, but also the items that would directly appeal to their emotions. One 
guest spotted his own name in an accounting book that recorded the tenant-landlord 
relationship between himself and the Confucius Mansion. Horrified by the discovery, the 




After seeing some illustration of the opulent lifestyle in the Confucius Mansion as 
well as evidence of the “decadent bourgeois lifestyle” in the International Guesthouse, 
one emotional peasant poured out his anger, “I have not been able to afford any cotton-
padded trousers for seven years and yet they led such an extravagant life! Kong Lingyi 
alone had over 300 fur coats!  Just one meal in the Confucius Mansion would cost several 
hundred taels of silver, but we couldn’t even afford a bowl of thin porridge after a year’s 
hard work!” Other guests joined the outpouring of anger, “The ‘Kong Sages’ ate the flesh 
and drank the blood of us poor and lower-middle peasants…We are shivering with 
anger!
   
16
                                               
14 KFDJN, 225.  
”  Some even became destructive right on the spot. When a female party secretary 
from Big Temple Village saw a porcelain pillow with what she considered to be sexually 
15 Ibid. 




graphic images on it, she smashed it into pieces in no time and asked rhetorically, “What 
kind of garbage is this?!”17
The display of raw emotions signaled the achievement of the tours’ desired effect. 
Having stirred up their indignation, Wang invited them to the special forum that he had 
designed for them to share their thoughts about how to move the anti-Confucian 
movement forward. This time, Wang’s somewhat timid guests became outspoken and 
eager Cultural Revolution enthusiasts who turned their anger into unconditional support 
for Wang and the Liaison Station under his leadership. Kong Zhaorong, a seventy-first 
generation descendant of Confucius, pledged, “If no one would support the Red Guards’ 
rebellion, we poor and lower-middle peasants will! We’d support you even if it meant we 
must sell our hens and smash and sell our pots!”
  
18  Kong Xiangyuan, a seventy-fifth 
generation descendant of Confucius, also offered his pledge of support, “From now on, 
whenever you run into problems, just let us poor and lower-middle peasants know. Be 
brave and daring to do what you must do. We are your staunchest supporters!”19
The guests’ raucous assurances of unflinching support for Wang’s cause was 
music to his ears, but he was even more pleased to hear their concrete suggestions on 
how to conduct the next stage of the anti-Confucian movement.  Guest Gao Youming 
suggested that every incriminating item found in the Confucius Mansion be put on 
  Quite a 
few guests also denounced the capitalist roaders who used to be their superiors, while 
others assured Wang that they would oppose Wang’s rivals and support only Wang’s 
brand of Red Guards. 
                                               
17 Ibid.  
18 These peasants measured their support by their material possessions. Hens and pots were their most 
important material possessions. Therefore, selling hens and pots meant to give everything they had to 





display and a mobile exhibition be created to bring the exhibits to the villages. Another 
guest Wei Liangkuan suggested that Wang tell those in charge of China’s foreign affairs 
that all foreign guests to the Confucius Mansion “must have their brains examined by 
Mao Zedong Thought first” or else “they should not be allowed to come to our Qufu!”20
Wang was so proud of this brain child of his that he had the Denounce Confucius 
Battlefield Report write a feature on the outcomes of the special forums.
 
One peasant encouraged Wang to open the class education exhibition to the whole 
country and world. Wang’s special forums were a smashing success.  
21
Preparing for the Class Education Exhibition 
 Through this 
innovative initiative, Wang had proven that he could be an effective Red Guard leader 
without an avalanche of big-character posters or belligerent shouting matches. His 
distinctive peasant mobilization strategy enabled him to rally the grassroots rural cadres, 
through whose support he hoped to obtain mass support from the peasants, isolate his 
rivals, and create his own brand of anti-Confucian movement.  
As Qufu’s new leader with a multitude of responsibilities, Wang had to multitask 
in order to keep things under control and moving. Therefore, as he was making progress 
in gaining support from grassroots rural cadres and taming Qufu officials, he also began 
to tackle his most important tasks as Qufu’s new leader—repurposing the Three Kong 
Sites for class education. He began this process by embarking on two special operations, 
namely, the operations to “clean up the Confucius Temple” and “clear up the cultural 
relics in the Confucius Mansion.”22
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Wang wanted to clean up the Confucius Temple because the once immaculate 
temple grounds were now a disaster area. Since he was going to turn the Confucius 
Temple into a class education facility, Wang considered tidying up the place a necessary 
part of the preparatory work. The Qufu that the BNU Red Guards’ saw on November 9 
was in pristine condition, but the Qufu they left behind on December 6 was in ruins. The 
Three Kong Sites were hit especially hard and the Confucius Temple, in particular, 
looked like a ravaged war zone. Smashed bits-and-pieces of steles, shrines, and statues 
were strewn everywhere. Fallen or half-fallen stone tablets and columns were scattered 
all over the temple grounds. The Hall of Great Perfection was littered with trash, filth, 
and scattered hay that traveling Red Guards used as bedding when they spent the nights 
in this unique “hostel of convenience” for Red Guards. The last time the Confucius 
Temple had been occupied by intruders was 1511 when peasant rebels led by the Liu 
Brothers encamped upon and littered the temple grounds. Although the damage to the 
Confucius Temple in 1511 was minimal compared with what befell it in 1966, it was 
considered so sacrilegious that the Ming court relocated the city of Qufu to its current 
place for the sole purpose of using the city to protect the temple.23
Wang approached his projects with caution and instructed the Red Guards to pull 
down only the Qing dynasty stone tablets and columns that remained standing in the 
Confucius Temple. He knew Qi Benyu’s November 11 telegram stipulated that all Qing-
dynasty relics were fair targets for removal, but not the earlier ones.
  It had since then 
survived every social upheaval intact until the arrival of Tan and her minions.   
24
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 Wang’s cleaning 
team followed these directives first but somewhere along the way ended up going above 
24 Qi Benyu was a key member of the CCRG and a backer of the Red Guards. His November 11 1966 




and beyond. They pulled down many pre-Qing stone tablets and columns that the BNU 
Red Guards had specifically marked “Keep” in bright red paint. In so doing, they had 
actually gone against Qi Benyu’s directive, but no one was going to blame the Red 
Guards for going “a bit overboard” in the name of the revolution. Soon, many bystanders 
who initially just watched and cheered on the Red Guards began to follow suit. Some 
even outdid the Red Guards. One mansion worker who witnessed it all recalls that those 
“accidental perpetrators of violence” willfully pulled down many stone tablets and 
columns regardless of their age and significance.”25
 If the operation to clean up the Confucius Temple was Wang’s way to get it 
physically ready for the class education exhibition, then the operation to clear up the 
cultural relics in the Confucius Mansion was his way to prepare for the content of the 
exhibition.  Ever since Tan’s tour of the Confucius Mansion on November 10, BNU Red 
Guards had behaved like bulls in a china shop and reduced the palatial residence of the 
“First Family under the Heaven” to a shambles.  When they hurriedly departed on 
December 6, they left behind a disaster area. It looked like a tornado had gone through 
the entire Mansion, leaving a trail of debris and chaos in its wake. Piles of old paintings 
and calligraphy works were all over the place; traditional thread-bound Chinese books lay 
rotting in warehouses; sacrificial vessels of all types, fine porcelain, silk clothing articles, 
and Buddhist statues covered the floors of the Mansion. The voluminous archival files of 
the Confucius Mansion accumulated over several hundred years were in similar 
conditions.
 Many of the removed items have 
since vanished from history and were never seen again. 
26
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The Confucius Mansion was such a treasure house that, even though the floors of 
the Mansion were already scattered with relics, many more items were yet to be screened 
and processed. Ever since 1948, when the Three Kong Sites came under communist 
control, the new government had committed untold resources to their upkeep and tasked 
myriad archivists, historians, curators, and subject specialists with organizing this living 
museum of Chinese history. But the contents of the Confucius Mansion were so 
enormous that, even with such continuous and concerted efforts, the evaluation of the 
relics and the archiving of the documents were left half finished at best at the start of the 
Cultural Revolution. Yet, in a matter of just a few weeks, history reversed its course and 
the treasury had become a haunted house. Most of the national treasures housed in the 
Mansion suddenly became “dirty linens” of the Kong Lineage and the Red Guards 
suddenly became responsible for determining which “dirty linens” were to be aired in 
public in the forthcoming class education exhibition. The volume of work was enormous 
and the complexity indescribable, but the burden of leadership fell on the shoulders of 
Wang Zhengxin, a 24-year-old Red Guard leader with no professional training or related 
experience in archival and museum work. It was as if Christie’s and Sotheby’s auction 
houses had hired a lumberjack to be their expert in evaluating valuable works of art. 
Wang understood the delicate political climate far better than he did the cultural 
artifacts. Given the volatile and unpredictable political circumstances and in the absence 
of clear directions from the Maoist government on how to handle the cultural relics in the 
Confucius Mansion, he decided to handle the contents of the Confucius Mansion with 
care. In the piles of “feudal dross” before him, there might be elements of the “splendid 




handled them roughly, he risked “throwing the baby out with the bathwater” and could 
end up being penalized for it. In fact, the November 11 CCRG directives clearly indicated 
that Han dynasty steles were to be preserved. If members of the CCRG did not even paint 
all the relics in the Three Kong Sites with one broad brush, the characteristically cautious 
Wang was certainly not going to outradicalize the Red Guards’ patron saints. 
In order not to create situations that could come back to bite him, Wang felt it 
would be necessary to involve the participation of experts with sufficient knowledge and 
expertise on a variety of subject areas such as epigraphy and museology. The Liaison 
Station was not going to be the only party involved. This diffusion of responsibility 
would not only give the appearance of a consensus and a collective effort but also ensure 
that the complicity and culpability would be shared if anything should go wrong. A 
participative project would protect Wang from arbitrary and capricious state policies and 
practices.  
With that strategy in mind, Wang approached some teachers from the history and 
Chinese departments of QTC to help the Liaison Station sort out the relics. However, he 
soon realized it was politically unwise and operationally unfeasible to depend on a group 
of local academics with dubious political credentials and limited expertise.27
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 Therefore, 
he abandoned this approach and created a unique “Cultural Relics Trial Committee,” 
whose charge was to evaluate cultural relics in the Confucius Mansion and then 
determine their fate. Committee members were composed of representatives from the 
Qufu Cultural Revolution Office, Qufu Cultural Relics Commission, Shandong 




representing Red Guards, local government, and cultural experts, Wang accomplished his 
goal of diffusing the responsibilities.  
The Cultural Relics Trial Committee was further divided into two subcommittees. 
Each subcommittee had members from all four representative groups. The first 
subcommittee was responsible for screening all the archival files in the Confucius 
Mansion, while the second committee was put in charge of evaluating all other items 
including books, old paintings, calligraphy works, gold, silver, bronze vessels, and even 
valuable Chinese herbal medicines. 
The “trial” got off to a bad start because the “jurors” had their own criteria and 
agenda. The Red Guards were primarily interested in finding four-olds items to be used 
for class education exhibition or to be discarded. However, the two experts from the 
Shandong Provincial Museum were supposed to provide expert opinions on cultural 
artifacts.  It turned out to be a frustrating experience for the experts because the Red 
Guard representatives on the committee always had the final say. Their frustration was 
further fueled by the fact that the cultural items “on trial” were not limited to the Qing 
dynasty but included those dating back to the earliest epochs.  All too often, the Red 
Guard representatives would throw away items based on their own interpretations of what 
the condemned items meant and the experts could only try to persuade them otherwise.28
The experts were successful only on a few occasions.  They would justify their 
recommendations for salvaging something by stating that a certain item had class struggle 
value or a certain book should be preserved because it was a rare edition. When Wu Xu, 
an expert from the Shandong provincial museum, heard the Red Guard representatives’ 
plan to burn the entire collection of Confucius Mansion Archives, he was shocked. He 
  
                                               




knew it took ten years of combined efforts on the part of the Chinese Academy of 
Science, the Second Historical Archives in Nanjing, and the Shandong Museum to just 
begin the process of inventorizing these priceless historical files. Wu tried to do 
something to prevent the unthinkable. As luck would have it, he saw an emperor-
approved list of people slated for execution. Pointing at the list, he told the Red Guard 
representatives, “This list has documented the suppression of the people by the Qing ruler 
and is a good source for studying the Qing social system. If it were burned then we 
wouldn’t be able to conduct research and criticism.”29
In the end the Red Guards did spare some items, but their decision was based not 
so much on the experts’ pleas as on the pertinence of the spared sources to the class 
education exhibition, such as those records that documented how many taels of silver 
were spent on a  meal for members of the Kong family.  More often than not, however, 
the experts would fail in their attempts. Anything that was suspected as being associated 
with the Four Olds would be grounds for discard. According to the diary of Du Mingpu, 
another expert from the Shandong Provincial Museum, an exquisite painting was 
discarded by a Red Guard representative because he believed a bird in the picture was a 
superstitious symbol for longevity. A classic scroll painting also was discarded because 
the same Red Guard representative did not like the warbler and swallow on the painting. 
A calligraphy scroll was trashed because a calligraphic inscription in it mentioned a 
legendary figure in Chinese history who was supposed to have mended the sky to save 
mankind.  The Red Guard representative believed the whole concept of mending the sky 
was “feudal and superstitious” and condemned the scroll accordingly.
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Wang was pleased with the outcomes of the Cultural Relics Trial Committee. The 
long list of the “guilty cultural relics” bespeaks the extent to which the contents of the 
Confucius Mansion were gutted. Among them were 209 sets of Confucian family 
genealogies, including the Ming and Qing originals, totaling 32,232 volumes and 
weighing 10,778.5 jin (14,439 pounds). They were shipped in eight horse carriages to a 
paper mill in the provincial capital Jinan where they were sold as waste paper for 
RMB269.4.31 A total of 114.2  jin (125 pounds) of bronze Buddhist statues were sold to a 
recycling center for RMB1,424.44.32
In sum, the two special operations that Wang launched were intended to “tidy up” 
the Confucius Temple and “clear up” the relics in the Confucius Mansion in preparation 
for the ultimate goal of turning the Confucian Complex into a class education facility, but 
both ended up damaging the two sites even further. Wang, however, was not bothered by 
this. He was able to justify all that had happened through the rules of the Cultural 
Revolution. If anything, he had, through these operations, gained more confidence about 
his leadership, more skills in handling thorny and complex matters, and more control of 
  Although the Kong family genealogies weighed 
114 times more than the bronze Buddhist statues, the bronze statues were sold for more 
than five times the amount for the Kong family genealogies. The historical, cultural, and 
artistic values of the relics in the Confucius Mansion had all given way to their material 
values.  The value of the family genealogies was reduced to paper and the value of the 
Buddhist statues was reduced to copper. The difference between the two was simplified 
as the difference between two types of raw materials.  
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or people’s currency.   




all facets of life in Qufu and the anti-Confucian movement. Wang felt he was on the right 
track and ready for the next battle. 
Poised for a New High Tide of the Anti-Confucian Campaign 
 By the end of December 1966, Wang had proven himself to be the worthy 
successor of BNU Red Guard leader Tan who handpicked him as the Red Guard leader in 
Qufu after the departure of the Beijing Red Guards. Indeed, in the highly volatile and 
complex political landscape of the early Cultural Revolution, when various competing 
forces vied for power control and political legitimacy, Wang’s list of accomplishments 
achieved in the three weeks since Tan’s departure was long and impressive. He won over 
the important grassroots rural cadres through tours and forums and completed two special 
operations. He also pressured the politically discredited but functionally-important Qufu 
top officials into siding with the Liaison Station under his leadership. He even crushed 
his opposition by directing the Qufu Public Security Bureau to have the key members of 
his main rival Red Guard organization arrested and paraded in public as 
“counterrevolutionary elements.”33
 Not only was Wang able to put Qufu’s rural cadres and county officials under his 
control and his enemies in jail, but the strong momentum that he had built up also led to 
support for his Liaison Station from Qufu’s general public as well. As radical Maoists 
gained even more control in Beijing and Wang demonstrated his ability to lead Qufu’s 
Cultural Revolution, members of the Qufu community, who had initially viewed the 
BNU Red Guards as pariahs, began to express their support for the anti-Confucian 
movement. Letters from workers, peasants, and soldiers poured in to the Liaison Station’s 
   
                                               




official publication Denounce Confucius Battlefield Report from near and far. Former 
tenant peasants condemned the “evil practices” of their former landlord—the Confucius 
Mansion. Many Qufu residents expressed their scorn for the Kong lineage. Some letter 
writers, who used to take pride in their association with the Kong lineage, now felt 
ashamed of it. Kong Xiangzhen, a seventy-fifth generation descendant of Confucius, 
wrote to support the leveling of Confucius’s tomb and the burning of her ancestor’s 
statue. “All Kongs are not the same,” she declared, “From now on, my name will be 
Kong Weidong (Kong who defends Mao Zedong) instead of Kong Xiangzhen (Kong who 
is precious and valuable).”34  Support letters from other parts of the country began to 
arrive.  In his letter to the editor, one reader from Hubei Province announced his break 
with Confucius through the change of his first name, “I solemnly declare that I have 
changed my original name Sui Jingni (Sui who admires Confucius) to “Sui Dong (Sui 
who follows Mao Zedong).”35
Indeed, not only was the anti-Confucian movement gaining new momentum, but 
the Campaign against the Bourgeois Reactionary Line in late December 1966 roared into 
high gear as well, creating the optimal moment for an upsurge in the anti-Confucian 
movement in Qufu. On December 15, the official beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 
the countryside was unveiled with the passage of the “The CC Directive on Implementing 
the Cultural Revolution in Rural Areas.”
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 This development added legitimacy to Wang’s 
work in rural Qufu and freed his hands to introduce even more aggressive initiatives to 
bolster the anti-Confucian movement. 
35 XBHZL, 11424.  




By the end of December 1966, conditions were ripe for Wang to accelerate the 
anti-Confucian movement to the next level. He had crushed the opposition, rallied the 
base, and tamed the bureaucrats. As the chief overseer of both the Three Kong Sites with 
power over Qufu’s administrative and political apparatus, he had amassed so much power 
that he was popularly known in Qufu as “nine thousand years of life” (jiu qian sui).  It 
was a Chinese title reserved for anyone who was beneath an emperor or a “wan sui” (ten 
thousand years of life).37
But Wang was not just content with an empty title. He planned to lead the anti-
Confucian movement to the next level and make his own mark in history. On December 
30, 1966, he unveiled his new plan to the entire country through an editorial on the front 
page of the now nationally circulated Denounce Confucius Battlefield Report titled 
“Usher in a New Tide of the Anti-Confucian Movement.” In it, Wang proclaimed that the 
Liaison Station was going to unite the workers and peasants to push the anti-Confucian 
movement to a new phase and create a “swelling new high tide.”  “Our victory so far is 
just the first step of a long march,” the editorial noted, mimicking what Mao said in 1949 
upon taking over the country, “We will remove any obstacles and sweep away any road-
blocking tigers. He who follows the tide will survive; he who impedes it will perish!”
 The title suggested the public’s perception of Wang’s power 
next only to the paramount leader’s.  
38
Tomb-robbing Mania: From a Trickle to a Flood 
 
 Just as Wang was envisioning the grandeur of the imminent “new high tide” of 
the campaign, another explosive situation was nearing eruption.  It so happened that just 
                                               
37 It was a title originally given to the famed Ming dynasty eunuch Wei Zhongxian. Since people were 
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as the Denounce Confucius Battlefield Report announcing the advent of the new high tide 
was leaving Qufu for national circulation, a team of 20-30 peasants carrying picks and 
shovels quietly walked past the Confucius Mansion, through Qufu’s north gate, and into 
the now unguarded Confucius Cemetery.  They stopped at a large mound-shaped tomb 
and began digging, spade by spade and shovel by shovel. Everyone seemed to know 
exactly what they were supposed to do and why they were doing it. Not much was said 
but much was getting done.39
These peasant tomb-robbers were members of the “Southgate Brigade 
Breakthrough Team”—a peasant Red Guard organization headed by the brigade party 
secretary Zhang Fuhai. Previously in August, Zhang and the peasants he led followed the 
order from Qufu authorities and successfully protected the Three Kong Sites. This time, 
however, they followed their own interest to plunder and pillage the cemetery of their 
own forefathers and ancestors. However, this dramatic transition of Zhang from a gallant 
protector to an exploitative predator of the same site did not just happen overnight. 
Several events contributed to the transition of this former party loyalist to a leader of 
peasant anarchists. Among them were the smashing of the State Council protection steles 
and mass rallies that led to the mass violence against the Three Kong Sites. 
 Few people noticed it and few people seemed to care, but 
what was unfolding was the first shovel of a massive catastrophic tomb-robbing frenzy 
hitherto unseen in Chinese history.  
However, the most direct catalyst for the peasants’ ironic transition from 
defenders to attackers was their witnessing of the excavation of the tombs for the last 
three Yansheng Dukes. It was through that particular firsthand experience that they 
recognized the enormous treasures buried in this two-square-kilometer lineage burial 
                                               




ground —gold, silver, jade, precious stones…. The image of treasures buried with the 
deceased bodies of their ancestors was seared in their memory. They saw members of the 
Qufu People’s Bank and Cultural Relics Commission putting all the valuable funerary 
objects from the tomb of the seventy-sixth Yansheng Duke Kong Lingyi into a trunk. 
They also remembered the disappointing exhuming of Confucius’s tomb that involved 
the use of dynamite but yielded nothing but yellow earth.40
Zhang Fuhai and his fellow fortune-seekers realized that they were not only 
sitting on a goldmine, but they could probably also tap into it with impunity. They turned 
their thoughts into actions and saw the tombs for the late generations of Confucius’s 
direct descendants as having the greatest promise. They started with the tomb for Kong 
Qingrong, the seventy-third Yansheng Duke since the last three tombs from the seventy-
fourth through the seventy-sixth Yansheng Dukes had already been emptied during BNU 
Red Guards’ operation in November. With no prior experience in gravedigging, the 
peasant fortune-seekers laboriously removed the entire top of the tomb in order to reach 
and open the coffin for valuable funerary objects. It was backbreaking work. They dug 
during the day and returned the next morning. Since it was the slack season in rural 
Shandong, they were able to work every day. And since they did not have any 
competition yet, they could afford to take their time to do a thorough job. Most important 
of all, there was no one to stop them. In the old days, the Confucius Mansion had a 
private security force to protect its properties. In 1929 when radical students in Qufu 
attacked the Kong lineage, lineage heads received help from the local branch of the semi-
 From all these experiences 
they learned something new: The state had abandoned Confucius and the Kong lineage 
and corpses meant wealth.  
                                               




martial and semi-religious “Red Spear Society.”41
Soon, their hard work paid off.  As the “earliest bird” in the gravedigging frenzy, 
Zhang Fuhai’s Southgate Brigade caught one of the “biggest worms.” The revenue from 
the sales of the unearthed spoils augmented their collective coffers and individual purses 
while the stones and bricks from the burial land of the dead feudal lords were used to 
build a Mao Zedong Thought School for the Southgate Brigade. “With a Mao Zedong 
Thought School,” Zhang told his fellow gravediggers, “no longer will we have to find a 
place to conduct our meetings anymore!
 During the postrevolutionary years, the 
Cultural Relics Commission managed the security of the Three Kong Sites. But with 
Tan’s visit to Qufu, all security mechanisms melted away and the Confucius Cemetery 
became, as it were, a no man’s land.   
42
 Word about Southgate Brigade’s groundbreaking activities quickly spread across 
the neighboring brigades. On the eve of New Year’s Day 1967, peasants from seven 
brigades in the immediate vicinity of the Confucius Cemetery joined the action and 
started claiming their share. There were no blasting loudspeakers, no mass rallies, and no 
public announcements through the countywide wired broadcast network to mobilize the 
peasants, yet Qufu peasants were more mobilized and motivated than they had ever been. 
Indeed, no public indoctrination or moralizing was necessary to motivate Qufu peasantry 
because, to the poverty-stricken peasants now unfettered by any obligations to their 
cultural heritage, money talked louder than anything else. Finally, the peasants saw an 
opportunity where they could combine economic pursuits with a lofty political cause and 
they were not going to let it slip through their fingers. Teams of peasant gravediggers 
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swarmed into the Confucius Cemetery from all directions to obtain their share of the 
fortune despite deep snow and freezing cold.  They desecrated the tombs for the 
Yansheng Dukes, high-ranking officials, prominent Kong personalities, or just any 
impressive-looking tombs that promised great treasures.43
Especially active were cadres and peasants from the Linqian Brigade, so named 
because the brigade was situated literally before the Confucius Cemetery and separated 
only by the cemetery wall. For countless generations, peasants in this nearby community 
developed a close bond with the Confucius Cemetery. As the Chinese saying goes, 
“Those living on a mountain live off the mountain; those living near the water live off the 
water.” The villagers living near the Confucius Cemetery had certainly lived off the 
Cemetery for centuries. They had benefited both socially and financially from the annual 
“Forest Gate Fair” or “Flower Market” routinely held before the main gate of the 
Cemetery.
  
44  In winter, they would also pick firewood in the Cemetery to stay warm. In 
the words of Linqian village cadre Li Baoming, “In summertime, we would enjoy the 
shade at the gate of the Confucius Cemetery, while in wintertime we would enjoy 
basking in the warmth of the winter sun against the Cemetery’s wall. This was why we 
did not agree with Red Guards’ attempt to smash the archway at the gate of Confucius 
Cemetery when they first arrived. We were attached to the Confucius Cemetery!”45
No attachment, however, was strong enough for the Linqian villagers to resist the 
temptation of the gold rush. Once the tomb-robbing started, their fond attachment for the 
Confucius Cemetery gave way to their wanton desires for material possessions. In the 
words of the same village cadre Li Baoming, “Once the digging for gold, silver and other 
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precious objects started, everyone went digging. Why shouldn’t we be a piece of the 
action? What’s the big deal with digging anyway?”46
Once they had overcome their qualms, peasants from all five production teams of 
the Linqian Brigade leapt into action. Since many members from their community served 
as grave watchers of the Confucius Cemetery for generations or worked on the 
Cemetery’s maintenance crew in the postrevolutionary years, they took advantage of their 
intimate knowledge of the Cemetery and quickly spotted the most promising tombs.  The 
most coveted “cash cow tomb” that they grabbed before anyone else could was the one 
for the seventy-second Yansheng Duke Kong Xianpei and his wife.  Buried inside this 
larger-than-average tomb were the two most prominent figures in the history of the Kong 
lineage. According to the 1937 edition of the genealogy for the Kong lineage, the wife of 
Kong Xianpei, known as Madame Yu, was the daughter of Qing Emperor Qianlong. 
They married in 1772 and became well known for their prestigious status and wealth.
  Indeed, once the BNU Red Guards 
set the precedent and peasants from the Southgate Brigade followed suit, all their 
uneasiness and inhibitions about digging up the graves of their forefathers were gone. 
What remained of the Confucius Cemetery became fair game for anyone who cared to 
take the trouble to find the buried treasures.  Since the law was not supposed to punish 
the majority, they felt they should all be safe joining the gravedigging crowds. Besides, 
they were not just any gravediggers, but peasant gravediggers exercising revolutionary 
justice against a much despised and vilified feudal establishment.  
47
                                               
46 KFDJN, 262.  
 
Madame Yu’s dowry reportedly included tax revenues from twenty villages and several 
47 Manchus and Han were not supposed to be intermarried, but Madame Yu was supposed to be married to 




thousand trunks of clothing and jewelry.48
Their assets became their liability, however, when the tomb-robbing frenzy took 
off.  Those who used to view them in awe became the first ones to lay their hands on their 
tomb. Around New Year’s Day 1967, Peasant Red Guards from the Fourth Production 
Team of the Linqian Brigade moved in on the tomb for Yansheng Duke Kong Xianpei 
and his wife. They dug open the rear side of the tomb, broke open the outer shell of the 
coffins, and then used thick ropes to drag them out of the tomb.
  It was speculated that one of the reasons 
Emperor Qianlong made as many as nine pilgrimages to Qufu in his lifetime was because 
his daughter was married to a Yansheng Duke in Qufu. As Qianlong’s son-in-law, Kong 
Xianpei was a frequent and favorite guest of Emperor Qianlong, who granted him large 
amounts of valuable gifts. It came as no surprise that, after the death of the couple, their 
tomb was among the most grandiose in the Confucius Cemetery.  
49 Once they plied open 
the coffin lids, they saw the couple tightly wrapped by nine layers of fabric and three 
layers of ropes. Both bodies were found to be well preserved. Kong Xianpei was dressed 
in a dragon robe with a jade belt at his waist.50 In the words of Zhang Baozhong, a 
Linqian village peasant who participated in the act, Kong Xianpei “was dressed like he 
was on stage in costume.”51
The peasants first sprayed alcohol on their bodies as disinfectant and then 
proceeded to remove their robes and clothes to search for valuable burial objects. Kong 
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Xianpei was wearing a gold bracelet on his left hand and a gold thumb-ring on his right 
hand. His wife’s coffin contained more valuable objects than her husband’s. In it were 
found several sets of bracelets and rings in gold, jade and emerald.  After removing the 
valuable burial objects, the peasants pushed the bodies back into the coffins which were 
then put back in the tomb but left uncovered. Unlike the ideologically and politically 
motivated gravedigging that often involved the mutilation of the exhumed corpses to 
make a political statement, the peasants were preoccupied with acquisitive vandalism and 
were more interested with what was buried with the dead bodies rather than the bodies 
themselves.  
 Peasants from the Second Production Team of Linqian Brigade were not as 
fortunate as their brethren from the Fourth Production Team who got Kong Xianpei’s 
tomb. Still, they knew the Confucius Cemetery well enough to grab other prominent 
gravesites such as those for the wealthy brothers of Yansheng Dukes.52  They also 
focused on some promising Ming tombs. Funeral architecture from the Ming and Qing 
periods “reached its zenith.” Among others, Ming tombs were especially deep, which 
created extra challenges for excavation.53
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 Still, they worked hard to beat the other 
peasants to the promising tombs and the treasures within them. All male laborers from 
this production team of over 200 people worked their hardest around the clock to get the 
most out of this once in a lifetime event. They worked nonstop and dug up over a dozen 
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tombs. Fortune did not smile on them, however, until they dug into a Ming tomb over 
500 years old where they retrieved twelve valuable funerary objects.54
 The peasant gravediggers from the Linqian Brigade probably had not worked that 
tirelessly and uncomplainingly since collectivization started in rural China and took away 
their work incentive. Their high motivation clearly stemmed from the strong economic 
incentives and rewards they received. With the magic of gravedigging, just Linqian 
Brigade alone sold over RMB30,000’s worth of burial objects, an astronomical figure 
considering the available cash for the entire brigade under normal circumstances was 
around RMB1,000-2,000 in total.
   
55 The gravedigging business became so lucrative that 
these catch slogans began to emerge: “Carve up the Confucius Cemetery” and “One 
night, one tractor,” suggesting the money from one night’s digging was enough to buy a 
tractor.56
The sight of long lines of peasants at the Qufu Branch of People’s Bank waiting 
to trade their loot for cash worked better than any rural wired broadcast network.  Word 
traveled so fast from mouth to mouth, village to village, and county to county that, within 
two days, the Confucius Cemetery became the talk of the entire region and the trickle of 
gravediggers turned into a torrential flood. Teams of peasants with digging instruments 
converged on Qufu from all directions just as they did during the November 28 and 29 
mass rallies, except this time they all came entirely by their own volition. At the height of 
the tomb-robbing frenzy during the first ten days of 1967, the number of gravediggers 
grew exponentially. First, it was just the Southgate Brigade. Then, seven additional 
brigades in the surrounding areas of the Cemetery joined the force, followed immediately 
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by all fifty villages in Qufu. Finally, peasants from the entire region came for their 
share.57
During the peak of the gravedigging frenzy, several thousand gravediggers 
packed the Confucius Cemetery. Most were organized by their production teams but 
some were just unaffiliated individuals or even siblings trying to make a killing out of the 
dead.
   
58
Peasant Resourcefulness   
  Also, gravediggers came not only for the buried wealth, but also for the materials 
above the ground. Practically anything that was of any conceivable use became fair 
target—tomb-stones, planks, copper nails on the doors, and bricks from the walls. The 
peasants turned the Confucius Cemetery into something of a construction site where 
people worked, ate and slept in the same place in order to get the most wealth in the 
shortest time possible. Having been so poor for so long, they relished every minute of this 
chance to make money for their own good.  
As the number of gravediggers from outside Qufu grew, so did the tension 
between Qufu locals and outsiders. The local peasants considered Confucius Cemetery 
their sphere of interest and its underground wealth their exclusive asset. Consequently, 
they were resentful about “outsiders and non-Kong families” encroaching on their turf.59
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While the locals could not monopolize the buried treasures in the Confucius Cemetery 
and keep this money maker all to themselves, they could at least take comfort in the 
knowledge that they enjoyed considerable advantages over their competitors from afar.  
Unlike the out-of-towners who would often indiscriminately dig up any tomb they saw 
58 Ibid., 254.  
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because of their lack of familiarity with the Confucius Cemetery, the local peasants could 
locate the best gravesites and knew the landscape, which allowed them to receive better 
logistical support.  For instance, some Linqian Brigade peasants were able to cook their 
food and rest at the residence of Kong Xianchang, a seventy-second generation 
descendant of Confucius who was both a fellow villager and a Cemetery staff member 
who resided in the Cemetery.  
Such local advantages alone were not enough to be competitive in this particular 
environment and defeat others in the race for buried treasures. To do so, they must know 
effective gravedigging techniques. And yet, Qufu did not have a history of tomb-robbing, 
as neither the imperial rulers nor their communist counterparts tolerated tomb-robbing in 
Qufu.60 The local culture was always against it too.61
They also greatly improved their efficiency by simplifying the way they reached 
buried corpses. When peasants from the Southgate Brigade under Zhang Fuhai worked 
on the tomb for the seventy-third Yansheng Duke Kong Qingrong, they removed the 
 Consequently, the peasant 
gravediggers had to learn effective gravedigging. Necessity, however, proved to be the 
mother of invention. In their efforts to cope with various new issues, Qufu peasants 
learned on the job and developed some effective and innovative techniques to improve 
their efficiency. For instance, they simplified the procedures to achieve top speed. 
Initially, they would spray alcohol on the corpses as disinfectant and put the bodies back 
to the graves after they had removed the valuable items from them, but they soon 
abandoned both to improve speed.  
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entire top of the tomb, which was both time-consuming and ineffective. However, when 
peasants from the Fourth Production Team of Linqian Brigade tried to reach the bodies of 
the seventy-second Yansheng Duke Kong Xianpei and his wife Madame Yu, they had 
already improved the procedure by removing only the rear side of the tomb, thus cutting 
the workload almost by half. 62 Although in both cases above the peasants would dig open 
the tombs, open the stone outer shells and then pull out the corpses, their quick-thinking 
fellow gravediggers soon discovered far more efficient ways to achieve the same result. 
They would simply open the outer shell, smash the coffin inside, and then send someone 
into the tomb who would then move the corpse out of the coffin to first search for the 
funerary objects on the floor of the coffin and then the corpse itself. Finally, they even 
abandoned that in favor of an even more time-saving approach. They would send 
someone down to the grave and into the coffin where this one person would search for 
funerary objects right inside the coffin without moving the corpse first.63 The person who 
was best at it happened to be a woman from the Southgate Brigade who eventually had to 
be taken to the hospital for treatment of skin problems that resulted from excessive 
exposure to dead bodies.64
The local peasants further improved their efficiency through learning from their 
mistakes and correcting wrong assumptions. At one point, they were under the 
impression that the larger the tombs, the more likely they would contain valuable 
funerary objects. After a few futile searches, however, they learned that the size of the 
 Historically, women in Qufu tended to be low-key, moderate, 
and circumspect, but the Cultural Revolution as a rule-breaking social upheaval helped 
render this tradition obsolete. 
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tomb was not the only determinant of fortune. On the contrary, they discovered that, 
whatever their sizes, those tombs that had a funerary pool in front of them would usually 
have a funerary table underneath the pool. This, as the peasants soon learned, would be 
where valuable funerary objects were most likely to be found.65
The innovative ideas that the local peasants unleashed also included the ironic use 
of former employees of the Confucius Mansion and educated people to help them 
identify lucrative gravesites. Once the promising tombs were all emptied, such as the 
tombs for the Yansheng Dukes of the Ming and Qing periods, gravediggers realized that 
they would have to depend on those with intimate knowledge of the Confucius Cemetery 
to locate the remaining “good sites” instead of digging up anything they saw and risk 
failures. They found two types of people particularly helpful in finding those sites. One 
type was the former employees of the Confucius Mansion who were able to pinpoint the 
good targets almost by reflex. The social status and prestige of the former employees and 
administrators of the Confucius Mansion dropped precipitously in the postrevolutionary 
years, but in the heat of the tomb-robbing mania, their status was briefly revived. The 
peasants treated them like “money gods” and invited these “experts” to the Confucius 
Cemetery where they showed the gravediggers the promising gravesites they knew.
  In another example, 
local peasants learned that the official rank of the deceased per se had no direct bearing 
on the worth of the tomb. What mattered more was the sex of the deceased. Female 
corpses as a rule would carry far more valuable funerary objects than their male 
counterparts, as was the case with Madame Yu from whom the peasants retrieved far 
more objects than from her husband Yansheng Duke Kong Xianpei.  
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For those peasants who could not get the assistance of the former Confucius 
Mansion employees, their solution was to find the educated and literate people in their 
communities who could read and identify the inscriptions on the tomb stones and tell the 
rank and social status of the deceased. The educated people in rural Qufu were few and 
far between and included ritual specialists, funeral specialists and feng shui masters. 
Their social status in the anti-intellectual and anti-superstitious postrevolutionary China 
was greatly diminished. In the rural Socialist Education Movement of 1964-65, ritual 
specialists were even struggled against as part of the “feudal and backward” forces.67
However, the most creative and yet ironic innovation the peasants demonstrated 
was the black humor in the cynical use of the traditional class enemies known as “the 
four bad elements”( sileifenzi), namely, landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, 
and bad elements (hereafter untouchables) to facilitate tomb-robbing and profit keeping.
 But 
their old knowledge gave them a brief reversal of fortune in the heat of the tomb-robbing 
frenzy when they suddenly became the much sought-after experts.  
68
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Since so many valuable items were involved in the gravedigging process, some 
organizers took extra caution to make sure that no one was going to pocket the spoils at 
others’ expense. Therefore, every time a tomb was dug open, only those deemed most 
politically reliable were allowed to enter the tomb to search for valuable objects. The 
selfish among them would be automatically disqualified for the job. But even that was 
not enough of an embezzlement-proof mechanism for the heads of the gravedigging 
68 After the communist takeover in 1949, landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, and bad elements 




teams, who adopted a “trust but verify” approach by searching the bodies of those who 
just searched the bodies of the deceased for treasures in order to prevent “theft.”69
But those village organizers soon discovered that none of their theft-prevention 
mechanisms were reliable enough to completely eliminate theft. The temptation was too 
great no matter how trustworthy the chosen peasants initially seemed to be. This was the 
case with one peasant from the Linqian village who claimed to have found nothing upon 
exiting a tomb but was then stopped and found carrying a silver ingot.
  
70
For once, organizers of gravedigging actually managed to stop the “theft” as the 
untouchables by 1966 had been so subdued by the ceaseless political campaigns against 
them that the last thing on their mind was to cheat on the peasants. One young woman 
from a landlord’s family recalled being forced to remove all her winter clothes in freezing 
cold before being sent down to a tomb just in her chemise to search for funerary objects. 
This was to deny her any place where she could hide any valuable items.
 Unable to find an 
effective solution to the problem, some production teams simply summoned the 
untouchables in their villages and made gravedigging their exclusive responsibility while 
the poor and lower-middle peasants would simply stand by and collect the funerary 
objects when the untouchables exited the tombs. The untouchables, they concluded, 
would not have the courage to pocket any valuable objects.  
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right to refuse to act against their own conscience and turned them into involuntary 
participants in a crime against their own culture.72
Return of Tradition  
  
 While it was a scathing irony that Qufu’s “class enemies” were regarded as more 
reliable and trustworthy than the poor peasants, it was just one of the many ironies that 
informed this gravedigging frenzy. Some particularly noteworthy ones had to do with 
how traditional values and practices were reflected in the tomb-robbing frenzy.   
Chinese society had especially frowned upon tomb-robbing and tomb desecration. 
The Confucian values upon which the Chinese society was built served as the bedrock of 
ancestor worship.  Punishment for tomb robbers included “death by a thousand cuts,” a 
tormented execution and “the most extreme form of bodily punishment a Chinese tribunal 
could impose.”73
 Despite the appearance of a massive all-out anti-tradition tomb-robbing frenzy, 
the invisible but powerful dead hand of the past still gripped many tomb robbers who 
were driven by ignorance, superstition, greed, and hypocrisy. Scores of Kong clan 
members from the neighboring Wenshang county came to the Confucius Cemetery for 
the express purpose of finding a “gold head” that was supposed to be attached to the body 
of a Qing dynasty high official from their own county.  Apparently, they believed the 
urban legend that, after this official was beheaded by an emperor for a certain offense, his 
   Tomb robbery in Qufu was especially rare and considered sacrilegious 
in both traditional and modern China. This is what made the tomb-robbing frenzy in early 
1967 in the Kong family cemetery such an extraordinary event.  
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family attached a gold head to his body before burying him in the Confucius Cemetery. 
These peasants were determined to find this gold head not to protect or preserve it but to 
get the gold. They kept digging grave after grave in search of this phantom head.  Gao 
Yongchun, head of Chengguan Commune, tried to explain the implausibility of this story 
to them, but to no avail. They dug up at least over a dozen tombs before finally giving 
up.74
Some peasants even saved the quality coffin board that they took from the 
Confucius Cemetery to be used as their own coffin board. They had no problem with 
coffins, burials or tradition; they just wanted to have something for nothing and they had 
a rare opportunity to do so with impunity.  When it came to gravedigging, no moral 
constraints mattered anymore. In the words of Tian Baotang, head of the Second 
Production Team of Linqian Brigade, “It was snowing when we were digging graves, but 
we couldn’t care less about snow. We just kept digging and digging to get rich! We 
seemed to be addicted to gravedigging!
 
75
Ignorance and superstition also led peasants from Li Hua and Fang Jia villages to 
another bizarre situation. Some peasants from these two villages spotted some fungus that 
grew on some decayed caskets that looked like black wood ear fungus. Convinced that 
what they had found was a legendary panacea long believed to be particularly effective 
for treating sore throat and esophagus cancer, the excited peasants decided to make some 
money out of this discovery by cutting the fungus into thin slices and selling them for two 
yuan a piece, an exorbitant price at that time. However, people flocked to that village to 
buy this miracle herbal cure. It became such a talk of the town that local authorities 
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eventually purchased a slice and took it to some local doctors to determine the legitimacy 
of the claim. The doctors tested it in the lab and concluded that the claim was bogus. Not 
only did it have no medicinal effect, but it could actually harm people.76
Associating death with medicinal effect has a long history in China. In his essay 
“Medicine” published in The New Youth in April 1919, writer Lu Xun describes how a 
man fed his son a steamed roll dipped in the blood of an executed revolutionary in hopes 




 It was Lu Xun’s scathing indictment of a traditional 
society plagued by ignorance and superstition. Yet, variations of the same theme occurred 
in the Confucius Cemetery in 1967, after the 1919 Chinese Enlightenment Movement 
(The May Fourth Movement), after the 1949 epoch-changing communist revolution, and 
in the middle of an unprecedented iconoclastic and anti-tradition Cultural Revolution. It 
was as if time had frozen for sixty-seven years. So much had changed, yet so much had 
stayed the same.  
The return and revenge of some seamy sides of Chinese tradition and society went 
hand in hand with the ever increasing chaos in the Confucius Cemetery during the frenzy. 
The first ten days of 1967 witnessed a scene of complete madness in the Cemetery. Ever 
since Zhang Fuhai and his peasant gravediggers turned the first shovel of earth in the 
Confucius Cemetery, the situation quickly deteriorated in ways no one could have ever 
imagined. The usually extremely serene sanctuary now looked like a “fairground” filled 
with gravediggers from every corner of the region. All the tombs for imperial officials 
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grade seven or higher were emptied, as were the tombs for all seventy-six generations of 
Yansheng Dukes.78  Tombs in the entire northeast section of the Cemetery were 
completely destroyed. Naked corpses were scattered around the Cemetery. Some corpses 
were even tied to tree branches dangling to and fro making the Confucius Cemetery seem 
more like the netherworld than anything else.79
While the Cemetery was crowded with people digging alongside countless red 
flags and wearing special arm bands for peasant Red Guard organizations, their true 
motives had little too do with what those visual iconography symbolized. No one seemed 
to be working hard to fulfill any revolutionary ideals or express any scorn for the 
Confucian establishment and values. Everyone had a clear-cut goal of getting buried 
treasures. To facilitate gravedigging, some production teams delivered liquor and meat to 
the Confucius Cemetery—a treat that they wouldn’t afford most of the time. The peasants 
worked tirelessly and ceaselessly and turned the slack season for the peasants into the 
busiest and most exciting season they had ever experienced. Cheers of joy were heard 
when valuable objects were brought up, as were curses of disappointment when 
gravediggers came out empty-handed.  
  
The sudden outbreak of the gravedigging frenzy completely blindsided Qufu’s 
outgoing and incoming authorities and presented them with a major challenge.  January 
1967 happened to be a complex time that was unique “not only in Chinese political 
history but also in the history of mankind.”80
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old government, those disgraced but still functioning bureaucrats and party officials, 
coexisted and created a distinct parallel governing structure. Both sides had some power, 
but neither had full control. As a result, confusion became the order of the day  This 
national picture was mirrored in Qufu as well where the publicly repudiated old county 
officials who were still managing the daily operation of the government coexisted with 
the Liaison Station, the coalition of Red Guard organizations which had the blessings of 
the Maoist government but had no operational apparatus under its direct control.  Thus, 
the incoming new government could not function without the operational and logistical 
support of the old government, while the outgoing old government could not get anything 
done without the consent or approval of the new government. Consequently, these two 
groups of mutually exclusive yet mutually dependent power holders formed a strange 
relationship where they clashed and collaborated from time to time.81
When the tomb-robbing frenzy erupted in the Confucius Cemetery, Wang 
Zhengxin as the head of the Liaison Station happened to be the most powerful person in 
Qufu, but he had to rely on the former Qufu officials to implement his plans. While the 
two camps did not agree on many things, both could be held accountable for not 
containing the tomb-robbing frenzy and both therefore agreed on one thing—the chaos in 
the Confucius Cemetery was unacceptable and must be stopped.  
  
But stopping the frenzy was easier said than done. As Qufu’s new chief, Wang 
suddenly faced an issue he had never anticipated, and a thorny and awkward one at that.  
For much of November 1966, BNU Red Guards and the Liaison Station kept calling on 
people to set the Confucius sites on fire and level Confucius’s tomb. On November 30, 
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Red Guards and peasants dug up six graves in the Confucius Cemetery in front of the 
entire community and transferred large amounts of buried wealth from the graves to the 
waiting bank employees. Their peasant audience learned from this “public education 
event” that it was not only acceptable but actually commendable to dig up graves of 
prominent Kongs and it was legitimate to turn the buried treasure to the government bank 
for money. In many ways, the mass rally served as a gravedigging initiation event for the 
Qufu public when the “gravedigging genie” began to slowly crawl out of the bottle. Once 
it got out, pushing it back to the bottle proved to be an insurmountable task.  
Local authorities, as represented by both the former officials and the Red Guards, 
reacted to the outburst of anarchistic tomb-robbing activities like a deer caught in the 
headlights. Their crisis management was ineffective and their response schizophrenic. At 
first they instructed the local branch of People’s Bank not to buy any unearthed funerary 
objects. Soon, they changed their mind and instructed banks to devote special personnel 
to handling the purchase of such objects, possibly out of their desire to keep the 
unearthed items in the possession of the state. The small local bank created a special 
fifteen-member purchasing task force to exclusively handle the large volume of 
transactions. Lacking expertise in evaluating unearthed funerary objects, they requested 
help from the Provincial Bank but never received any response. Consequently, bank 
employees improvised a solution and used the gold-testing stone (shijinshi), a pure black, 
smooth stone used to test alloys of silver and gold.82
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of tomb robbery and an open invitation to even more of this activity.  Soon, peasants 
filled the small standing-room-only local bank where employees had to work overtime to 
meet the demand.83
As the schizophrenic local authorities ordered the Qufu bank to purchase the 
funerary objects, they also began to stop the massive tomb-robbery that produced these 
objects. The Liaison Station and the local government under its control worked together 
to bring this to an end.  The wired broadcast network urged people across the county to 
stop this activity. But the appeals without any effective enforcement mechanism proved 
to be futile. Not only did the peasants ignore government’s pleas, but they actually took it 
as a signal that they must hurry up before the government got serious and intervened.  
  
Wang and the Red Guards leaders in the Liaison Station were frustrated by their 
ineffective intervention. Although they needed the former officials to help them contain 
the situation, they were in charge and their inability to halt the frenzy would reveal their 
incompetence. While the party central did not issue any directives banning such activities 
until March and May of 1967, Wang and Qufu officials knew that the chaos in the 
Confucius Cemetery had nothing to do with revolution but everything to do with greed. 
The futility of their intervention was at least in part due to the fact that the people they 
were trying to stop were not capitalist roaders or the untouchables, but flag-waving 
peasant Red Guards with strong revolutionary credentials.  
Still, Wang and the Qufu government intensified their efforts to stop the ongoing 
anarchy in the Confucius Cemetery. In addition to issuing three public notices to stop the 
gravedigging, they also dispatched rural cadres and Red Guards to personally intervene. 
Deputy County Commissioner Ji Wenying required every commune to send a cadre to 
                                               




stop and bring back peasants from their own communes. The head of Chengguan 
Commune spent three days in the Confucius Cemetery trying to stop the tomb robbery, 
but no one bothered to heed the plea from a “quasi-capitalist-roader” like him.84
Even the threat of firearms was ignored. Chu Hongjiang, another cadre from 
Shuyuan Commune, was ordered to lead a team of People’s Militia to patrol the 
Confucius Cemetery and stop the tomb-robbing, but the gun-toting militia did not have 
any effect on the determined and defiant peasant fortune-seekers because it was an 
apparatus of the now discredited old Qufu government.
  The 
madness continued.  
85 Without political legitimacy, the 
People’s Militia meant little to the peasants and their loaded guns wielded no real power. 
With the collapse of the old party establishment and repeated parading of party and 
government officials, the peasants did not even fear the superiors of the People’s Militia, 
namely, the old county officials whom they used to hold in high regard, let alone the 
militia itself. Instead, they taunted and mocked party official Chu Hongjiang by asking 
him, “Hey, Old Chu, since when have you become a loyal dog of Confucius?” Chu was 
so outraged that he felt like “mowing them all down with his gun,” but he dared not.86
The peasants who mocked him actually had a point. In late November, Chu was 
put in charge of gathering 300 peasants to dig up the six most prominent tombs in the 
Confucius Cemetery and had a reputation for being a gravedigging pioneer. Now he was 
put in charge of leading the People’s Militia to stop the same type of activity that made 
him famous. Even Deputy County Commissioner Ji Wenying was repeatedly ignored by 
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the gravedigging peasants. Ji pleaded with the peasants, “Revolutionary poor and lower-
middle peasant comrades, you cannot make money out of the state property!” His pleas 
fell on deaf ears. Instead, peasant gravediggers called him and his fellow cadres 
“watchdogs of Confucius.87 Frustrating and infuriating though his encounters with the 
gravediggers were, Ji’s experience was nothing compared with how the gravedigging 
peasants handled the Red Guards from the Liaison Station. Some peasants even beat up 
the Red Guards who tried to stop them. One Liaison Station student leader recalls that 
one peasant in particular almost killed a Red Guard with his shovel.88  Eventually, even 
Wang Zhengxin, the indisputable paramount leader of Qufu, was snubbed by the peasants 
when he toured the Cemetery.89
At this point, both the new government as represented by the Liaison Station and 
old Qufu government were at their wit’s end. Having failed every attempt to rectify the 
situation, Wang tried to seek help from the central government through the CCRG. He 
sent a telegram directly to Chen Boda and Mao’s wife Jiang Qing, the head and deputy 
head of the CCRG. It read, “With the encouragement of Qufu capitalist roaders, a tomb-
robbing frenzy is unfolding in Qufu… State properties buried under the Confucius 
Cemetery are being robbed. We tried to stop it but to no avail. We ask you to please 
immediately respond with instructions on how to handle the situation.”
  His charisma failed.   
90
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Failing to get any response from the CCRG, Wang and a deputy county 
commissioner went to the provincial capital Jinan to seek help. The old rivals now joined 
hands in combating a new rival—the peasants. But the provincial authorities did not 
know how to handle it either and referred them to the central government. Wang and an 
official from the provincial Cultural Relics Commission tried to get to Beijing by train 
but couldn’t do so because of the chaos at the train station caused by traveling Red 
Guards. They then wanted to fly to Beijing but did not have enough money for both to 
go. Since the characteristically cautious Wang refused to go to Beijing by himself, they 
abandoned the idea of going to Beijing.91
Community Rivalry 
 Meanwhile, in the Confucius Cemetery, utter 
anarchism went on unchecked and the Kong lineage burial grounds continued to be 
brutalized. Law and order collapsed in the face of the defiant peasants who for the first 
time in history could say no to anyone and willfully and gleefully continued their 
plundering with complete impunity.  
Most historical events were started by people who did know or had no control of 
how they would end. This was certainly the case with both the Cultural Revolution and 
the gravedigging frenzy in the Confucius Cemetery. Peasant leader Zhang Fuhai and his 
peasant gravediggers started the event on New Year’s Eve of 1967 and the Qufu masses 
turned it into a region-wide spectacle in the following weeks. All kinds of power players 
joined hands to stop the madness but the peasants ignored both persuasion and guns. Like 
the Red Guards in late 1966 who kept coming to Qufu from all directions and refused to 
leave until they had their way, the peasants poured into the Confucius Cemetery from all 
                                               




directions and would not leave until they got what they came for. Like the Red Guards 
whom the local authorities had to handle with care, the peasant gravediggers with their 
recently elevated political status also had to be handled with extra care by anyone in 
power.  
However, all historical events come to an end, as did the gravedigging frenzy in 
Qufu—but it ended with a bizarre twist of events. Towards the Chinese New Year 
(February 9, 1967), the mother of a cadre from the Daogou Village behind the Confucius 
Cemetery passed away. Since this village was practically an “all-Kong village” where 
everyone was surnamed Kong, this woman was entitled to burial in the Confucius 
Cemetery following Qufu’s centuries-old tradition, which somehow continued unabated 
even in the middle of the gravedigging frenzy. As soon as this peasant woman was laid to 
rest in a newly dug tomb, gravediggers from the neighboring Jiuxian community mistook 
it for another age-old tomb and began to dig this new tomb. Family members of this 
deceased woman explained to the gravediggers that this was a new tomb and should be 
left alone. The gravediggers stopped. However, when the woman’s family members 
returned the following morning, they were horrified to discover that this new tomb had 
been dug open by the same gravediggers the night before.92
 All residents from the Daogou Village were outraged. What happened was totally 
unacceptable to them. The gravedigging frenzy in the Confucius Cemetery had been 
continuing, but they were supposed to be digging up the graves of the rich and famous. 
The graves of the poor and lower-middle peasants were supposed to be left alone, not to 
mention there was really no buried wealth to be had from the grave of this poor rural 
woman anyway. However, all these reasonable considerations were disregarded by the 
  
                                               




gravediggers, who at this point were digging indiscriminately. They had to get 
something. Going home empty-handed was not an option. As a result, some 200 peasants 
from the Daogou Village were immediately mobilized and marched to the Confucius 
Cemetery to settle the score with the perpetrators. A violent clash ensued in the 
Confucius Cemetery between peasants from two communities and blood began to fly.93
Deputy County Commissioner Ji and some commune cadres had been patrolling 
the Confucius Cemetery. They immediately mediated and finally managed to break up 
the fight. The county and commune leaders took advantage of this unusual opportunity to 
bring the gravedigging frenzy to a halt. They used moral persuasion, “Look, even the 
graves of poor and lower-middle peasants have been dug up. You’d better stop digging 
and go home, or else more serious consequences may follow.”
  
94
The conflict between these two rural communities was nothing less than a form of 
violent community feud (xiedou) that was entrenched in the traditional Chinese society 
for centuries.
 Between the diminished 
underground wealth and the evidence of bloodshed between two groups of peasants, the 
peasant gravediggers finally halted the madness. It was also about the time for the 
Chinese New Year and a “harvest time” to distribute the wealth from the Confucius 
Cemetery and enjoy the “fruits of their labor.”  
95 As Martin Whyte notes, Chinese peasants continued to adhere to 
traditional customs regarding mortuary ritual despite all the political campaigns and 
indoctrination programs at eradicating old ideas and practices.96
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times have to lay low and dormant, but it almost always returns, and sometimes does so 
with a vengeance. 
The Aftermath  
 The loss of buried treasures is partially reflected in the local bank’s accounting 
book. The Qufu branch of the People’s Bank alone purchased over RMB110,000’s worth 
of gold in the first twenty days of the frenzy.97 By early April 1967 when the frenzy 
dwindled to its final close, Qufu’s bank purchased over RMB290,000’s worth of 
unearthed jewelry. This was close to the RMB348,000 famine relief fund Qufu 
government released to the entire county in 1959 when over 4,000 Qufu residents left 
Qufu to flee a devastating famine.98  Besides the loss of buried treasures, several thousand 
trees were also cut down and removed from the Cemetery. Countless stone steles were 
pulled down and hauled away as well. The Liaison Station’s own investigation report 
noted that as much as eighty-five percent of the steles in the Confucius Cemetery were 
taken away by peasants and used for their own construction projects, such as warehouses, 
meeting halls, and even pigsties.99  In addition, five stretches of the cemetery wall were 
broken open and wall bricks were hauled away by peasants for their own construction 
projects as well. 100
Along with material damage was nonmaterial damage which is hard to quantify 
but equally significant. Since time immemorial, people of Qufu were exemplary in 
 The frenzy even spread to all other historical sites in Qufu, causing 
untold damage all over this historical area.  
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following such well-known Confucian values as, “Serving the dead as if they were alive” 
(shisi ru shisheng), and “Let there be a careful attention to perform the funeral rites to 
parents, and let them be followed when long gone with the ceremonies of sacrifice” 
(shenzhong zhuiyuan).101
After the tomb-robbing frenzy, communist cadre Chu Hongjiang from the 
neighboring Shuyuan Commune returned to the Confucius Cemetery with some two 
dozen people from his commune to clean up the cemetery. As a rural cadre, Chu was 
always trying to do the right thing, although the definition of the “right thing” kept 
changing during the early Cultural Revolution. First, he was put in charge of organizing 
peasants to dig up Confucius’s tomb. Then he tried to stop the peasants from digging up 
tombs for money. And now, he returned to do some clean-up work, as the Confucius 
Cemetery, littered with human remains, was a bit too “unsightly.”  Recognizing that this 
was going to be dirty work with no monetary reward, Chu and his fellow cadres brought 
with them some rural untouchables to do the dirty and unhealthy work. Those political 
untouchables and modern-day slaves were not supposed to disagree or disobey anyway. 
  But this tradition was shattered during the frenzy when a 
community with over one-fifth of its population surnamed Kong dug up the graves of 
their own forefathers, tossed out their remains, and even hung already violated corpses on 
the trees as pranks. The Cemetery was scattered with human remains, but fear, guilt, and 
shame seemed to be the last things on the minds of the descendants of Confucius. To 
them, the once sacred bodies of their ancestors and forefathers were nothing more than 
physical materials where buried treasures resided, just as sand and gravel are where gold 
is extracted. Once the gold is retrieved, sand and gravel are discarded.  
                                               




The untouchables collected over thirty scattered corpses along with many 
scattered pieces of clothes removed from the corpses. They then put some coffin board in 
a pit, laid the collected corpses and clothes on the top, and set them afire.  Those scattered 
bodies had no “homes” to return to and had to be “involuntarily cremated.”  The fire from 
the dead bodies and rotten coffin board gave off such an unbearable odor that their 
handlers huddled by this “human bonfire,” where they found the odor to be least 
powerful. It was a cold night, and Chu recalled how they were able to “stay warm” by 
this bonfire of human remains.102
As a result of the tumultuous events in late 1966 and early 1967, the pristine 
historical town of Qufu was reduced to a state of great wretchedness. Before the Cultural 
Revolution, there were 338 official cultural relic protection units in Qufu. After the 
Cultural Revolution, only eighty seven units remained.
 The descendants of Confucius desecrated their 
forefathers’ tombs, ransacked their contents, and threw out their bodies from their resting 
places, but their forefathers kept them warm with what was left of them.  
103 In just a few months, seventy-
four percent of the material representation of Qufu’s long and splendid history and 
culture permanently disappeared from its map. For over two thousand years, Qufu’s 
cultural treasures went through vicissitudes of many kinds and managed to survive 
unscathed, but they collapsed within eighteen years of state management.  The cause of 
this cultural holocaust is at least partly attributable to what James Flath describes as “the 
contradictions inherent in the nationalization and management of a body of largely elitist 
historical relics by an ideologically populist state.”104
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against the Four Olds and a manipulative power struggle in the top party echelon, the 
finest cultural institutions in Confucius’s hometown received a devastating blow from 
which they would never be able to recover.  
Conclusion 
 In the final analysis, the exceptionally violent pillaging of the Confucius 
Cemetery by Qufu mobs was the culmination of the tensions among three contesting 
authorities, namely, traditional authority, bureaucratic authority, and charismatic 
authority. For over 2,000 years, the hegemony of traditional authority in Qufu stood 
unmatched.  The entire community of Qufu practically revolved around the Three Kong 
Sites and their guardians, the Kong lineage, controlled every aspect of the Qufu society. 
To Qufu locals, the Kong lineage symbolized absolute power which they both feared and 
revered. During late Qing and early republican periods, traditional authority began to lose 
its grip as the modern state began to penetrate traditional societies. But its impact on 
Qufu was limited, as reflected in the joy residents expressed at the birth of the Yansheng 
Duke Kong Decheng as well as their genuine sorrow at the funeral for the seventy-sixth 
Yansheng Duke Kong Lingyi in 1920.105
 With the arrival of the communist state in 1949 came the reconfiguration of the 
state-society relations. As the communist state established its control at every level of the 
society, traditional authority gave way to bureaucratic authority. Despite that, the early 
PRC remained a contested field where traditional authority stayed relevant in people’s 
private life and the charismatic authority loomed large, especially after 1964 when Mao’s 
  
                                               




personality cult began to gain additional momentum.106
 The Cultural Revolution was the watershed moment when Mao’s charismatic 
authority reached its zenith. His Cultural Revolution doctrines in general and the 
campaign against the Four Olds in particular fatally undermined the traditional authority. 
His unique battle against the government he headed was not all smooth-sailing, however. 
Through a series of political maneuverings and gamesmanship in the second half of 1966, 
Mao called on the masses to overthrow the incumbent government and bureaucratic 
authority. While the bureaucrats facilitated Mao’s obliteration of the traditional authority, 
they held their ground when their own existence was at stake. This was reflected in the 
Qufu bureaucrats’ resistance to the Beijing Red Guards’ attack on the Three Kong Sites 
in late August and early November, which directly threatened their authority.  Drawing 
on the strengths of such bureaucratic characteristics as organization and efficiency that 
Max Weber describes, Qufu bureaucrats initially effectively neutralized Red Guards’ 
attacks and guarded their turf.
 In other words, the early PRC is 
when three authorities coexisted with traditional authority in the background, 
bureaucratic authority in the public running the country, and Mao’s charismatic authority 
gaining strength and gradually coming into conflict with the bureaucratic authority 
represented by the state machine of the PRC.   
107
But Mao was obsessed with toppling the bureaucrats in his own government. As 
he pressed on, the bureaucrats in their “iron cage” suffered from the inflexibility and 
rigidity of bureaucracy and began to lose their battle against the radical Maoists, who 
enjoyed the flexibility and rule-breaking power of charismatic mobilization.  As the 
 
                                               
106 Maurice Meisner, Mao’s China and after: a History of the People’s Republic (New York: The Free 
Press, 1999), 281.  




radical wing of the government competed with the conservative wing of the government, 
a distinct form of transitional governing structure emerged in Qufu where the Red Guards 
gradually came into power and the entrenched bureaucrats gradually lost theirs. Neither, 
however, was fully capable of independently keeping the government running. A strange 
partnership between two rival power groups thus took shape. The new leadership as 
represented by the Liaison Station took advantage of the “bureaucratic efficiencies of the 
formal organizations,” while the remnants of the old government clung to the new 
leadership for survival and legitimacy.108
The tension between the bureaucratic authority and the charismatic authority was 
not lost on the Qufu peasants, who not only recognized the complete abandonment of the 
traditional authority by the state and, hence, Confucianism that they had long revered, but 
also the imminent demise of the bureaucratic authority as represented by their own 
county officials, whose authority they had long respected.  This power vacuum awakened 
the innate opportunism that happened to be rooted in the Chinese peasantry.”
  The inherent conflicts within this partnership 
gave rise to frequent clashes between the two camps and created a dysfunctional 
government and a power vacuum. 
109
 
 The now 
politically empowered peasants saw and profited from an opportunity of a lifetime.  In 
the name of the Cultural Revolution and collectivity, they turned an anti-tradition, 
iconoclastic movement into a most primitive, self-serving plundering of their ancestral 
lands. 
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This study has established the basic facts surrounding the spasms of violence against 
the Three Kong Sites, offered alternative interpretations of those events, and employed 
some relevant conceptual frameworks to analyze and understand the phenomenon of 
extreme violence in the birthplace of Confucius known for his emphasis on order, 
moderation, and harmony.  
Setting the Record Straight 
This study has provided some basic but important facts relative to the violence in 
Qufu that remain invisible in the existing scholarship. The following points summarize 
my findings concerning the factual background of this study. 
First, three episodes of the campaign against the Four Olds took place in Qufu 
during the anti-Confucian movement of 1966-1967, contrary to the prevailing perception 
that only one episode took place.110
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  Each episode had its own distinct genesis, time, 
participants, target, modus operandi, and outcomes. The first episode that started about 
August 20, 1966 was initiated and spearheaded by Qufu Red Guards in response to the 
nationwide Anti-Four Olds frenzy. This episode culminated in a Qufu Red Guards attack 
on the Three Kong Sites, but ended with their defeat on August 26.   The second episode 
occurred between September 5 and September 14 in the wake of Red Guards’ August 26 
debacle. Initiated by the local government and enforced by the Qufu bureaucratic 




Sites intact. The third episode was initiated and engineered in October in Beijing by 
members of Mao’s inner circle, spearheaded by Beijing Red Guards, and carried out in 
Qufu in November 1966 by a coalition of outside and local Red Guards with the 
assistance of Qufu peasantry and local government. Other than the first episode that was 
a spontaneous local reaction to the nationwide campaign against the Four Olds, the other 
two episodes were both top-down, state-sponsored acts of violence, with one aiming to 
protect the Three Kong Sites and the other to destroy them.111
Second, the Beijing Red Guards’ Qufu mission, often characterized as a typical 
example of the campaign against the Four Olds, was, at best, a most unusual episode of 
this campaign. Evidence shows that the major campaign against the Four Olds and the 
Red Guards’ Qufu mission were different at least in terms of time (August vs. 
November), participants (teenage Red Guards vs. college Red Guards), manner (random 
and chaotic vs. methodical and orderly), and primary target (Four Olds vs. political 
rivals).  The important thing to keep in mind about the Beijing Red Guards’ Qufu mission 
is that it meant different things to different actors: to the rank-and-file Red Guards, it was 
a typical episode of the campaign against the Four Olds and the continuation of the 1919 
Chinese Enlightenment Movement; to its initiators and instigators, it was the 
politicization of the dead or, to use their own words, “to use the dead to attack the living.”   
 
Third, the Beijing Red Guards only contributed to part of the physical damage to 
the Three Kong Sites, contrary to the widely-held view that Beijing Red Guards were the 
only perpetrators.112
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violence against the Confucius Mansion and Confucius Temple was inflicted by the local 
Red Guards while the most destructive and thorough violence against the Confucius 
Cemetery was entirely initiated and committed by peasants from the greater Qufu area. 
The Beijing Red Guards were indeed instrumental in initiating the violence, hitting the 
most symbolic targets, and empowering the local rebel elements, but it was the local Red 
Guards and peasants who inflicted far greater damage to the Three Kong Sites 
independent of the Beijing Red Guards and the radical Maoists in Beijing. Ultimately, 
both the provincial and local governments were complicit in the violence against the 
Kong sites as well, for it was they who provided peasant labor, archeological experts, 
health workers, and bank employees to facilitate the excavation of graves, the processing 
of exhumed corpses, and the appraisal of the funerary objects.  Consequently, the Beijing 
Red Guards should be “vindicated” and freed from the burden of being responsible for all 
the violence against the Three Kong Sites.  
Fourth, it seems appropriate to reconsider the characterization of Qufu locals’ 
initial protection of the Three Kong Sites as deriving from their pride in their own 
cultural heritage. While there is some anecdotal evidence of a few individuals resisting 
Red Guards’ violence and questioning their motives, there is insufficient evidence to 
claim that the Qufu community as a whole resisted the violence out of their pride in their 
culture and history. In fact, the counterargument can be made that pride in local culture 
and heritage played an inconsequential role in resisting the attackers. The local officials 
made it abundantly clear that they protected the Three Kong Sites primarily to guard the 
state property under the protection of the State Council. 113
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as the CCRG gave permission for the Red Guards to dig up Confucius’s grave and burn 
his statue. Qufu peasants plundered the Confucius Cemetery without any encouragement 
from the state. 
Finally, rural Cultural Revolution started in Qufu much earlier than the rest of 
rural China as a result of the violence against the Three Kong Sites. While December 15, 
1966 is considered the official start of the Cultural Revolution in rural China and massive 
collective killings in the villages did not occur until 1967 and 1968, rural Qufu saw 
extreme violence much earlier.114
Qufu Exceptionalism  
 By December 15, Qufu had already witnessed most of 
the hallmarks of the Cultural Revolution, including mass mobilization of the rural 
population, marginalization of local officials, rise of revolutionary committees, mass 
rallies of 100,000 peasants, rise of radical peasant rebel organizations, and significant 
factional fighting among Red Guard organizations.  
The single most important yet challenging task of this study is to make sense of 
the collective violence perpetrated on the birthplace of Confucius, the Model Teacher of 
All Ages, by both future teachers from China’s very best teachers’ university and 
members of a community with twenty percent of its residents as the direct descendants of 
Confucius. Yes, China’s history is fraught with violence, but Confucius’s birthplace, long 
known as a nonviolent community and a “tender place,” had always been able to survive 
the seemingly unsurvivable.  For over 2,000 years, Qufu’s invulnerability to violence 
became so legendary that a special term “Qufu exceptionalism” is created and used in this 
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study to describe this exceptional phenomenon.115
Qufu exceptionalism, in a nutshell, refers to Qufu’s unique ability to survive 
numerous crises in China’s extraordinarily violent history. For over 2,000 years and 
across feudal, imperial, and republican China, Qufu and the prominent Confucian 
monuments there were subjected to numerous tumultuous dynastic and regime changes, 
foreign invasions, peasant revolts, iconoclastic outbursts, and revolutions. Any one of 
them could have easily erased the little town of Qufu from the map, but Qufu weathered 
them all. The Mongols devastated much of Northern China, but they spared Qufu; 
peasant leader Li Zicheng toppled the entire Ming dynasty, but he came to Qufu not to 
destroy it but to show respect; bandits robbed valuable items belonging to the Confucius 
Mansion, but they voluntarily returned them once they realized they belonged to the 
Sage’s family.
  The following segments will define 
Qufu exceptionalism, explain why it worked so well for so long, and explore the reasons 
for its demise during the Cultural Revolution.  
116
Especially noteworthy was Qufu’s ability to survive multiple political convulsions 
during the early PRC period, such as the Land Reform and agricultural collectivization 
when the state confiscated land and turned private cemeteries to agricultural use. Qufu 
exceptionalism continued even during the most chaotic and violent phase of the Cultural 
Revolution. When the campaign against the Four Olds was in full swing in late August 
1966 and Red Guards managed to destroy almost anything they wished to destroy across 
China, Qufu continued to be the exception to the rule—the Three Kong Sites remained 
completely intact despite its reputation as the “root of Four Olds.”  
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But Qufu exceptionalism did not come out of thin air. Rather, it has a plethora of 
underlying causes. The most important reason why Qufu fared so well for so long stems 
from the elevation of Confucianism to the state creed during the Han dynasty. As a result, 
Qufu gradually acquired its reputation as China’s holy land and Confucius’s lineal 
descendants in Qufu over time acquired unparalleled power, wealth, and privilege.  As 
the guardian of China’s holy land, the Kong lineage became so powerful that it was 
allowed to run its own court, control the local bureaucracy and population, and 
communicate directly with emperors. Not only did the Kong lineage have its own private 
security force, but it also forged alliances with local militia groups, such as the “Red 
Spear Society” that helped the Kong lineage to handle threatened attacks from 
Kuomintang radicals in 1929.117  The wealth of the Kong lineage in Qufu was also 
unparalleled: the Qufu Kongs owned land in five provinces and had an army of servant 
households. The Kong lineage even operated its own bank and pawn shops.118
But it was the prestige that Qufu enjoyed that offered the best “insurance policy” 
for its safety. Not only did Qufu witness a succession of pilgrimages of emperors 
throughout history, but heads of the Kong lineage were given the privilege to “walk 
beside the emperor along the Imperial Way within the Imperial Palace and ride a horse 
inside the walls of the Purple Forbidden City.”
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lineage’s privilege was the Three Kong Sites.  The Confucius Temple, for instance, 
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administration of the Confucius Mansion was also modeled after that of the imperial 
court in that the former had six departments while the latter had six ministries.  
 Although Confucianism lost its orthodox status towards the end of imperial 
China, it continued to be supported and appropriated by various cultural, social and 
political forces and its birthplace continued to be respected. The Nationalist government 
under Chiang Kai-shek initially posed a threat to the Confucian establishment in Qufu, 
but it quickly turned around to embrace it. The Japanese occupied Qufu but left the Three 
Kong Sites largely undisturbed. The communist state also found both practical and 
ideological value in keeping the Three Kong Sites intact. It even appointed a descendant 
of Confucius as its first Qufu commissioner and Mao Zedong personally toured Qufu in 
1952 in the middle of the Korean War. The communists handled both the Kong lineage 
and Confucian monuments with extra care, as shown in their classification of the Three 
Kong Sites as key cultural relic protection sites and in their efforts to reach out to the 
patriarch of the Kong lineage in Taiwan even on the eve of the Cultural Revolution. In 
short, the respect for and the cooption of Confucianism by various cultural, social and 
political forces as well as the power, wealth, and prestige of Confucius’s descendants in 
Qufu collectively accounted for the remarkable phenomenon of Qufu exceptionalism.  
 However, Qufu exceptionalism succumbed to the Cultural Revolution. The causes 
of its failure are about as varied as the reasons for its success. They range from (1) early 
PRC policies and practices and their interactions with Qufu’s historical and cultural 
conditions; (2) new policies and practices adopted during the Cultural Revolution and 




factors that contribute to human violence. The following segments will be devoted to the 
discussion of these three areas.  
The impact of early PRC policies and practices on the violence in Qufu was 
unmistakable. Top among them was the nationalization of the semi-religious Three Kong 
Sites by a secular state. Not only did the state remove their former residents and 
administrators with whom the Qufu public used to have a close relationship, but it also 
closed the Kong sites to the public, thus isolating the Three Kong Sites from the local 
population.120
Besides nationalization, the introduction of the dominant communist ideology as 
the new state orthodoxy further diminished the long-held respect for Confucian values 
and, by extension, the Kong lineage and the Three Kong Sites. Without the ideological 
and moral connections, the significance of the Three Kong Sites changed from a 
prominent symbol of Chinese culture and a source of local pride to just a cluster of 
imposing and mysterious buildings that produced more curiosity than awe.  To make 
matters worse for the Confucian establishment, the introduction of the new ideology went 
 This created an erosion of Qufu locals’ identification with the symbols of 
their own cultural heritage and made it easier for the locals to commit violence on their 
own cultural property later on. While Qufu’s older generation remembered or knew about 
how the Kong lineage provided shelter and food in the Confucius Mansion to the Qufu 
public in times of war and famine, the younger generation were uninformed about their 
own cultural heritage and history. This policy-induced knowledge and experience gap 
helps to explain why the young Red Guards were far more enthusiastic and aggressive 
than the older Qufu residents in the destruction of Qufu’s cultural properties.   
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hand in hand with the sharp expansion and penetration of the new state in rural China at 
the expense of the local sources of authority where the Kong lineage had always played a 
dominant role.121
The Land Reform also contributed to the eventual demise of Qufu exceptionalism. 
While it freed Qufu peasants from their economic ties with the Kong lineage, it also 
severed their centuries-long close social and cultural interactions with the Three Kong 
Sites, making Qufu’s Confucian monuments even more remote and foreign to the local 
population. Ironically, the new government’s gentle handling of the landowning Kong 
lineage during the Land Reform delayed the redressing of peasants’ past grievances 
against the Kong lineage and left some old scores unsettled, creating the condition for the 
Red Guards to use the grievances to mobilize the rural population against the Kong 
lineage during the siege of Qufu.  
 The breakdown of the traditional “cultural nexus of power” or “corps 
intermediaire” removed the intermediate entities standing between the state and the 
individuals and greatly facilitated the direct penetration of the state power into every 
fabric of the society. It fundamentally changed the state-society relations in Qufu and 
boded ill for the fate of the Three Kong Sites.  
Finally, the agricultural collectivization and the Great Leap Forward further 
exacerbated the already very difficult living conditions in Qufu and contributed to a 
social ecology conducive to the violence against the Three Kong Sites. The chronic 
poverty and the eventual cataclysmic famine of 1959-1961 that directly resulted from 
these two failed mass movements engendered the motivation and incentives for Qufu 
peasants to pillage the Three Kong Sites to alleviate their harsh living conditions. Indeed, 
in her study on peasant rebellions in North China, Elizabeth Perry also makes the 
                                               




connection between peasants’ living environment and their rebellions. Her ecological 
approach to violence clearly indicates the link between the two.122 Other research also 
indicates that, in times of revolution or regime change, people who have existed on a 
periphery and had been long denied an acceptable living situation tend to seize the 
opportunity to “act out their hatred of rival groups, a regime, the establishment in general, 
or civilization as a whole.”123
The Cultural Revolution and the Qufu Violence  
 
It was the Cultural Revolution, however, that ended Qufu exceptionalism. Not 
only did it turn the aforementioned preexisting conditions into active agents for radical 
changes, but the new policies and practices adopted during the Cultural Revolution also 
created new conditions that quickened the steps towards the destruction of the Three 
Kong Sites. To begin with, the almost nonstop open, explicit, and vigorous promotion of 
violence by the state made violence not only acceptable but also commendable. As 
students and peasants chanted Mao’s quotation “to rebel is justified,” restraints of 
civilization were lifted and otherwise ordinary Chinese engaged in unprecedented 
violence without much hesitation.124
The personality cult of Mao and the dominance of radical Maoism during the 
Cultural Revolution determined that all competing ideologies, active or dormant, must be 
eliminated. In this context, Confucianism, which survived the government’s 
reconfiguration of the ideological and religious fields during the early PRC years, became 
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a natural target this time. Even Mao himself, who visited Qufu twice and named his two 
daughters after Confucian sayings, proclaimed that “One of the important tasks of the 
Cultural Revolution is to eradicate the influence of Confucius in all aspects of life.”125 It 
was only natural for Mao to target Confucianism during the Cultural Revolution because 
Mao had by then accomplished what no ruler of China before him was able to do: he had 
gained complete control of political leadership, ideological legitimacy, and moral 
authority.”126
Intensified politicization of culture and history is another phenomenon during the 
Cultural Revolution that had consequential bearing on Qufu’s fate. Not only was it 
reflected in Mao’s use of the historical play Hai Rui Dismissed to create a political witch-
hunt against Beijing’s cultural circles and eventually the entire party establishment, but it 
was also used in Qufu’s case where Chen Boda and Mao’s wife Jiang Qing—the director 
and deputy director of the CCRG—used the 1962 Confucius Forum to attack the cultural 
officials. Their ultra-radical aides Qi Benyu and Lin Jie turned their verbal attacks into a 
concrete plan to assault Qufu. Then the Red Guards and Qufu peasants put the plan into 
execution. Just as the Cultural Revolution started as a mere “cultural event” but ended as 
an unprecedented catastrophe in every aspect of Chinese society, the 1962 Confucius 
Forum started as a cultural and academic event but eventually served as one of the main 
pretexts for the politically motivated violence against the Three Kong Sites.  
 Confucianism, whose tenets stood in sharp contrast with Maoism, became a 
natural target for eradication.   
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But turning a nonevent into an event and an academic forum into a political 
witch-hunt and eventually a violent political campaign required extraordinary 
mobilization capabilities on the part of the radical leaders. This is where charismatic 
mobilization came in. The rise of Mao as a charismatic leader not only contributed to 
Mao’s unprecedented power, but it also gave rise to charismatic mobilization 
characterized by Joel Andreas as an informal structure of mobilization that provides a 
“rule-breaking power that made it highly effective in undermining bureaucratic 
authority.”127
Two additional phenomena emerged during the Cultural Revolution and 
significantly contributed to the violence in Qufu, namely, “the demobilization of legal 
constraints” and “the demobilization of moral constraints.” Both are used by sociologist 
Su Yang to help account for the collective killings in rural China during the Cultural 
Revolution and both are applicable to the Qufu case as well.
 Based on Mao’s charisma and mission, this mobilization structure allowed 
radical Cultural Revolutionaries to circumvent the bureaucratic hierarchy and mobilize 
the masses directly. It made it possible for Mao and the CCRG to use the Red Guards to 
attack the party establishment. It encouraged Maoist theorist Lin to get Red Guard chief 
Tan to spearhead the Qufu mission. It further enabled Tan to recruit Beijing Red Guards 
for the Qufu mission overnight and subsequently mobilize the Qufu rural population 
unimpeded.  Indeed, the successful use of charismatic mobilization helped the arbitrary 
power, i.e., Mao and the CCRG, to gain an upper hand over the routine power, i.e., 
Beijing and Qufu bureaucrats, and contributed, in the end, to the demise of Qufu 
exceptionalism.  
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backed Beijing Red Guards in November 1966 led to the breakdown of law and order in 
Qufu, while the relentless demonization of Confucianism as an evil ideology and the 
Kong lineage as a “bloodsucking” landlord clan contributed to the loss of moral and 
cultural constraints for Qufu residents. Consequently, the opportunistic Qufu peasants 
used the breakdown of the legal system and the power vacuum in the local government as 
their license for anarchy and committed wanton violence against those which they used to 
regard with utmost awe and reverence. All the moral constraints that made the Shandong 
outlaws voluntarily return robbed items to the Kong lineage in the past had now given 
way to the feverish desire to make a fortune from the dead through tomb-robbery.  
One last, but not least, phenomenon of the Cultural Revolution that contributed to 
the Qufu violence is the paradox of state sponsorship and state failure.129 This paradox 
describes a great many instances of violence during the Cultural Revolution where the 
state created the environment for or directly encouraged violence against certain types of 
people (e.g., teachers, scholars, or former landlords), but then failed to do anything when 
things got out of hand, such as when a little girl and her grandmother were buried alive 
by Red Guards or when neighbors massacred neighbors.130
                                               
129 This concept is introduced by Su Yang to determine the cause and responsible parties in his study on 
collective killings in rural China during the Cultural Revolution Su Yang, Collective Killings in Rural 
China during the Cultural Revolution, 249. 
  This paradox is also 
applicable to the Qufu situation in that the state initiated the violence against the Three 
Kong Sites and failed to stop the peasant violence spawned from the state-initiated 
violence. However, the state failure part of the paradox in Qufu’s case was even more 
serious than most other places, for the Qufu authorities did try to stop the peasant 
violence in the Confucius Cemetery and even used firearms to threaten the peasant tomb-




robbers, only to be mocked or violently pushed back by the peasants whom they had 
empowered and emboldened.  
Thus, the state failure in Qufu’s case was not only complete and thorough, but it 
also became one of the rare instances during the Cultural Revolution when the Maoist 
regime was actually unable to hold the violence in check when it wanted to and had to 
see it die down by itself.  This is significant because much of the violence and chaos 
during the Cultural Revolution was either instigated or closely watched by the state, 
which could intervene and stop it when it wanted to, as was the case with Mao’s sudden 
termination of the Red Guard movement in late 1968 when the Red Guards had outlived 
their usefulness for him.  
In the final analysis, it was the juxtaposition of many factors, such as chronic 
poverty, a power vacuum, the empowerment of the peasants, and the demobilization of 
legal and moral constraints, that conspired to bring about the unprecedented attacks on 
the Three Kong Sites and the eventual demise of Qufu exceptionalism. 
The Campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius 
 When it comes to the anti-Confucian movements during the Cultural Revolution, 
the 1966-67 anti-Confucian movement treated in this study has received far less attention 
than the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius of 1973-1975. Consequently, a brief 
overview of the second campaign is provided here to identify the distinctions between the 
two anti-Confucian campaigns during the Cultural Revolution.  
The second campaign began in 1973 after people discovered the use of Confucian 
quotes by Marshall Lin Biao, the disgraced former heir apparent of Mao, who died in a 




Confucius got underway in earnest and some tenuous connections between Lin Biao and 
Confucius were made to discredit Lin Biao. However, by the time the campaign reached 
its peak in the first half of 1974, its main target had already switched from its nominal 
target Lin Biao to its more important target Zhou Enlai, who acquired significant power 
in 1972 and antagonized Mao and the left wing of the party. By June 1974, the focus of 
the campaign once again shifted to the struggle between Legalists and Confucians where 
the former was supposed to represent Mao’s totalitarian ideology while the latter were 
supposed to represent the opponents of the Cultural Revolution.  With a loose definition 
and shifting targets, the campaign was soon co-opted by various opportunistic political 
forces that turned their rivals into the target of the campaign. The campaign eventually 
moved so far away from its original aims that it led to armed conflicts and chaos across 
the country.131 In February 1975, it was replaced by a new campaign, but its 
reverberations continued to be felt till the end of the Cultural Revolution in late 1976.”132
 While the 1966-67 campaign and the 1973-75 campaign were both anti-Confucian 
in name, they were far more different than they were similar. To begin with, the 
objectives of the two campaigns were worlds apart. The first campaign targeted the Four 
Olds and the incumbent party establishment and bureaucracy, but the second campaign 
changed its target from Lin Biao and Zhou Enlai to defending Mao’s ideology. While Lin 
Biao was unconvincingly accused of being a “closet Confucian,” Zhou Enlai was viewed 
by Mao as the latest “Khrushchev-like figure,” a “symbol of Confucian virtue,” and a 
“present-day Confucius” who attempted to reject the Cultural Revolution.
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Besides, the scopes of the two campaigns were different too. The first campaign 
was mostly limited to the Qufu area while the second campaign was a nationwide 
campaign viewed by some as “nothing less than a second Cultural Revolution.”134 
Moreover, the organizers and participants in the two campaigns were different too. While 
the first campaign was engineered by Mao’s top lieutenants, spearheaded by college Red 
Guards, and perpetrated by Red Guards and peasants, the second campaign was directly 
orchestrated by Mao and the central authorities and implemented across the country at 
every level of the society. Furthermore, the method of each campaign differed from the 
others. The first campaign was dominated by physical violence, while the second one was 
an ideological campaign dominated by rhetorical violence and allegorical politics.”135 
Finally, the outcomes of each campaign were different. The first campaign resulted in the 
massive destruction of the Kong Sites, while the second campaign led to confusion and 
chaos across the country.136
 The two campaigns did have three things in common: both deviated from their 
original goals; both served as vehicles for the politicization of culture and history; and 
both had Zhou Enlai as the true but undeclared target. The anti-Confucian movements 
were full of ironies too. Among the top CCP leaders who never chose to set foot in Qufu 
were Marshall Lin Biao and premier Zhou Enlai, yet it was precisely these two who were 
respectively accused as being a “closet Confucian” and “present-day Confucius.” 
Additionally, by the time of the second campaign, all backstage schemers and Red 
Guards leaders of the first campaign had already been either sent to Mao’s jails or 
investigated for anti-Cultural Revolution, anti-Mao activities. Their crime, ironically, was 
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not their involvement in the destruction of the Three Kong Sites. Rather, they were 
charged with using the destruction of the Three Kong Sites to attack Zhou Enlai. 137
Ultimately, the reappearance of Confucius and Confucianism on the political 
stage of the Cultural Revolution towards the end of the Cultural Revolution spoke 
volumes about how unsuccessful the 1966-67 anti-Confucian campaign was and how 
determined Mao and members of his inner circle were to appropriate a historical figure 
and his doctrine to serve present-day politics.   
 
Qufu Violence and Its Implications  
The extreme physical violence in and against the bedrock of the Chinese culture 
naturally raises the question about why such extraordinary violence took place in a 
predominantly cultural place like Qufu. The party state blames the Qufu violence on the 
Red Guards leader Tan Houlan, the CCRG, and the “Gang of Four.”138 However, the 
underlying causes of the Qufu violence are far more complex and nuanced. One way to 
make sense of the violent events in Qufu is by understanding the relationship between 
political symbolism and nonpolitical institutions. Abner Cohen notes that “most of the 
symbols that are politically significant are overtly nonpolitical. Often, the less obviously 
political in form symbols are, the more efficacious politically they proved to be.”139
Indeed, the Three Kong Sites, ostensibly prominent symbols of the splendid 
Chinese culture, have actually been rife with political symbolism. Their symbolic 
functions were consistently recognized and frequently appropriated, overtly or covertly, 
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throughout Chinese history. The Mongol rulers during China’s Yuan dynasty put 
Confucians one step above beggars, but they subsidized the upkeep of the Three Kong 
Sites ant turned the position of the Qufu district magistrate into a hereditary one for the 
Qufu Kongs only.140
The advent of the Cultural Revolution drastically increased the symbolic 
significance and functions of the Three Kong Sites. The most popular of Mao’s 
quotations during the Cultural Revolution was almost a point-by-point contrast of the 
differences between Maoism and Confucianism: “A revolution is not a dinner party…it 
cannot be so refined, so leisurely and gentle, so temperate, kind, courteous, restrained and 
magnanimous. A revolution is…an act of violence by which one class overthrows 
another.”
  The Ming court even sponsored the relocation of the entire city of 
Qufu to protect the Confucius Temple, or their de facto “National Cathedral.” Emperor 
Qianlong of the Qing dynasty visited Qufu nine times to do more than kowtow to 
Confucius; he wanted to send a political message to his Chinese subjects about the 
Manchu ruler’s identification with the Han Chinese culture. The Japanese invaders 
committed egregious atrocities during China’s war with Japan, but they maintained a 
cordial relationship with Qufu’s Kong lineage and left the Three Kong Sites undisturbed 
to accentuate the “pan-Asian values” based on Confucian virtues. The Chinese 
communist government took meticulous care of the Three Kong Sites in the early PRC to 
send a strong message about how the new regime was a better guardian of the Chinese 
cultural heritage than its predecessors. 
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signified both the rejection of Maoism and the defiance of the targets of the Cultural 
Revolution. A successful raid on the Three Kong Sites would therefore serve as an ideal 
vehicle for sending multiple political messages and serving a number of political 
functions, including eradicating “the root of all Four Olds,” discrediting the “black gang” 
members who backed the 1962 Confucius Forum, and undermining the authority of the 
party establishment and the incumbent government at the central, provincial and local 
levels. 142
It is worth noting, however, that the methods that various political actors 
employed to realize the symbolic functions of the Three Kong Sites were drastically 
different from one another. The imperial patrons of the Three Kong Sites established their 
alliance with the state orthodoxy through their generous support for the Three Kong Sites. 
The competing dynasties of the twentieth-century China claimed their alliance with the 
Kong lineage through establishing their own Yansheng Dukes. The May Fourth 
iconoclasts viewed the Confucianism-based Chinese tradition as the source of China’s ills 
and used it to express their frustration with China’s backwardness, but they launched a 
“cultural revolution” as they distinguished Confucianism from the Three Kong Sites and 
left the material representation of Confucianism intact. However, their self-styled heirs, 
the Red Guards and the radical leaders behind them, resorted to physical violence against 
the Three Kong Sites to bring their symbolic functions into full play because of the 
unique political circumstances of the Cultural Revolution.  
 Therefore, in the eyes of the radical Maoists, the violence against the Three 
Kong Sites during the Cultural Revolution became not only operationally necessary but 
also morally justified and ideologically imperative.  
                                               




Finally, a study on such important events as the violent attacks on the Three Kong 
Sites would not be complete without an attempt to explore and identify some appropriate 
interpretative frameworks to understand the causes of radical behavior during the 
Cultural Revolution, with particular attention to the Qufu violence. Two contesting 
schools of thought are represented in the scholarly literature regarding Cultural 
Revolution participants’ source of motivation: the irrationality model and the rational 
choice model. The irrationality model argues that people committed radical behavior out 
of true belief or blind faith in Mao and his revolutionary ideology.143  On the other hand, 
the rational choice model contends that people’s behavior stemmed from preexisting 
“social conflicts” or their “personal interests.”144 Neither model can adequately explain 
the highly complex Qufu situation as the irrationality model cannot explain the rational 
choices of the tomb-robbing peasants and the fact that some BNU Red Guards joined the 
Qufu mission also to embellish their political credentials. The rational choice model, on 
the other hand, cannot fully explain the zest and zeal of those Red Guards who chose to 
go to dull rural Qufu instead of more popular routes for “red tourism.” Nor can it explain 
why quite a few Red Guards, who participated in the Qufu violence, remained 
unremorseful even many years after the Qufu violence.145
The violence in Qufu was so complex and volatile with myriad actors, constant 
shifting of alliances, and a multitude of motives that additional explanations outside of 
the Cultural Revolution discourse are necessary to comprehend many unique dimensions 
of the Qufu violence. Aside from the general Cultural Revolution theories above, there 
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are those who employ the “state-policy model” or “regime-sponsored model” to explain 
violence in human events, which puts the blame squarely on the state or the regime in 
question.146
Existing scholarship on causes of violence in general is rich but two models are 
particularly noteworthy and helpful to explain the Qufu violence. One is proposed by 
psychologist Philip Zimbardo, who underscores the role of external circumstances in 
causing good people to do bad things. Zimbardo introduces a set of contributing factors 
to violence. Each and every one of them is a good match for the Qufu situation. 
 While these models can help to explain such phenomena as the “Reign of 
Terror” during the French Revolution or the genocide under the reign of the Khmer 
Rouge, they fail to explain the fact that violence committed by the Qufu peasants was a 
bottom-up type initiated by the peasants. The state not only did not encourage the mass 
tomb-robbing frenzy, but it actually tried and failed to stop it.  
147 There 
is “indoctrination into an ideology that legitimizes violence,” which applies to both the 
Red Guards and Qufu locals who embraced violence. There is the “dehumanization of the 
enemy or the victim,” as was the case throughout the Qufu campaign. There is also 
“obedience to authority with no opportunity for dissent,” which also explained why the 
Qufu bureaucrats became the reluctant collaborators with the Red Guards and why some 
Red Guards felt they were involved with the Qufu violence because they had to go with 
the “revolutionary flow of the moment.”148
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violence” was precisely what transpired in Qufu where violence started with the 
destruction of the Four Olds, followed by the smashing of the State Council protection 
steles, the leveling of tombs outside the Confucius Cemetery, the Red Guards-led 
massive destruction against the Three Kong Sites in late November, and finally the 
peasant-initiated violence in the Confucius Cemetery. Indeed, Zimbardo has identified 
the important elements that cause regular people to commit extreme deeds and provided 
good explanations for why future teachers would dig up the grave of China’s first and 
foremost teacher and Qufu residents would protect the Three Kong Sites one day and 
participate in cultural immolation a short while later.  
Anthropologist David Eller’s theory on violence represents another helpful model 
in explaining the Qufu violence. It not only explains the building blocks of violence but 
also explores how they interact with one another. Eller notes, “Humans as individuals are 
quite violent. Humans in groups are more violent…Human groups with a group identity 
are more violent still, and human groups with ideologies and interests are the most 
violent of all.”149
                                               
149Eller, Violence and Culture, xii-xiii. 
 This model addresses the shortcomings of the aforementioned simplistic 
interest-based or ideology-based models and provides a most fitting explanation for how 
the Qufu peasants gradually changed from compliant, rule-abiding individuals who 
assisted the local authorities to repel the attackers to attackers themselves.  The peasants 
worked as members of production teams (groups); they then became peasant Red Guards 
armed with a violent ideology (groups with ideology); and finally they found fortune in 
buried caskets and pounced on them without a moment’s hesitation (groups with identity, 




The aforementioned models, though helpful in explaining many violent situations, 
still do not fully address the cultural aspect of violence in China, especially the Qufu 
violence. Two recent publications on violence in China have addressed the relationship 
between culture and violence in the Chinese context. In his Crimson Rain, social 
historian William Rowe traces the violence in one of the eight most violent communities 
in China to some elements of the community’s popular culture and social ecology, such 
as respect for martial adventures and the practice of “muscular Confucianism.”150 
Likewise, in his book addressing the collective killings in rural China during the Cultural 
Revolution, Su Yang also traces such killings to the preexisting rivalry between some 
clans in the two provinces in question and notes, “The more salient the traditional clan 
identities, the more severe the collective killings.”151
These two studies have posed more challenges to the study on Qufu violence. 
While Macheng county in Hubei Province, the violent community in Rowe’s study, is 
known as a famous “hotbed” of violence in Chinese history and the clan rivalries in Su’s 
research happened in Guangxi and Guangdong Provinces with a history of a well-
documented bloody clan rivalry behind them, Qufu presents an entirely opposite model in 
that it has long been known as a quiet and peaceful community with no history of clan 
rivalry or a reputation as an incubator of violence. The seventy-sixth Yansheng Duke 
Kong Lingyi was actually well known for the poem that he wrote in 1904, titled 
“Refraining from Litigations” which discourages lawsuits among fellow community 
members and advocates peaceful resolution of disputes.
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 Given all these factors, why 
151Su Yang, Collective Killings in Rural China during the Cultural Revolution, 250 





then didn’t the Confucian values of moderation, harmony and order prevail, or at least 
make an appreciable difference in the Qufu violence? How does the conflict-averse and 
harmony-promoting Qufu reconcile itself to violence? 
In his study on violence in China, Steven Harrell raises the question about why 
Chinese society has been so prone to violence despite the dominance of an ostensibly 
conflict-averse orthodox/Confucian culture. He has provided some insights that are well 
worth borrowing for this study. Harrell divides violence in China into vertical violence 
and horizontal violence. Vertical violence involves “dominance by one group over 
another” and “the use of violence either from above or below.”  On the other hand, 
horizontal violence involves “disputes between equals.”153 Harrell’s research indicates 
that Confucianism only frowns upon vertical violence from below, such as military 
challenges to the dynasty and rebellions, and horizontal violence, such as disputes among 
villagers. However, Confucianism does not reject vertical violence from above, such as 
suppression of rebellions or corporal punishment on children by their parents.154
Harrell’s model is very helpful for analyzing Confucianism and its relationship 
with violence, at least as it was practiced in Qufu throughout history. The Kong lineage 
had long exercised the top-down vertical violence against the servant households over 
whom it had almost unlimited judicial and penal power. The Kong lineage could try, 
punish, excommunicate, or deny fellow Kongs their burial space in the Confucius 
Cemetery. Indeed, there was no shortage of evidence of the hardships the Kong lineage 
inflicted on their tenants and servant households, which were more than adequately 
exposed and used by the Red Guards and publicly shared by the peasants during the siege 
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of Qufu. Meanwhile, the Kong lineage had never permitted bottom-up vertical violence, 
such as disrespect or insubordination from the mansion staff or servant households. The 
lineage also actively advised against horizontal violence and promoted harmony and 
peaceful coexistence among community members, as reflected in Kong Lingyi’s anti-
litigation poem.  
Not only did Confucianism reject some types of violence and sanction some other 
types, but it actually never dominated all of Chinese society either, which is another 
finding of Harrell’s research. He argues that not only has Chinese popular culture not 
been subject to the influence of Confucianism, but it happens to be violent in nature and 
often glorifies violent deeds.155 Rowe puts it even more bluntly, “Grassroots China was… 
effectively a culture of violence.”156
This approach to Confucianism is very instrumental in explaining peasant violence 
against the Confucius Cemetery. Throughout history, Qufu peasants, like peasants 
elsewhere in China, were actually capable of violence at the grassroots level, but they 
were never able to extend their violence to the Kong lineage, as the traditional society 
dominated by the orthodoxy/Confucianism would not permit it. However, once the state 
orthodoxy changed from Confucianism to radical Maoism, which actually promoted and 
encouraged violence against the former orthodoxy, Qufu peasants buried all their qualms 
and began to view the Kong lineage and the Three Kong Sites as below them. 
Consequently, they unleashed their violent attacks on the Confucian establishment and 
thoroughly plundered the Confucius Cemetery with little hesitation. In the final analysis, 
  In other words, Chinese society has been shaped by 
both a “conditionally nonviolent Confucianism” and a violence-prone popular culture.  
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Qufu violence was rooted not only in radicalism, iconoclasm, anarchism, communism 
and Maoism, but in Confucianism as well. After all, Confucianism, long known for its 
emphasis on harmony, moderation, order, and stability, contributed to the cultural origins 
of the Cultural Revolution and was not completely blameless for the violence against its 
own birthplace.  
This study has established the basic facts about Qufu violence, addressed some 
misconceptions, ascertained the reasons for the failure of Qufu exceptionalism, and 
explored some relevant theoretical frameworks. Many more avenues of research 
concerning this topic remain to be explored. First, this study has focused on Qufu’s rural 
community, but the connections and interactions between the urban and rural 
communities of Qufu during the Qufu violence are well worth exploring. Second, the 
relationship between the additional damage to the Three Kong Sites and the political 
developments, such as Red Guard factional fighting inside the Confucius Temple, is 
worth looking into.157
                                               
157 The main divisions among Red Guard organizations involved in the factional fighting actually 
originated from the 1966-67 violence in Qufu.  
 Third, the ripple effect of the Qufu violence in other regions 
remains to be determined. There have been tales of people mimicking the Qufu events 
and spreading the tomb-robbing mania across the country after BNU Red Guards had left 
Qufu. Efforts can be made to determine if these claims are true and, if so, to what extent.  
Fourth, gender issues can be incorporated into future discussions as well, as the violence 
discussed here has revealed some important roles that women played, such as Tan Houlan 
as the leader of the Red Guards and the fearless female gravedigger. This is significant 
both symbolically and substantively in that women’s status in the historically 




having a low opinion of women, as shown in his famous saying “Women and people of 
low birth are hard to deal with.”  Fifth, the highly complicated Red Guards factionalism 
and rivalries that played a significant role throughout the Qufu saga is well worth further 
investigations. The tensions among various Red Guard groups existed before the arrival 
of BNU Red Guards, intensified during their stay in Qufu, and continued long after their 
departure, all of which had considerable impact on the fate of the Three Kong Sites. 
Sixth, the legacy of the Qufu violence is well worth exploration too to both uncover how 
the former participants view their involvement in the Qufu violence and examine the 
possible connections between the 1966-67 anti-Confucian movement and today’s revival 
of Confucianism in the PRC.  Seventh, an even more comprehensive account of the Qufu 
events that integrates the perspectives of the representatives of all participants of the 
Qufu violence, be they victims, tomb-robbers, officials, and the political untouchables, 
would help provide a full description of the calamity in Qufu.  This study has started this 
process, but much more remains to be done. 
Finally, the role of Zhou Enlai in the Qufu saga deserves some attention. Zhou has 
often been described as the patron saint of cultural relics and was said to have ordered 
Tan Houlan back to Beijing from Qufu.158
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she, 2004), 82-87.  
 However, under close scrutiny, none of the 
claims could be verified. Yet, Zhou was apparently a target of both anti-Confucian 
campaigns during the Cultural Revolution. During the campaign against the May 16 
Counterrevolutionary Conspiratorial Clique in the early 1970s, which was widely 
believed to have Zhou’s involvement, many Red Guards involved in the Qufu violence 




attacks on Zhou Enlai.159
It has been forty-five years since calamities befell Qufu. While the scars of the 
violence against the Three Kong Sites are still visible everywhere in today’s Qufu, 
Confucius and Confucianism have once again been brought back to the mainstream life 
in China by the very same state that once sanctioned extreme violence against them.
 This raises the question about what roles Zhou actually played 
in the Qufu events and to what extent, if any, he was involved with the investigations and 




To understand why the pendulum has swung back in favor of Confucius and 
Confucianism again, it would be helpful to trace and study the trajectory of Confucianism 
in Chinese history in general and in modern and contemporary Chinese history in 
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